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demonstrate that advanced knowledge does not significantly reduce this productivity loss.
Chapter 2 examines how risk preferences differ over goods and in-kind monetary rewards. I study an
incentivized experiment in which subjects allocate bundles of either Amazon.com goods or Amazon.com gift
credit (which must be spent immediately) across uncertain states. Under a standard model of perfect
information of prices and goods available, I demonstrate risk preferences across these treatments would be
identical. In practice, I uncover substantial differences in risk preferences across goods and in-kind monetary
rewards. With additional treatments, I find no evidence that these differences are driven by price or product
uncertainty.
Chapter 3 is joint work with David Dillenberger, Daniel Gottlieb, and Pietro Ortoleva. We study preferences
over lotteries that pay a specific prize at uncertain dates. Expected Utility with convex discounting implies that
individuals prefer receiving x in a random date with mean t over receiving x in t days for sure. Our experiment
rejects this prediction. It suggests a link between preferences for payments at certain dates and standard risk
aversion. Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences accommodate such behavior, and fit the data better than a model
with probability weighting.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON LABOR AND RISK
Patrick E. DeJarnette
Jeremy Tobacman
This dissertation presents three essays in labor economics and risk. Chapter 1 examines how
past e↵ort can impact current e↵ort, such as when e↵ort is reduced following an interruption.
I present a series of real-e↵ort incentivized experiments in which both piece rates and
leisure options were manipulated and find e↵ort displays significant stickiness, even in the
absence of switching costs. I demonstrate that this intertemporal evidence is indicative of
e↵ort momentum, rather than on-the-job learning, reciprocity, or income targeting. When
employing an instrumental variables (IV) approach, approximately 50% of the e↵ort increase
persists for 5 minutes after incentives return to baseline. Thus if a worker su↵ers a complete
interruption in productivity, it would take an average of 15 minutes to return to 90% of
prior work e↵ort. I further demonstrate that advanced knowledge does not significantly
reduce this productivity loss.
Chapter 2 examines how risk preferences di↵er over goods and in-kind monetary rewards. I
study an incentivized experiment in which subjects allocate bundles of either Amazon.com
goods or Amazon.com gift credit (which must be spent immediately) across uncertain states.
Under a standard model of perfect information of prices and goods available, I demonstrate
risk preferences across these treatments would be identical. In practice, I uncover sub-
stantial di↵erences in risk preferences across goods and in-kind monetary rewards. With
additional treatments, I find no evidence that these di↵erences are driven by price or product
uncertainty.
Chapter 3 is joint work with David Dillenberger, Daniel Gottlieb, and Pietro Ortoleva.
v
We study preferences over lotteries that pay a specific prize at uncertain dates. Expected
Utility with convex discounting implies that individuals prefer receiving x in a random date
with mean t over receiving x in t days for sure. Our experiment rejects this prediction. It
suggests a link between preferences for payments at certain dates and standard risk aversion.
Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences accommodate such behavior, and fit the data better than a
model with probability weighting.
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CHAPTER 1 : E↵ort Momentum
1.1. Introduction
By some estimates, interruptions disrupt 1.5 to 2.1 hours per work day for over 56 million
US “knowledge workers” (Gonzalez and Mark (2004); Spira and Feintuch (2005)). Obser-
vational studies show that hospital workers are interrupted 5 times per hour (Weigl et al.
(2014); Berg et al. (2013)) while software developers and managers are interrupted 25 times
per day (Gonzalez and Mark (2004)).1 In similar studies, 15-23% of interrupted work is
not resumed on the same day, a particular concern within the health services literature
(Westbrook et al. (2010); Mark et al. (2005)). However, this evidence is di cult to inter-
pret when the interruptions themselves may be necessary, as within a hospital’s emergency
department. In other contexts, interruptions from a manager may reduce principal-agent
concerns through increased monitoring or communication as formulated by Coviello et al.
(2014). Interruptions from a co-worker could increase a firm’s total output, even at the
expense of the interrupted worker. As a result, it might be presumptuous to target inter-
ruptions themselves as a source of productivity waste.
At the heart of the question of how interruptions a↵ect behavior is whether there is stickiness
in e↵ort allocation. If so, interruptions could undermine productivity due to unplanned
e↵ort reduction following an interruption. This paper answers this more general question
of whether productivity loss persists over time, and if so, what might be done to recover it.
This “loss of momentum” is often posited by the psychology literature,2 media,3 and con-
sulting reports,4 but has not been thoroughly examined within the economics literature.
1While half of these are considered “internal” interruptions, which may be more indicative of task jug-
gling (Coviello et al. (2014)), the remaining half of “external” interruptions are arguably the most time
intensive. For example, the data in Gonzalez and Mark (2004) also shows that 1.5 hours per day are spent
on unscheduled meetings such as workers stopping by or talking through cubicle walls.
2See an extensive psychology literature on “flow”, cf. Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2002); Scha↵er
(2013), in which clear tasks with adequate challenge and objective goals enables a continuous work state.
3E.g. “First, there is the diversion itself, taking your employees o↵ task after they have assembled the
resources and thinking necessary for that particular task. Then there is the restart—reassembling the re-
sources, thoughts, and readiness. There is the loss of momentum caused by the initial distraction from the
original purpose.” (Brown (2015))
4Such as “ .. even a one-minute interruption can easily cost a knowledge worker 10 to 15 minutes of
1
The closest literature on intertemporal labor supply tends to focus on longer time scales
and hours worked rather than output (Camerer et al. (1997); Oettinger (1999); Farber (2005,
2008); Crawford and Meng (2011); Chetty et al. (2011)). Within this literature, Fehr and
Goette (2007) employ a field experiment on bicycle riders and finds evidence consistent with
a model in which past e↵ort exhausts riders, making additional e↵ort more costly. Under
this model, an exogenous interruption in e↵ort could actually boost future productivity as
the worker has had a chance to “catch their breath”.5 However, the longer time scale and
the physical nature of the task make these findings di cult to apply to interruptions among
a broader class of knowledge workers.6
In this paper, I hypothesize and test a theory in which past e↵ort has a direct e↵ect on
disutility from present e↵ort. This model has theoretical similarities to a model of habit
preferences, but over e↵ort rather than consumption. I refer to this theory as e↵ort mo-
mentum.
To test for the presence of e↵ort momentum, I conduct a series of real-e↵ort laboratory
experiments with 577 University of Pennsylvania students at the Wharton Behavioral Lab.
This controlled setting allows me to observe workers’ responses to both piece rates and
leisure opportunities over multiple periods. The workers complete counting or slider tasks
on a computer screen but have the option to engage in leisure by viewing YouTube videos
at any time.7 I manipulate (i) the piece rate for completed problems and (ii) the leisure
opportunities available (by varying subjects’ access to their cell phones). Subjects are
quizzed prior to every period to ensure incentives and leisure options are understood.
lost productivity due to the time needed to reestablish mental context and reenter the flow state.” (Nielsen
(2003))
5While consistent with an e↵ort exhaustion model, the authors find that individual measures of loss
aversion are predictive of the e↵ort decrease, suggesting a model of loss-aversion may be more appropriate
for that setting.
6There is a noted lack of consensus regarding what constitutes a “knowledge worker”, but in line with
the literature, I characterize knowledge work “as less tangible than manual work and using the worker’s
brain as the means of production” (Ramı´rez and Nembhard (2004)). This would roughly coincide with the
56 million “management, professional, and related occupations” from the 2014 Current Population Survey.
7This is in line with recent work demonstrating the importance of outside leisure options for external
validity of laboratory experiments. (Corgnet et al. (2014); Charness et al. (2010); Eriksson et al. (2009);
Kessler and Norton (2015))
2
The laboratory setting for the experiment enabled me to accurately measure productivity.
This accuracy allows me to induce variation in e↵ort over short time scales by changing
incentives quickly. In addition, while the tasks involved are somewhat artificial, exerting
e↵ort on a computer located in a cubicle closely resembles a relevant work environment
for many knowledge workers (Gonzalez and Mark (2004)).8 The laboratory also eliminates
peer e↵ect confounds that might be present in a field setting, such as fairness concerns over
some workers being paid more. Moreover, the setting allowed me to replicate across mul-
tiple designs and tasks to ensure e↵ort momentum is not limited to a single context. The
laboratory environment also made it possible to accurately enforce available leisure oppor-
tunities, particularly cell phone access. This leisure variation is important for di↵erentiating
momentum from alternate theories such as reciprocity.
My results show significant evidence of e↵ort stickiness. Workers treated with a higher
(lower) piece rate exert more (less) e↵ort in the treated period relative to control.9 Even
after financial incentives return to baseline, workers who received a higher piece rate continue
to work harder than those who only received a baseline piece rate. This lingering e↵ort
di↵erential is approximately half of the original e↵ort increase induced by the heightened
piece rate. By the same token, workers who receive a lower piece rate in one period continue
to exert less e↵ort in following periods relative to the control group. These findings indicate
that e↵ort allocation in one period may depend positively on recent work e↵ort.
This evidence of e↵ort stickiness could be a result of momentum, reciprocity, on-the-job
learning, or potentially other interpretations. To identify the source of this e↵ort stickiness,
I structured the experimental design to provide additional comparisons informed by theoret-
ical predictions. One key feature of this design is that some workers are randomly informed
of future piece rate and leisure opportunities a full period in advance. Previous studies on
intertemporal e↵ort allocation feature either imperfectly anticipated shocks (Camerer et al.
8This statement is not meant to downplay the notable concerns over external validity of laboratory
experiments. For a detailed discussion, please see Charness and Kuhn (2011); Falk and Heckman (2009);
Levitt and List (2007).
9I find a positive elasticity of e↵ort with respect to that period’s piece rate of approximately 5% to 10%.
In comparison to previous papers, this is a small but significant elasticity (Chetty et al. (2011)). I also find
a significant negative e↵ect on e↵ort when given access to cell phones in some specifications.
3
(1997); Oettinger (1999); Pistaferri (2003)) or fully anticipated shocks (Lozano (2011); Fehr
and Goette (2007)); none (to my knowledge) intentionally manipulate the degree of antici-
pation of piece rate or leisure shocks.
I am able to di↵erentiate between reciprocity and e↵ort momentum using this variation
in anticipation. First, one would expect a reciprocating worker to work harder at the
time of receiving the news of an increased piece rate, not just the period in which the
higher piece rate is in e↵ect.10 I find no such evidence. Second, for those who enjoy the
additional leisure opportunity (cellphone), one would expect them to reciprocate with higher
e↵ort in surrounding periods.11 I also uncover no evidence of this, but rather find e↵ort
is significantly reduced following phone access for those a↵ected, as consistent with e↵ort
momentum. Thus, e↵ort stickiness seems unlikely to be driven by reciprocity in this setting.
To address concerns about on-the-job learning, the experiments feature extensive “training”
periods. Analyzing the training period data suggests that subjects reach full competency
with the tasks within the first 3 minutes (see Figures 3 and 4). After this time average output
is remarkably flat, as opposed to increasing output predicted by an on-the-job learning
model.12 This may not be surprising given the extreme simplicity of the tasks and is
further confirmed by post-experimental surveys (see Section 3). In an experiment with
multiple post-treatment periods, post-treatment e↵ort continues to converge to baseline as
predicted by momentum, rather than stay elevated as predicted by on-the-job training.
Lastly, the e↵ort stickiness implies implausibly large e↵ects under a model of on-the-job
learning, addressed in more detail in Section 6.
One might think that “switching costs” could drive this e↵ort stickiness, but the experi-
mental design allows me to investigate e↵ort momentum in the absence of such switching
10Indeed, if one expects to find evidence of reciprocity either pre- or post-treatment, Gneezy and List
(2006) suggests that the pre-treatment e↵ects should be larger than post-treatment due to the declining
e↵ects of reciprocity over time.
11Some recent evidence regarding the importance of non-monetary gifts suggests this might even trigger
greater reciprocation than the financial rewards (Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011); Bradler et al. (2013);
Kube et al. (2012)).
12Even if one allows for on-the-job learning to be combined with income e↵ects in such a way to produce
flat output, one would expect to see the e ciency increases result in increased leisure time. The evidence
instead suggests that leisure time is also flat or even declining for the control group.
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costs. In particular, increasing the piece rate to induce greater e↵ort would not result in
switching costs as the subject would remain engaged in the task, yet there is still evidence
of e↵ort stickiness in the following period. In addition, the experimental tasks employed are
able to be stopped and resumed easily as the time investment is small. Thus, to the extent
that interruptions incur additional switching costs, my estimates of e↵ort momentum could
represent a lower bound of the total e↵ort loss.13
Other potential explanations for e↵ort stickiness, such as neoclassical income e↵ects or
income reference dependence, are outlined in the section on theoretical predictions and
following the experimental results. In addition to not accurately matching the comparative
statics found, these theories were also tested with one additional treatment involving the
salience of income. I find this information salience had no e↵ect on piece rate e↵ects, further
suggesting that e↵ort momentum is the most parsimonious theory to explain the evidence
at hand.
After addressing alternate theories, I employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach in
which the previous period’s piece rate and leisure options influence the previous period’s
e↵ort.14 The primary concern with this approach would be if a past period’s piece rate
could directly influence future e↵ort (e.g. via a model of reciprocity). This is distinct from
a model of e↵ort momentum, where the previous period’s piece rate influences this period’s
optimal e↵ort only through previous period’s e↵ort.
To summarize the main findings, I find that approximately 40-50% of e↵ort changes persist
for 5 minutes even after the incentives return to baseline levels. This increase continues to
decline exponentially over multiple periods. Framed another way, after an interruption of
e↵ort, it takes about 15 minutes to return to 90% of pre-interruption e↵ort levels. Structur-
ing the findings using this momentum parameter also provides a way to transport findings
to new populations or environments (Levitt and List (2007); Falk and Heckman (2009)). For
example, this estimate of 40-50% was replicated using a di↵erent “slider” task as discussed
13One might expect cell phones to incur greater switching costs as there is a change in user focus. This
might explain why I find larger estimates of e↵ort stickiness for cell phones in some specifications.
14Using asymptotics to remove the known bias, I also employ a Panel Median Unbiased Estimator as an
alternate specification and find very consistent results. See Appendix Section 10.6.
5
in Appendix 9.3.
To address whether this productivity loss can be prevented with knowledge, I treat some
subjects with information about future piece rates and leisure opportunities. Analysis shows
this advance information does not impact productivity. This suggests the average subject
follows a “naive” model of momentum as opposed to a more “sophisticated” model. These
models are discussed in more detail in Section 2.
To put these findings in context, research suggest US knowledge workers are interrupted
somewhere between 12 and 40 times a day depending on work environment. Given the
ubiquity of interruptions and the large number of US knowledge workers, it is perhaps not
surprising that the resulting momentum loss is quite high. If the average knowledge worker
su↵ers 15 interruptions per work day, this will result in about 1 hour of productivity loss
due to momentum alone.15 This works out to 200 hours per year per full-time worker. If
each knowledge worker earns an average of $21 per hour, then 56 million workers16 would
lose $235 billion per year from momentum loss alone.17 One important caveat is that if the
reduced productivity results in greater leisure, this figure would also not account for any
welfare gains from this leisure – however, workers tend to report interruptions as a major
source of stress in the workplace, making welfare gains unlikely (Mark et al. (2008)).18
While there are serious concerns about generalizing evidence from students,19 this back of
15Momentum loss might also explain why subjective reports of time wasted due to interruptions (often as
high as 40% of total work time) tend to be higher than the observed time loss (roughly 20% of total work
time).
16From 2014 Current Population Survey, number of management, professional, and related workers. Most
common examples include software developers, financial managers, accountants, lawyers, school teachers,
registered nurses, and chief executives. This number also corresponds with the 77 million workers that
reported using a computer at work in 2003 by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
17Though this is just a rough estimate for a number of reasons. One might expect that the individuals
who earn higher than average wages are less prone to interruptions or momentum loss. Alternatively,
perhaps wages have already been lowered to account for interruption loss, underestimating the true value of
productivity loss.
18This may not be surprising given that interruptions are unplanned, making such ’breaks’ in e↵ort unlikely
to be ex ante optimal from the interrupted worker’s perspective. Thus, even if the productivity loss following
interruption increases utility through leisure, it may be used as a substitute for a more relaxing (planned)
break. Thus, the utility from such leisure could be a net welfare loss as it disrupts the optimal on-the-job
leisure schedule.
19For example, students may lack the workplace experience that could help reduce momentum loss. On
the other hand, one might also expect college students to be better than average at avoiding momentum loss
as they have passed college admissions. In addition, while the environment studied is similar to what many
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the envelope calculation demonstrates the potential value of further research.
Additional Contributions to Literature
In addition to the broader intertemporal labor supply literature, this paper builds on an
extensive literature that uses laboratory experiments to investigate labor economic theories
(for a review see Charness and Kuhn (2011)). While many papers in this literature have
intertemporal implications (e.g. Rabin (1993); Dickinson (1999); Gneezy and List (2006);
Levitt and List (2007); Buser and Peter (2012); Kube et al. (2012); Milkman et al. (2013);
Kessler and Norton (2015)), I believe this is the first laboratory study to vary incentives
over short time periods specifically to investigate intertemporal spillovers.20
As I find evidence of e↵ort momentum over short time periods, this paper also suggests not
to estimate individual fixed e↵ects with short time panels. This is discussed in more depth
within Section 4, but follows from earlier work on the asymptotic bias from fixed e↵ects
in time recursive models, proven in Nickell (1981). Although this has been noted when
estimating e↵ects of training programs (Card and Sullivan (1988)), this study presents new
evidence that the bias may be present in more general labor settings.
This new evidence of e↵ort momentum may also provide new interpretations of existing
labor studies. While pursuing other research topics, a few21 recent studies have uncovered
intertemporal evidence consistent with momentum. In Cardella and Depew (2015), exper-
imental subjects stu↵ fewer envelopes after being quantity constrained in the first period
(compared to control). By itself, however, this could be evidence of on-the-job learning or
reduced reciprocity due to constrained output. Bradler et al. (2015) experimentally varies
payment structures in one period and also finds some persistence in e↵ort after those incen-
tives have been removed. For example, those who face a tournament structure exert greater
e↵ort for both creative and uncreative tasks, which significantly persists in the following
knowledge workers face, the tasks employed di↵er, raising additional concerns about external validity.
20Following Corgnet et al. (2014), it is also among the first to experimentally vary leisure opportunities
within the laboratory, providing additional evidence on the e↵ect of leisure on e↵ort (Chapela (2007);
Connolly (2008); Lozano (2011); Ward (2012)).
21This literature review is unlikely to be comprehensive as previous studies may have su↵ered from bias
driven by individual fixed e↵ects or may have simply omitted reporting intertemporal spillovers.
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period. Yet this e↵ect was strongest among tournament winners, making it theoretically
unclear whether there was a “joy of winning” e↵ect as in Kra¨kel (2008) or whether tourna-
ment winners, who worked hardest, simply had the largest spillover e↵ects. Despite these
confounds, this suggests that e↵ort momentum might fill a gap between theory and empirics
that has previously gone unreported.
The burgeoning literature on multitasking within economics may also benefit from study
of e↵ort momentum. Buser and Peter (2012) employ a real-e↵ort experiment and find that
subjects forced to work sequentially were more productive than subjects forced to work on
tasks simultaneously. Additionally, workers allowed to work sequentially or simultaneously
were also less productive than workers forced to work sequentially – mirroring the “naive”
theory of e↵ort momentum. However as Coviello et al. (2014) outlines theoretically, this
sort of task-juggling may provide incentives to work harder when e↵ort cannot be observed
(as others compete for the worker’s attention).
Even though my time scale is short, understanding intertemporal labor supply has impor-
tant implications for labor markets and public policy. For example, if the intertemporal
substitution elasticity is large and positive, one might interpret the lower pay of “flexi-
ble” positions as resulting from compensating di↵erentials (Goldin (2014)) or a “Rat Race”
equilibrium22 (Akerlof (1976); Landers et al. (1996)). These outcomes might invite labor
market policies to increase total surplus.23 On the other hand, if this elasticity is small or
negative, then the documented wage-flexibility tradeo↵ may be driven by firms’ production
and cost functions.24 In this case, labor restrictions on hours could reduce firm e ciency.
22By a rat race equilibrium, I mean one in which workers work ine cient hours or e↵ort to signal hard
to observe qualities (such as ability) to employers. This was first proposed in a theoretical framework by
Akerlof (1976), and there has been evidence to suggest this occurs in at least law firms (Landers et al.
(1996)). As Arulampalam et al. (2007) point out, this rat race equilibrium could contribute to gender pay
gaps, especially toward the top.
23For example, Goldin (2014) calls for “alterations in the labor market, in particular changing how jobs are
structured and remunerated to enhance temporal flexibility” to reduce gender inequality in labor markets.
Generally, if firms have imperfect information about worker productivity, workers may be afraid to express
a desire for flexibility even though such a change would increase total surplus for the worker and firm. For
example, if an hour’s potential productivity is correlated with leisure opportunities, a worker’s desire for
flexibility could signal a desire to only work low productivity hours.
24For example, this could result either from per employee fixed costs (requisite search and training, benefits,
or capital) or from increasing returns to hours worked (increasing worker knowledge flows, being available
for clients).
8
The experimental design I constructed provides additional evidence on this intertemporal
elasticity and is the first within this literature to vary anticipation of piece rates. As Fehr
and Goette (2007) stress, the anticipation of wage changes is critical to interpretation of
these elasticities.25 Yet, informing workers about wage changes has the potential to trigger
reciprocity toward the employer (Rabin (1993); Fehr and Schmidt (2006)). This complicates
the interpretation of previously measured intertemporal elasticities, as anticipation and
reciprocation are linked in studies with anticipated wage changes.26 Furthermore, Gneezy
and List (2006) suggest reciprocity may decline over time, potentially introducing an upward
bias to wage elasticities measured over a short time period (if reciprocity is a large factor).27
The experimental design also allows me to address whether higher piece rates induce reci-
procity. While the role of reciprocity in labor markets is an area of active research (for
review see Kessler (2013); Levitt and Neckermann (2014)), I believe this is the first paper
to tackle this particular question. The answer is ex ante unclear because while a higher piece
rate expands the budget set, the worker must still exert e↵ort to receive the benefits. Most
previous studies testing for reciprocity in labor markets employ flat hourly wage variation
in a reputation free environment (Kube et al. (2012); Fehr et al. (2008); Englmaier and
Leider (2010, 2012); Kessler (2013); Gneezy and List (2006); Charness (2004)). As workers
have arguably no financial incentive to work harder, evidence of greater e↵ort is taken as
evidence of reciprocity. Recent work such as Kube et al. (2012); Bradler and Neckermann
(2015) suggests workers may reciprocate based on their impressions of employer intentions,
rather than the actual “gift”.28 While my study is more suggestive on this point, I find no
evidence that additional leisure opportunities induce reciprocity.
25In studies with imperfect knowledge of future wage variation, workers with better predictions may
react di↵erently to wage changes and this could also be correlated with ability. Pistaferri (2003) attempts
to overcome this issue by incorporating elicited worker expectations into estimates and finds a larger EIS
estimate. Unfortunately, output or e↵ort levels are not directly observable in their dataset.
26This “total e↵ect” may be the most policy relevant measurement, but as Kube et al. (2012) have found,
the framing of the wage increase can contribute greatly to the degree of reciprocation. Thus, there may be
no unified policy relevant reciprocation measurement if it varies greatly based on implementation.
27Though, as authors admit, whether the reciprocity e↵ects would return on the second day of work is an
important open question for interpretation.
28However earlier work from Charness (2004) suggests that exogenously determined wages elicit almost
as much reciprocation as employer designated wages.
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I also address whether salience of information induces workers to engage in income targeting.
In a real-e↵ort laboratory experiment, Abeler et al. (2011) find workers exert more e↵ort
when facing a chance of a higher fixed payment. Pope and Schweitzer (2011) finds evidence
of loss aversion in a high stakes labor market (professional sports). In these settings, the
reference point is at least partially induced by the environment (i.e. the magnitude of the
outside option in Abeler et al. (2011) and golf par score in Pope and Schweitzer (2011)),
but there remains some uncertainty whether information about own performance can alter
endogenously chosen reference points. To investigate this possibility, I vary whether the
worker sees her total earnings or her past period earnings and find it does not alter e↵ort
allocation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives straightforward com-
parative statics to distinguish the theories suggested above. Section 3 outlines the experi-
ment designs. Section 4 discusses the specifics of the estimation strategy. Section 5 presents
the results. Section 6 addresses additional concerns of alternate theories and Section 7 con-
cludes.
1.2. Predictions
In this section, I derive predicted changes in labor supply to inform the experimental de-
signs. I discuss three model classes below: (i) (neoclassical) time separable utility, (ii) e↵ort
momentum, and (iii) reciprocity. Additional model discussion may be found in Section 6
and the Appendix. I find straightforward comparative statics that can then be tested by
the experimental design presented in Section 3.
1.2.1. Time Separable Utility
To serve as a starting point for predictions, I present a time separable model in which an
agent maximizes lifetime utility
U0 =
TX
t=0
 tu(ct, et,  t)
10
where   < 1 represents the discount factor, u(·) represents the one-period utility function,
ct represents consumption, et is e↵ort, and  t is a taste shifter that alters preferences for
working in particular time periods. In my setting,  t can incorporate the varying leisure
opportunities available, such as cell phone access. I further assume that the utility function
is di↵erentiable and uc > 0, ue < 0 and strictly concave in ct and et. The lifetime budget
constraint is given by
TX
t=0
ptct(1 + r)
 t 
TX
t=0
(wtet + yt)(1 + r)
 t
where pt represents prices at time t, wt the piece rate at time t for each unit of e↵ort et,
and yt represents non-labor income. Also the interest rate r is assumed to be constant, but
this does not impact the sign of the comparative statics.
As shown in Fehr and Goette (2007), along the optimal path, this model can be equivalently
represented as an individual optimizing a static one period utility function that is linear in
income. This can be written as:29
v(et,  t) =  wtet   g(et,  t)
where g(et,  t) is strictly convex in et and captures the discounted disutility of e↵ort.  
captures the marginal utility of life-time wealth. In this formulation,  wtet represents the
discounted utility from total income earned in period t.
Thus, as wt increases, the optimal e⇤t will also increase. The e↵ort exerted today is only
influenced by past piece rates through the marginal utility of life-time wealth  . In the
literature on measuring temporary wage or piece rate shocks, this   is assumed constant
as the total impact on lifetime wealth is very small, implying small changes in   (Fehr and
Goette (2007)). Therefore, with no income e↵ects, a single period’s piece rate would have
no impact on e↵ort in surrounding periods.
29Note that this formulation omits the price path {pt} and   as these are not the objects of study. If these
elements change, the corresponding g function would also change, but it could still be written in a similar
format.
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If one allows for income e↵ects, additional income would increase the attractiveness of leisure
given the concavity of consumption. As a result, allowing for income e↵ects would reduce
e↵ort in periods surrounding a piece rate increase.30
Lastly, if one allows for leisure technology  t to increase the disutility of e↵ort (e.g. harder to
work when the World Cup is on), then increasing leisure technology would decrease optimal
e↵ort e⇤t in that period. As with piece rates, in the absence of income e↵ects there are no
predicted spillovers on the surrounding periods. If one allows for income e↵ects, then an
agent would work harder in surrounding periods (say before or after the World Cup game).
This follows as the reduced lifetime income (from the high leisure time) would increase the
marginal utility of lifetime income,  .
1.2.2. E↵ort Momentum
E↵ort momentum is a model in which past period’s e↵ort directly influences the disutility
of future periods. For example, working hard may engage a flow-like state in which future
e↵ort is less costly.31 Alternatively, if e↵ort is interrupted for a period (et = 0), the worker
may face greater disutility to start working again.32
To capture these ideas, I present a model in which an agent encounters lifetime utility:
UM =
TX
t=1
 t 1u(ct, et, et 1,  t)
where   < 1 represents the discount factor, u(·) represents the one-period utility function,
ct represents consumption, et is contemporaneous e↵ort, and  t is a taste shifter that alters
preferences for e↵ort in particular time periods. In my setting,  t can incorporate varying
leisure opportunities available and will be referred to as leisure technology.
30Under the current experimental design, this would have very similar predictions to a model in which the
agent has a daily income target.
31This is consistent with an extensive psychology literature on “flow”, cf. Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi
(2002); Scha↵er (2013), in which workers enter a state where the disutility of work is reduced as subjects
report losing a sense of self.
32It is worth noting that these intertemporal e↵ects do not necessarily have to be positive – a conceptually
similar model proposed by Fehr and Goette (2007) includes a cost function in which greater e↵ort today
increases the marginal disutility of e↵ort in the next period, perhaps due to stress or physical exertion.
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I further assume that the utility function is twice-di↵erentiable in its arguments with u1  
0, u2  0, has a positive cross partial u23   0. With these assumptions, consumption is
enjoyable, e↵ort is unenjoyable, and past e↵ort decreases the marginal disutility of e↵ort. I
also assume that leisure technology makes e↵ort more costly in utility terms (u24  0), but
also has no positive e↵ect on consumption (u14  0).33 Lastly, that e↵ort does not make
consumption more enjoyable (u12  0, u13  0). The lifetime budget constraint is given by
TX
t=1
ptct(1 + r)
 t 
TX
t=1
(wtet + yt)(1 + r)
 t
where pt represents prices at time t, wt the piece rate at time t for each unit of e↵ort et,
yt represents non-labor income, and r is the interest rate from one period to the next.34 I
also assume there is no change in lifetime marginal utility of wealth   is constant, as the
total impact on lifetime wealth is very small. This is in line with other field and laboratory
experiments in the labor economics literature (Fehr and Goette (2007); Camerer et al.
(1997)).
Sophisticated Momentum
Sophisticated Momentum is the model as described above, in which the agent correctly
realizes that today’s e↵ort will influence tomorrow’s marginal disutility of e↵ort.
Proposition 1.2.1 Under the above assumptions, e↵ort is monotonic non-decreasing in
past, present, and future piece rates. Alternatively, e↵ort is monotonic non-increasing in
past, present, and future leisure technology expansions.
Proof Application of supermodularity theorems. See Appendix Section 10.4.
The intuition for these comparative statics is straightforward. If a worker is aware that e↵ort
now will decrease the cost of e↵ort in the next period, then the periods’ optimal e↵orts will
33Otherwise, increased leisure technology could boost desire for consumption to the extent that the agent
works more to increase lifetime wealth.
34While the interest rate r is assumed to be constant for notation simplicity, this assumption does not
impact the sign of the comparative statics.
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move together due to the spillover. For example, if the worker faces a higher piece rate
next period, then next period’s e↵ort will become marginally more valuable. As work in
the present reduces the costs of working next period, the marginal benefit of working in
the present has also increased. By a similar argument, if the worker faces greater leisure
opportunities next period, the benefits (due to e↵ort momentum) of working today has also
decreased.
Naive Momentum
Although the agent experiences the e↵ects of momentum, it may be possible that either
the agent does not realize this momentum will occur in the future, or otherwise uses an
exogenous reference for future e↵ort.35 I call this model Naive Momentum. In this model,
at period t, the agent maximizes a discounted stream of future utility:
Ut = u(ct, et, et 1,  t) +
TX
j=t+1
 jv(cj , ej ,  j)
and will formulate plans of this period and future period’s e↵ort. Note that the v(·) function
above does not have et 1 in its arguments. However, once the agent actually arrives at time
t+ 1, he correctly incorporates previous period’s e↵ort into his lifetime utility:
Ut+1 = u(ct+1, et+1, et,  t+1) +
TX
j=t+2
 jv(cj , ej ,  j)
This will cause the agent to revise his plans he made in time period t. The agent also faces
the same budget constraint as before:
TX
t=0
ptct(1 + r)
 t 
TX
t=0
(wtet + yt)(1 + r)
 t
Proposition 1.2.2 Under the assumptions above, there is an equivalent period utility func-
35One possible justification for this is the literature on Projection Bias, see Loewenstein et al. (2003);
Conlin et al. (2007); Simonsohn (2010). Under such projection bias, a tired individual may incorrectly
project that they will always be tired – but if he started working harder he may be surprised to find he isn’t
as tired as expected.
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tion
u =  wtet   g(et, et 1,  t)
This form demonstrates that e↵ort is increasing in past and present piece rates, but future
piece rates have no impact. By the same token, e↵ort is decreasing in past and present
leisure technology, but future leisure technology has no impact.
Proof Proof of the g(·) function equivalence and its convexity is provided in Appendix 9.1,
but builds on work by Browning et al. (1985) and Fehr and Goette (2007). A brief proof
for the comparative statics is provided below.
Consider the e↵ect of an increase in wt+j . In the first period, the first order condition states:
ge(e
⇤
1, e0,  1) =  w1
e0 cannot be influenced by any wt0 by construction, as time period 0 is before any information
is received.  1 are not choice variables, they are only exogenously given. Thus when I take
the derivative with respect to wt+j to get:
gee
de⇤1
dwt+j
= 0
Which, as gee > 0 gives us the e↵ect in the first period of 0. In time period t, to complete
the induction proof I assume
de⇤t 1
dwt+j
= 0 and look to prove the same is true for de
⇤
t
dwt+j
. This
follows from taking the total di↵erential of the first order condition:
gee
de⇤t
dwt+j
+ ge2
det 1
dwt+j
= 0
) de
⇤
t
dwt+j
= 0.
Thus, by induction, optimal e↵ort prior to a piece rate increase is unchanged when holding
  constant. This follows from the assumption of naivety that the agent does not anticipate
future momentum. However, once the agent reaches the period with higher piece rates, an
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increase in the piece rate still elicits greater e↵ort:
de⇤t
dwt
=
 
gee
> 0
This follows from the convexity of g w.r.t. e⇤t . The same sign can be seen by looking at the
total derivative with respect to past piece rates, wt 1:
de⇤t
dwt 1
=  ge2
gee
det 1
dwt 1
> 0
As gee > 0,
det 1
dwt 1 > 0 and ge2 < 0 (as u23 > 0). The proofs for leisure technology are the
same as above with opposite signs (as leisure technology makes e↵ort more costly, rather
than less).
Although the above proposition gives us the required comparative statics of interest for
naive momentum, considerably more can be said with an additional restriction on the
period utility function. Without assuming a specific functional form, one can show that
that the optimal e↵ort will follow a linear time recursive structure.
Proposition 1.2.3 Assuming further that u(ct, et, et 1,  t) = q(ct, et   ⇢ · et 1,  t) with
|⇢| < 1, then optimal e↵ort will follow a time recursive structure
e⇤t = ⇢ · et 1 + z(wt,  t)
with z(·) increasing in wt and decreasing in  t.
Proof By a similar proof as above, the FOC will be
 qe(c⇤t , e⇤t   ⇢et 1,  t) =  wt
qc(c
⇤
t , e
⇤
t   ⇢et 1,  t) =  pt
As q is strictly concave over the first argument, this allows for inverse of qc:
c⇤t = q
 1
c ( pt, e
⇤
t   ⇢et 1,  t)
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Which can be inserted into the first FOC to give:
 qe(q 1c ( pt, e⇤t   ⇢et 1,  t) , e⇤t   ⇢et 1,  t) =  wt
Thus, a new utility function  wtet   h(e⇤t   ⇢et 1,  t). The convexity of h(·) gives us an
inverse function for h1:
e⇤t = ⇢et 1 + h
 1
1 ( wt,  t)
As this is a special case of the first proposition (if ⇢ > 0), optimal e↵ort e⇤t will still be an
increasing function of wt and decreasing in  t. In addition, past e↵ort positively influences
current e↵ort and future piece rates or leisure technology does not influence current e↵ort.
1.2.3. Reciprocity
Consider instead a model in which changes in wt and  t induce a desire to reciprocate. As
formulated, this is similar to the time separable utility, but with an additional component
of utility based on the piece rates and leisure o↵ered across all time periods:
UR =
TX
t=0
 tu(ct, et,  t) + ↵ ({wt}, { t}) ·
 
TX
t=0
 tet
!
In which u has the same properties as outlined above (u1   0, u11 < 0, u2  0, u22 <
0, u23 < 0) and with ↵(·) strictly increasing in its arguments. In this model, increases in
future or past piece rates can increase the marginal utility of e↵ort through the ’altruism’
or ’fairness’ function ↵. This model is similar to ones found in Rabin (1993); Fehr and
Schmidt (2006). Extending the work of Browning et al. (1985), this utility function can be
reformulated as a series of period utility functions:
v(et) = [ wt + ↵({wt}, { t})] · et   g(et,  t)
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In a simple two period model for illustrative purposes, the agent receives additional marginal
utility based on w1 and w2. For simplicity, I assume that this additional utility is linear
in piece rate and e↵ort, ↵({wt} , { t}) = ↵1(w1 + w2) + ↵2( 1 +  2). Thus the agent is
maximizing:
UR = v(e1) + v(e2)
v(e1) ⌘ ( w1 + ↵1w1 + ↵1w2 + ↵2 1 + ↵2 2)e1   g(e1,  1)
v(e2) ⌘ ( w2 + ↵1w1 + ↵1w2 + ↵2 1 + ↵2 2)e2   g(e2,  2)
In this setting, increasing the piece rate can increase reciprocity, even in surrounding periods.
Under this simple model, if ↵2 > 0 and e1, e2 is an interior solution, then
@e2
@ 1
> 0. Likewise,
if ↵1 > 0 and e1, e2 is an interior solution, then
@e2
@w1
> 0. Similar intuitions apply for
future piece rates or leisure technologies when informed in advance. For proofs, please see
Appendix Section 10.4.
1.2.4. Summary
Owing to space limitations, several theories have been moved to a discussion following the
results. To summarize the most relevant theories, I present the following table that outlines
how e↵ort at time t will respond to piece rates and leisure technologies at di↵erent times
(past, present, and future):
Please note that not all reference models give precise comparative statics in some situations,
as shown in Brandon et al. (2014). The comparative statics for reference models above are
under the case that the reference or target is strong and influences the intertemporal e↵ort
allocation. For example, an income target of $1000 would not be possible to achieve in
a laboratory setting, but would also not influence the intertemporal results (the agent
would appear as a neoclassical time-separable agent). More adaptive models of reference
dependence are discussed in Section 6.
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Table 1: Predictions Summary Table
E↵ort at time t in response to increase in:
Piece Rate at time: Leisure Tech at time:
t  1 t t+ 1 t  1 t t+ 1
Models
Time Separable
No Income E↵ects 0 + 0 0 - 0
Income E↵ects - +/- - + -/+ +
Momentum
Naive + + 0 - - 0
Sophisticated + + + - - -
Reciprocity + + + + - +
On-the-job Learning + + + - - -
Income References
Period Target 0 - 0 0 - 0
Total Target - +/- - + - +
Previous Period + - 0 - - 0
Experiment Results* + + 0 - or 0 - or 0 0
(*see Section 5 for details)
Also please note that although On-the-job Learning and Sophisticated Momentum have the
same predictions for the 6 comparative statics above, there are additional tests to distinguish
these two hypotheses. For example, if the gains are primarily driven by learning, one would
expect either (a) increasing quantity over time or (b) increasing leisure engagement over
time. Neither of these are found to occur. There are also reasons to believe that the
magnitudes involved make learning a very unlikely possibility, see Section 6 for more details.
In practice, as I find evidence for Naive Momentum, these comparisons are not as crucial.
1.3. Experiment Design Overview
In order to test these comparative statics, I investigate how e↵ort responds to changes in
(i) past (ii) contemporaneous and (iii) future piece rates and leisure opportunities. These
correspond to the 6 columns of the Prediction Summary Table above. These hypotheses
were tested over two similar experiments (di↵erences outlined below).
In both experiments, subjects complete incentivized real-e↵ort tasks in a laboratory setting.
The tasks involve counting images and are performed on a computer. This is similar to
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previous labor economics experiments studying e↵ort in the laboratory, especially Abeler
et al. (2011). Subjects count particular images from a matrix of 98 images, as can be seen
in Figure 1.36 This task was selected as it requires little to no training, but is menial and
requires e↵ort.37 In post experiment surveys, subjects often mention the task is boring
(see Appendix Figure 1), in line with findings presented in Abeler et al. (2011). Thus the
primary measure of e↵ort is the number of problems solved correctly – consistent with the
experimental labor literature ( Charness and Kuhn (2011); Fehr and Goette (2007)).38
In line with Corgnet et al. (2014); Eriksson et al. (2009); Charness et al. (2010) and to
mirror many labor contexts outside of the laboratory, I introduce a baseline leisure activity.
Specifically, the participants were allowed to watch YouTube.com videos at any time instead
of performing counting tasks (see bottom of Figure 1). To help make YouTube videos a
potentially worthwhile leisure activity, a pair of headphones was attached to every computer.
However, as the video was located below the counting problem, it was di cult to engage in
both simultaneously. In the appendix, I confirm that YouTube videos were indeed a time
substitute for e↵ort.
As discussed in Section 2, many models of e↵ort allocation allow for changes in either piece
rates or leisure options to impact e↵ort. To test these models, I experimentally varied
the piece rate and leisure opportunities in specific periods. Although the piece rate varied
in some periods, every period contributed to final earnings. This was done to focus on
intertemporal substitution as opposed to regret or risk aversion. Paying in every period
also allowed me to distinguish between potential “daily” income targeting and “period”
income targeting models. Final payment also included a flat $10 participation fee so long
36Abeler et al. (2011) has agents counting zeroes in a string of 100 numbers. This exact task was not
feasible in a web browser with a “search” feature, which makes the task trivial as one can merely search for
0. As a result, I ask the worker to count either heart or drop icons (randomized at the subject level). Only
one subject tried bypass the task by searching the “source code” (after being asked not to) and is dropped
from analysis.
37Gill and Prowse (2012) employ a task with sliders that also has attractive properties (further outlined
in Gill and Prowse (2011)) – this task was employed in a replication experiment with very similar results,
see Appendix 9.3. However, focusing on the task similar to Abeler et al. (2011) also allows for a closer
comparison to their results, including testing for possibility of reference dependence.
38Though output and e↵ort may not be perfectly correlated, changes in the production function are
unlikely to explain evidence provided, as discussed in a Section 6.
20
as they followed laboratory guidelines (e.g. no food, no talking).39 However no payments
were made until the end of the entire session.40
To vary the leisure opportunities, some subjects were randomly assigned access to their cell
phones. The laboratory employed for this study, Wharton Behavioral Lab, ordinarily has a
strict no phone policy to improve study compliance and concentration. This policy was put
in place because participants have a tendency to want to text, browse the web, and play
games on their cell phones during the lab session. Thus, phone access has the potential
to represent an increase in the marginal utility of leisure ( t from Section 2).41 This is
conceptually similar to experiments conducted in Corgnet et al. (2014) which allowed some
users to browse the internet to expand possible leisure activities participants face.42
Prior to being allowed to start each period, the subjects had to correctly answer questions
about the upcoming period’s piece rate and cell access. These procedures were implemented
to ensure subjects fully understood the incentives they faced.43 In addition, counters at
the bottom kept track of current earnings (as in Abeler et al. (2011)) as well as visual
indications for whether phone use was permitted.44 In post experiment surveys, 98% of
39It was made clear and reiterated that they did not need to solve any problems to guarantee their $10
participation fee. In practice, every participant adequately followed the laboratory guidelines and received
the $10 participation fee.
40Paying at the end was both a practical necessity given length of the periods and also mirrors the design
of Fehr and Goette (2007).
41The subjects of the experiment were University of Pennsylvania undergraduates. The second experiment
surveyed cellphone access – only 8 out of 422 subjects (2%) did not bring a cellphone to the laboratory. Even
though phone quality may vary or some subjects may not have a phone, this will not impact estimate validity
if randomization was adequately done. However, this research will only be able to answer whether access to
phones already owned by the subjects influence e↵ort rather than the e↵ect of access to a particular phone.
This was done in part because introducing a new cell phone would lead to significant learning, additional
experimental cost, and may not represent the same expansion of leisure opportunities as if the individual
owned the phone (e.g. no contacts, no texts, etc.)
42When given access, the students could also use the internet on their phones, so internet access could be
seen in some way as a lower bound of the potential leisure opportunity faced by allowing phone use. Other
leisure technology expansions were considered, but deemed too di cult to adequately monitor under the
current lab setup. With cell phones, lab assistants were able to quickly verify whether cell phone users were
allowed to use the cell phone at that time.
43In one pilot study, rather than quiz the subject on the piece rate, the website merely didn’t allow them to
continue until 30 seconds have passed. This allows me to investigate potential salience e↵ects from repeating
the piece rate but in the post experiment analysis did not seem to make a di↵erence.
44In addition to the subject’s earnings for the current period, either (i) the total earnings or (ii) previous
period earnings are displayed on the screen at all times. This treatment serves as a supplementary test for
income targeting and is explained in more detail in Section 6.
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Table 2: Design Summary Table
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Task Image Counting Image Counting
Location Wharton Behavioral Lab Wharton Behavioral Lab
Subjects 155 UPenn Undergraduates 422 UPenn Undergraduates
Number of Treatment Periods* 6 3
Duration of Treatment Periods 5 minutes 5 minutes
Duration of Pre-Treatment 5 minutes 15 minutes
Baseline Piece Rate (US $) 0.05 0.05
Piece Rate Treatments (US $) 0.15 or 0.30 0.03 or 0.08 or 0.15
Baseline Leisure Access Youtube.com Youtube.com
Leisure Access Treatment Phone Access Phone Access
Advance Information Occurs Periods 1, 3, 5 Randomly in Period 1
Instructions followed by 30 second timer and Quiz 30 second timer and Quiz
Counters at Bottom Period Earnings Period Earnings and either
and Total Earnings Total Earnings or Last Period Earnings
On Screen Timer No Yes
Image Counted Hearts Hearts or Drops (randomized)
Randomization Subject Level by Computer Subject Level by Computer
subjects report that the payments and leisure opportunities available were clear.
Although the experiments followed the general design above, I outline di↵erences in the
table below and elaborate in the following sections:
*Note: Number of treatment periods is the number of all periods after the pretreatment, i.e. periods
in which individuals could di↵er in some way. In experiment 1, every subject experienced precisely
2 of the 6 rounds had a piece rate or leisure technology that was not baseline. In experiment 2, at
most 1 period had a piece rate or leisure technology that was not baseline.
1.3.1. Experiment 1 Design
At the beginning of the session, the subject was given a series of instructions and an example
problem. This was followed by one 5 minute “Pre-treatment” period to become acquainted with the
task. This Pre-treatment period had the same incentives for all subjects and serves as a proxy of
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worker ability, as will be discussed in Section 4. For each solved problem in that period, the subject
is informed she will earn $0.05. In order to discourage random guessing, there was also a penalty
for wrong answers – entering the incorrect answer three times for a single problem resulted in a
deduction of $0.20, akin to Abeler et al. (2011).45
The participants then completed six additional periods, each 5 minutes long, with three di↵erent
possible treatments:
• Control – Subjects receive $0.05 per completed problem for that period.
• High Piece Rate – Subjects receive a higher piece rate for that period, either $0.15 or $0.30.
• High Leisure Technology – Subjects receive the ability to access their cellphones for one
period but still received $0.05 per completed problem.
The control and piece rate treatments were calibrated using a small pilot study to allow for movement
in either direction, as suggested by Charness and Kuhn (2011).
Regarding the randomization, these six treatment periods are broken up into three pairs. Each pair
consisted of either two periods of Control treatment; a Control treatment and a High Piece Rate
treatment; or a Control treatment and High Leisure Technology treatment. Within each pair, the
order of the treatments was random in order to di↵erentiate period e↵ects and anticipation e↵ects.
Each subject eventually receives all three treatment pairs, potentially allowing for both between and
within subject analysis. This randomization was executed at the individual level by a pseudo-random
number generator seeded by computer time (down to the millisecond).
To test for adequate randomization, I investigate whether pre-treatment indicators (such as gender,
self-reported SAT scores, and pretreatment performance) predict the period at which the subjects
faced the High Piece Rate or High Leisure treatments. As reported in Table 2A, none of these
factors individually or together are predictive of the period that they receive the treatments.46 As
a result, I conclude that the treatment randomization was adequately done given the observable
characteristics.
45On average the participants entered about 0.67 problems per period incorrectly, about 10% of total
problems correctly solved per period.
46For regressing “High Piece Rate” treatment period # on pre-treatment variables, the F stat corresponds
to a p-value of 0.29. For regressing the “High Leisure” treatment period # on pre-treatment variables, the
F stat corresponds to a p-value of 0.71. Thus, for both treatments I fail to reject the hypothesis that all
coe cients are zero and that none of the observable pre-treatment variables is significantly correlated with
the period in which treatments occurred.
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1.3.2. Experiment 2 Design
The second experiment simplifies the first by assigning each worker only a single primary treatment,
over four periods rather than seven. The first “Pre-treatment” period lasted 15 minutes, was the
same for all subjects and is used to generate proxies for worker ability (see Section 4). The following
“treatment” periods were all 5 minutes. The first of these featured a baseline piece rate, but could
(randomly) inform the subject about the next period piece rate and leisure opportunity. In the
following period, the subject receives either the baseline, a piece rate treatment, or a high leisure
treatment. In the final period, the subject is returned to baseline piece rate and no access to the cell
phone. As in experiment 1, randomization was executed at the individual level by a pseudo-random
number generator seeded by computer time (down to the millisecond).
This experiment also expands on the first one in a number of ways. First, a second piece rate
treatment arm was included, in which the piece rate is decreased from $0.05 to $0.03 and another
treatment arm randomizing “total” vs “previous period” earnings shown. Second, by randomizing
the information available for all subjects, the design eliminates concerns about “odd-period” x
treatment interaction e↵ects present in the first experiment.47 Third, by keeping each individual to
a single treatment, there may be less concern that interactions between multiple treatments confound
e↵ects. This also allowed for a longer training period to further reduce concerns about on-the-job
learning. Fourth, a timer was added in accordance with Abeler et al. (2011) to minimize concerns
about time uncertainty driving results. Lastly, additional variables, including specific timing and
phone usage, were collected and a timer was added to the post experiment survey to improve
information quality.
1.4. Empirical Specifications
In the following section, the results of the experiments will be addressed, but prior to that, three
important empirical notes need to be made.
1. First, the potential presence of momentum – where the previous period’s e↵ort could directly
influence this period’s e↵ort – makes this a poor setting for individual fixed e↵ects. Estimating these
47In the first design, being “surprised” can only happen on treatment periods 1, 3, and 5 and “advance
knowledge” can only occur for periods 2, 4, and 6. Although period fixed e↵ects are included in most
specifications, if odd-periods were interacting with treatments in some other way besides knowledge (e.g.
piece rate increases are more e↵ective in the final period), then estimates from experiment 1 could be a
combination of those odd-period interaction e↵ects and the e↵ect of advance knowledge.
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individual fixed e↵ects will lead to bias in the estimate of the momentum.48 Nickell (1981) proves
this, but the intuition is that shocks will be partially absorbed into the fixed e↵ect estimate rather
than the coe cient estimate for the previous period’s e↵ort. This is worse when there are fewer
periods as there are fewer shocks to properly distinguish the coe cient estimates.
For example, assume e↵ort follows an AR(1) process (similar to Proposition 2.3) and there is a
time-constant individual fixed component
ei,t = ⇢ · ei,t 1 + fi +  xi,t + ⌫i,t
where ei,t is the number of problems solved by individual i at time t, ⇢ captures the degree of
“momentum” from the previous period, fi is the individual ability or motivation component, xi,t
include other shifters such as piece rate or leisure technology and ⌫i,t is an error term. Under
this model, estimating individual fixed e↵ects will introduce an asymptotic downward bias to ⇢,
approximately equal to   1+⇢T 1 . In my setting with T = 3, even if ⇢ was 0.5, asymptotic estimates
would become indistinguishable from 0 as N !1. This remains an issue even though the piece rate
and leisure technology are randomized.49 To be clear, this is not an issue of error terms correlated
within an individual which could bias the standard errors50 but rather a bias in the coe cient
estimates themselves.
However, this was a known issue when designing the experiment and a primary justification for the
pre-treatment period. This pre-treatment period can then serve as a proxy for individual ability
or motivation, taking the place of fi. To minimize risk of overfitting the data, a non-parametric
approach is employed – individuals are split into five quintiles based the number of problems solved
in the pre-treatment period, then each quintile receives it’s own binary indicator variable.51 The
pre-treatment period is therefore omitted from the dependent variable for all specifications. In line
with Card and Sullivan (1988), I also present a random e↵ects model with identical findings in the
Appendix.
2. The second note is that, although many labor studies take logarithms of dependent and in-
48Simply omitting the momentum term will not solve this issue in general but rather can bias other
coe cients.
49However it may be worth noting that period fixed e↵ects or session fixed e↵ects will not be biased by
this momentum, as the error terms are not correlated across individuals.
50Throughout the paper all standard errors are clustered at the subject level to reduce the influence of
error terms correlated within an individual.
51Though in practice the results are virtually identical when using a linear and quadratic term for number
of problems solved in pre-treatment.
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dependent variables, my specifications are reported at the unit level of analysis. This is done for
several reasons, first being that the theory of momentum in section 2.2 suggested a unit level of
analysis of e↵ort. Given the linearity of the task, one might think e↵ort would be closely correlated
with quantity, not log(quantity). Second, while not common, some individuals did opt to solve no
problems in a given period, a common issue with log forms. Third, the unit level was my ex ante
specification while designing the experiment and analysis, and interpretation of new p values would
be problematic after analysis has already been completed.
On the other hand, a linear formulation with OLS may be considered problematic as e↵ort shocks
cannot be too negative if e↵ort is bound at the lower end at 0. It’s also hard to represent upward
e↵ort “caps” with a linear specification. That being said I employ a log(problems correct + 1) on
log(piece rate) specification and find qualitatively very similar results. While these measurement
issues are important, the hypotheses are tested by the qualitative signs.
3. Third, as explained in Section 3, experiment 1 had each subject being treated to all 3 possible
treatments. This helped improve power of treatment e↵ects given the smaller sample – but it
runs the risk of multiple treatments interacting to confound estimates. For example, access to a
cellphone following a high piece rate period could negate additional e↵ort resulting from momentum
or reciprocity. As a result, I also perform analysis on just the first treatment received (corresponding
to the first 3 periods of treatment)52 and find that it does influence the intertemporal results in some
specifications. While the interaction of treatments may be interesting, this was not the primary
goal of this research study. Given this and the above di culties of within-individual analysis in this
setting, the second experiment design was simplified so that each person received only one treatment.
This also allowed for a longer “training” period to further ensure the results are not being driven
by on-the-job learning.
1.5. Experiment Results
Within this section, experimental results are presented together, as they are overall very similar
across the two experiments. I use these results, particularly the qualitative signs, to test predictions
of di↵erent theories from Section 2. I begin with the contemporaneous (same period) e↵ects and
move on to intertemporal e↵ects.
52Restricting analysis to only the first treatment pair is equivalent to focusing on just periods 1 and
2; however as half of those subjects received treatment in period 2, the following period (for intertemporal
analysis) would be period 3. Results change very little when limiting it to individuals who have only received
baseline piece rate (0.05) and leisure (YouTube) in period 3.
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1.5.1. Contemporaneous E↵ects
The first question is whether the primary treatments impacted contemporaneous e↵ort as predicted
by most theories of intertemporal labor supply. Recall that the primary treatments (piece rate
or leisure technology) were in place for only 1 period, so this is asking whether or not e↵ort was
influenced in that treated period. This is important because if there is no e↵ect on e↵ort in the
treated period, it would be di cult to understand why they would a↵ect earlier or later periods.53
Result 1.5.1 In accordance with most intertemporal theories of e↵ort allocation, an increase in the
piece rate significantly raised e↵ort in the e↵ected period. Likewise, in some specifications, there was
a significant decrease in e↵ort when subjects are o↵ered access to their cellphones. See Tables 3A
and 3B for details.
In the first experiment, the average worker solves 0.20 to 0.45 more problems (p < 0.01) when faced
with a 10 cent increase in the piece rate, as seen in Table 3A. This treatment estimate corresponds
roughly to an e↵ort elasticity of 2% = (0.325/7.85) / (0.10/0.05). Thus, increasing the piece rate
by 50% would increase average e↵ort in this context by approximately 1%. This elasticity is small
relative to previous findings in the literature, though still significant (Card (1991); Chetty et al.
(2011); Fehr and Goette (2007)). Compared to the existing literature, this low result may be best
explained by an e↵ort ceiling.54 In other words, at a $0.15 piece rate, agents may have already been
exerting close to their maximum potential e↵ort. There is some evidence for this, as the $0.15 and
$0.30 piece rates both elicited greater e↵ort, did not significantly di↵er from one another. This in
turn would push down the average elasticity. To examine this possibility, experiment 2 features a
$0.08 piece rate (1.6x baseline) and a $0.03 piece rate (0.6x baseline) instead of the $0.30 piece rate
(6x baseline). Alternatively, the low elasticity could be the result of multiple treatment interactions.
As seen in Table 4A, limiting the analysis to the first treatment increases the elasticity up to about
5%. Given these issues, I believe experiment 2 represents a better estimate for the contemporaneous
elasticity.
53That is not to say that certain combinations of theories could not predict such a finding, e.g. if an agent
had a period income target but also experienced reciprocity, the two e↵ects might cancel out in the e↵ected
period but could influence outside periods. However, given the extensive literature on piece rates influencing
e↵ort in the given period, such a null finding would likely indicate the treatment or sample size is too small
(Levitt and Neckermann (2014)).
54Though it may be di cult to compare as previous literature often focuses on hour or participation
elasticity rather than e↵ort.
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In the second experiment, I find a larger e↵ect of a higher piece rate on e↵ort. As can be seen in
Table 3B, every 10 cents (200%) increase (decrease) in piece rate increases (decreases) the number
of correct problems by 1.24 - 1.57 (17-22%). Thus, the estimated elasticity of e↵ort with respect
to contemporaneous piece rate is 9.3% for experiment 2, quite a bit higher than the 5% found in
experiment 1. Although not my primary inquiry, there did not seem to be a di↵erence in magnitude
for piece rate increases compared to decreases (no significant “kink” in the slope).
As discussed in Section 2, many intertemporal labor models also predict that increasing the marginal
utility of leisure detracts from e↵ort provision. One way to test this hypothesis is by increasing the
leisure options available to the subject. To the extent that these leisurely options are complements
with leisure time, one would expect an increase in leisure time and a corresponding decrease in total
e↵ort. In this experiment, the agents had access to Youtube.com videos throughout the experiment,
but during the “High Leisure Technology” treatment, were also given access to their cellphones.
When faced with this phone access, experiment 1 subjects complete 0.43 fewer problems on average
(p < 0.05), as seen in Table 3A. This provides support for the hypothesis that leisure opportunities
can reduce e↵ort allocation.55 However, once the sample is restricted to the first 3 treatment periods
(to eliminate potential multiple-treatment interactions), this coe cient is no longer significant (see
Table 4A specifications 4 through 6). Thus it is possible then that the original e↵ort decrease due to
cellphones was driven by subjects who received access to cellphones after the increased piece rate.56
In the second experiment, there was no significant decrease when cell phones were permitted. This
matches the finding in the first experiment once restricted to the first treatment. However, when
broken down by gender, cellphones appear to reduce e↵ort in the contemporaneous period for males,
as can be seen in Tables 5A and 5B.
These contemporaneous estimates also serve to test the “period income” reference dependence model.
In this model, an agent receives relatively greater disutility if she falls short of a particular income in
a given period. For example, a subject might try to earn $0.50 each period and then spent the rest of
the time watching YouTube videos. Under this model one would usually57 expect to see a reduction
55Unfortunately the binary nature of phone access does not allow for an accurate elasticity measurement
of e↵ort with respect to leisure opportunities. However, calculations of implicit time value of the leisure
opportunity might allow one derive an estimate.
56Alternatively this evidence might suggest that cell phones were more e↵ective in reducing e↵ort during
the later periods, or may be due to lower power from a smaller sample sample size. Results from experiment
2 suggests the latter hypothesis, as subjects in experiment 2 are treated with cellphone access quite “late”
in the session, yet the treatment does not seem to influence e↵ort.
57As discussed in Brandon et al. (2014), if the piece rate increase is large enough or if the target is too
large, contemporaneous e↵ort could still increase with piece rates akin to a neoclassical time separable utility
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in e↵ort when faced with a higher piece rate (as it has become easier to earn the target income for
that period). Yet, as discussed, the findings suggest the opposite direction, with an increased piece
rate inducing greater e↵ort in the period it was enacted. Therefore, the contemporaneous evidence
does not support a “period income” reference point.
1.5.2. Intertemporal Treatment E↵ects
In addition to a contemporaneous treatment e↵ect, pre-and post-treatment e↵ects are important
to di↵erentiate the theories outlined in Section 2. For example, if workers followed a neoclassical
time separable utility function, then as total impact on income is small, one would not expect to
see any reduction or increase in e↵ort in the periods surrounding the high piece rate or high leisure
treatments.58 Instead, I find significant stickiness in e↵ort:
Result 1.5.2 In the period following an increase in the piece rate, e↵ort was also significantly
higher. This is consistent with models of E↵ort Momentum as well as Reciprocity. See Table 4A and
4B for details. However (randomized) advance knowledge of higher piecerates did not significantly
influence e↵ort. Of the models outlined in Section 2, these results are only consistent with a model
of Naive Momentum. See Table 6A and 6B for details.
In the second experiment, the intertemporal treatment e↵ects are quite striking, presented in Table
4B. An increase in the previous period’s piece rate of $0.10 (200%) significantly increases the e↵ort
in the following period by about 0.75 problems (10%). Thus, for experiment 2 the intertemporal
elasticity is about half of the contemporaneous elasticity. By itself, this intertemporal e↵ect could
be due to reciprocity or momentum, as both predict higher e↵ort following a higher piece rate.
Experiment 1 also has similar findings once restricted to the first three treatment periods, as can be
seen in Table 4A. This may be due to the fact that in the first experiment, every individual received
all 3 treatment pairs. As discussed in Section 4, this suggests the presence of multiple treatment
interactions that were not ex ante predicted. Therefore, to limit the analysis to the post-treatment
e↵ects of just the first treatment pair, I analyze only the first three treatment periods.59 Upon doing
model. But if the targets are not strong enough to induce behavior that di↵ers, their predictive value is
reduced.
58Contrary to this prediction, the literature has found some evidence of e↵ects in surrounding periods in
the pursuit of other research (Cardella and Depew (2015); Bradler et al. (2015); Connolly (2008)).
59Restricting analysis to only the first treatment pair is equivalent to focusing on the first 3 periods;
however as half of those subjects received treatment in period 3, the following period would be period 4.
Results change very little when limiting it to individuals who have only received baseline piece rate (0.05)
and leisure (YouTube) in period 4.
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so, estimates suggest that a 5 cent (100%) piece rate increase in the previous period increases e↵ort
by 0.5 - 0.66 correct problems (6 - 9%). By itself, this result could be indicative of either momentum
or reciprocity, as shown in Section 2.
Also worth noting is that while cellphones do not e↵ect e↵ort on average, it does seem to reduce
contemporaneous e↵ort for men over both experiments (see Tables 5A and 5B). This e↵ect also
persists in experiment 2 and some specifications of experiment 1. Also worth noting is that while
cellphone access does not significantly alter e↵ort in future periods, that self-reported cellphone
usage is correlated with decreased e↵ort in future periods, even after controlling for worker ability
with productivity proxies (see Appendix Table 6).60 Therefore, the intertemporal evidence of leisure
is broadly suggestive of momentum rather than reciprocity (or other theories), as reciprocity would
suggest a worker work harder after use or access to an increased leisure technology, not less hard.61
These findings also reject the “total income” target model. In this model, an agent receives rela-
tively greater disutility for falling short of a particular income over multiple periods (in this case,
the experimental session). If subjects in this experiment exhibited a total income reference point,
subjects should reduce e↵ort following a high piece rate period, as the agent was more likely to have
hit their target in the preceding period. As shown in Tables 4A and 4B, the previous piece rate
is instead positively correlated with e↵ort in this period. Thus, I conclude there was no significant
evidence of a total income target in this experiment.62
Lastly, being informed of the upcoming piece rates one period in advance did not influence e↵ort.
In the results of experiment 1, presented in Table 6A, there seems to be some borderline significant
results when focusing on early panels, but not in the full panel. In the results of experiment
2, presented in Table 6B, knowledge of future piece rates also has no e↵ect on e↵ort – despite
having similar sized standard errors and a similar level of power to detect as the e↵ect of past
60However, this finding has the potential for selection e↵ects driving omitted variable bias, suggesting the
coe cients should not be taken as causal estimates.
61As reciprocity seems more likely to trigger with non-monetary goods (Kube et al. (2012)), one might
expect cell phone access to be even more likely to generate reciprocity than increased piece rates. One
possible caveat – if subjects engage in cellphone use but do not actually “enjoy” this ability to use cell
phones, e.g. due to self-control problems, it may not necessarily engage in reciprocity. However, this does
not seem to be the case as the subject has a number of other self-control methods for cell phones (turning
phone o↵, pulling out battery, leaving at home) and otherwise might su↵er a very similar self-control issue
with YouTube.
62Although not detected in my setting, Abeler et al. (2011) have devised an elegant method to elicit loss
aversion even in a laboratory setting by varying a random outside option. It may be that in my experiment
the subject has no experience with the task prior to the experiment, making it di cult to select a total
income target.
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piece rates. This evidence is suggestive of naive momentum rather than sophisticated momentum
or reciprocity; both of these alternatives would predict e↵ort increases upon learning about future
piece rate increases.
Indeed, for both sophisticated momentum and reciprocity, one might expect the “pre-” piece rate
e↵ect to be larger than the “post-” piece rate e↵ect. For reciprocity, work by Gneezy and List
(2006) suggests that reciprocity decreases over time, thus the “post-” period having a larger e↵ect is
unlikely. For sophisticated momentum, extra e↵ort in the “pre-” piece rate period would help take
full advantage of the higher piece rates in the next period, whereas “post-” piece rate e↵ects would
be a result of previously expanded e↵ort. Thus, the small and insignificant coe cient of future
knowledge is strong evidence in favor of Naive Momentum.
1.5.3. Instrumental Variable Approach
If naive e↵ort momentum is occurring, Proposition 3 in Section 2 guides how one might estimate it
– in particular using an AR(1) approach. As discussed in Section 4, assume the true model is of the
following sort:
ei,t = ⇢ · ei,t 1 + fi +  1wi,t +  2 i,t + ⌫i,t
Where ei,t is the number of problems solved by individual i at time t, ⇢ captures the degree of
“momentum” from the previous period, fi is the individual ability or motivation component, wi,t
is the piece rate at time period t and  i,t is the leisure technology available at time t, and ⌫i,t is
an error term. This theory allows us to encapsulate the force of momentum in a single parameter,
which is potentially broader in application and policy implications and allows for easier comparisons
across tasks (Charness and Kuhn (2011)).
While one could design an OLS structure to estimate the above, as mentioned before, the presence of
fixed e↵ects may bias the parameter ⇢. I can employ productivity proxies as in previous specifications,
but there may be remaining omitted variable bias as the uncaptured component of fi , which now
resides in the error term, may be correlated with ei,t 1.
However, natural instrumental variables for previous period’s e↵ort are present – the previous pe-
riod’s piece rate and leisure technology. These variables are assigned randomly, but should influence
the previous period’s e↵ort directly. To achieve asymptotic consistency, the instrumental variable
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wit 1 would need to satisfy the following:
Cov(wit 1, eit 1) 6= 0 (”First stage”)
Cov(wit 1, ⌫it) = 0 (”Exclusion Principle”)
While the “first stage” is strong as piece rates do impact contemporaneous e↵ort (see Tables 3A
and 3B), one might have reasonable doubts about the exclusion principle. In particular, suppose the
true data generating process was a model of reciprocity, a process in which past piece rates directly
influence current e↵ort (rather than influencing e↵ort through past e↵ort). For example,
eit = ⇢eit 1 + ↵1wit + ↵2wit 1 + ↵3 it + ⌫it
If data from this data generating process was used to estimate an AR(1) model without wit 1 as a
regressor, then ↵2wit 1 would remain in the error term. Since wit 1 will be correlated with eit 1,
this would result in omitted variable bias. In this case, it would overestimate the magnitude of ⇢,
as what is actually driven by reciprocity would be misinterpreted as momentum (wit 1 and eit 1
positively correlated).
Therefore, in order to believe the asymptotic consistency of an instrumental variable (IV) approach,
one must be reasonably confident that the other models where previous piece rates enters directly
(such as reciprocity or “total” income targeting) are not occurring. Although momentum most
closely fits the comparative statics, additional discussion of alternate theories is provided below.
With this caveat in mind, I apply the instrumental variables (IV) approach using previous piece
rate and phone access to predict previous period’s e↵ort. As presented in Table 7, the estimates
find around 43-45% of the increased e↵ort is retained in the following period, even once incentives
revert to baseline.63 I replicate this estimate of 43% using an alternate slider task in a replication
experiment (see Appendix Table 1 and Section 10.3). Experiment 1 su↵ers from a weak instrument
problem due to a smaller sample, but several specifications of experiment 1 are in line with this
estimate of 45% (see Appendix Table 2).
63This is substantially higher than the estimate of 75% given by OLS without employing an IV strategy.
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1.6. Alternative Theories
While momentum seems to be the most parsimonious description of the contemporaneous and in-
tertemporal results, careful consideration of other theories is warranted.
To reiterate, the comparative statics for the most part the design gives us have two tests to di↵er-
entiate between momentum and reciprocity, both of which point in the direction of momentum.
1. As discussed in Section 5.2, informing a subject of a future piece rate increase or leisure option
did not immediately increase e↵ort as predicted by a model of reciprocity. Instead, I find that
individuals only increase e↵ort once the higher piece rate is applied. See Tables 6A and 6B.
2. After cell phone access, subjects exert less e↵ort, not more as predicted by reciprocity (see
Section 2.3 for predictions). See Tables 5A and 5B as well as Appendix Table 6 for results.
One possible alternative explanation for the experimental findings is that workers who experienced
additional problems were able to increase their productivity in post-treatment periods (“On the
Job Learning”). If there is significant on the job learning, then increased e↵ort in an early period
could result in additional problems solved in later periods. If true, this could account for stickiness
detected.
However on-the-job learning seems an unlikely explanation as there was no indication of increased
productivity over time as one would predict – see figures 2A and 2B. In addition, one might expect
the number of incorrect problems to fall over time with learning, but this does not happen. Also, the
task itself (counting 100 images dozens of times) has a limited scope for learning – indeed, Figure 4
shows a rapid convergence of problems solved per minute even within the Pre-treatment period.
Furthermore, even if on-the-job learning were occurring, it seems unlikely to explain the post-
treatment e↵ects. The relatively small increase in problems solved during period 2 (approximately
1 problem) is small relative to the total number of problems solved by that point (approximately
3%). If increasing the number of problems solved by 3% increases productivity by 10%, then period
3 should see an increase of approximately 60% even in the control group, which is inconsistent with
the data. In addition, if this on the job learning was known to workers, then a future increase in
piece rate would motivate additional e↵ort in the preceding period so as to increase productivity.
This was also not found in the data.
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To recap why a period income targeting model does not fit the data, one would expect an increased
piece rate to decrease contemporaneous e↵ort (if the period income target is a significant component
of utility). In addition, without adaptive references, a period income target model would predict no
intertemporal spillovers. For more details, see the discussion in the contemporaneous e↵ects section
above.
To address why a “total” income targeting model does not fit the data, note that an increase in piece
rate should reduce e↵ort in surrounding periods. A higher piece rate makes it easier to hit a fixed
“total” income target. Thus, to the extent that income targets induce e↵ort,64 the worker would
exert less e↵ort in the lower piece rate periods compared to control.65 Instead, the data displays an
increase in e↵ort. For more details, see the discussion in the intertemporal results section above.
However, another possibility is period-level income reference dependence with adaptive references.
In other words, by earning more in the previous period, the agent increases the income target for
the following period.66 This model may be hard to distinguish empirically from momentum, but
there are two related tests that suggest adaptive income references are not driving the results.
First, if references are an important component of the utility function, this model would predict
decreased e↵ort when faced with a higher piece rate. This occurs as it is now easier to hit the
income reference of the previous period. In the data, there are no such decreases when faced with
higher piece rates, and workers work less hard when piece rates decrease.
Second, every subject had a counter to keep track of earnings from that period (see Figure 1). This
was implemented to reduce subject uncertainty about earnings. In addition, experiment 2 subjects
either had a “previous period earnings” or a “total earnings” counter located below the period
earnings. This was randomly assigned at an individual level to potentially nudge period or daily
income targeting. Specifically if an individual had been given the “previous period earnings” counter
treatment and were driven by a period-level e↵ort reference model, the post-treatment e↵ects should
have been stronger as they have more precise information about the e↵ort and earnings exerted in
64If the target is too low or too high (e.g. $0.10 or $1000 for a laboratory study), then the agent will
demonstrate behavior consistent with a neoclassical time separable model as the kink in utility will not be
relevant to e↵ort decisions.
65A neoclassical time separable model with income e↵ects has similar predictions.
66Although not discussed extensively in this paper, a theory of adaptive income references presented in
Brandon et al. (2014); Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) would also generally have an e↵ect if information
about piece rates is presented in advance. In addition, as shown by Brandon et al. (2014); Hu↵man and
Goette (2006) workers who receive a higher lump sum early in the day should reduce their optimal e↵ort
afterward. This does not fit with the findings above, as workers treated to a higher piece rate worked harder
even after incentives return to baseline.
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the previous period. As can be seen in Table 8, this information did not significantly change the
impact of an increased piece rate, either contemporaneously or in the previous period.67 Though
it seems to have influenced phone use slightly, this is hard to construe as evidence consistent with
income reference dependence.
Another possibility is worker confusion regarding the piece rates. There are two reasons why this is
unlikely to be driving results. First, before every period, the worker is presented a new instructions
page which clearly outlines the piece rate in that period. This instructions page cannot be skipped
for at least 30 seconds and workers must successfully type in the piece rate before they can continue.
If the worker has information about future incentives, they are also quizzed on the future piece
rate. Second, as mentioned above, in all experiments there was a counter that showed how much the
subject had earned that period; thus even if they failed to understand the instructions, subjects would
quickly see how much each problem was earning them. Of the 422 workers in the second experiment,
only 4 individuals answered that the compensation was “somewhat unclear” or “unclear” in a post-
experiment survey.
One last potential explanation is a lack of worker trust. If workers do not trust the promised piece
rate increase, they may not reciprocate it initially, and instead wait until the piece rate is actually put
in place. However, I believe two aspects make this explanation unlikely. First, 90% of subjects have
previously completed 3 or more studies at the Wharton Behavioral Lab. As a dedicated experimental
lab, Wharton Behavioral Lab has a reputation and incentives for upholding its promises to subjects.
Secondly, if the worker did not trust promises of higher piece rates, it is unclear why higher piece
rates would incentivize them to work harder in the treated period either, as there was no actual
payment until the end of the experimental session.
1.7. Conclusion
I investigated the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply with a series of incentivized real e↵ort
experiments and find e↵ort levels persist even once incentives return to baseline. After testing
predictions to distinguish theories, I find strong evidence of e↵ort momentum over short time scales
and estimate a 5-minute momentum parameter of 0.45 across multiple experiments and tasks. This
suggests it takes 15 minutes after an interruption to return to 90% of prior productivity levels, in
line with observational evidence on interrupted work (Mark et al. (2005)). Providing information
67Unfortunately, while every subject did face a randomized counter, a small programming typo prevented
the capture of this variable for the first day. As it is unclear which counter day 1 subjects faced, they are
dropped from Table 7.
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a full period in advance of does not seem to significantly influence this e↵ort allocation – further
suggesting a “naive” sort of momentum.
One weakness of this study is remaining uncertainty regarding the source of the momentum e↵ects.
For example, if e↵ort momentum is a result of quickly decaying task-specific human capital (i.e. a
“train of thought”), then switching tasks could be equally harmful as being interrupted. This would
also be consistent with evidence that multitasking is less productive than sequential work, as found
in Buser and Peter (2012). Alternatively, it may be that momentum has a physiological component,
perhaps due to adrenaline or other neurobiological processes. Lastly, the momentum could also be
related to e↵ort reference dependence (as opposed to income reference dependence), though many
reference dependence models would predict that receiving information in advance should change
the e↵ort allocation (Brandon et al. (2014); Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009)). Distinguishing
these theories could help provide additional suggestions on how to minimize momentum loss after
an interruption, e.g. a cellphone wallpaper reminding one to return to work after a phone call or
doing 5 jumping jacks immediately after an interruption.
There’s also some uncertainty to the extent to which workers are aware of these momentum e↵ects.
Although they do not seem to employ information to take advantage of momentum, there is still
a chance workers are aware of it conceptually. As has occurred with some past studies (Price and
Wolfers (2010); Pope et al. (2013)), increased awareness of the momentum e↵ect may overturn or
undo some of the e↵ect. For example, if a worker knows they tend to work harder after working
hard, they may slack o↵ early and expect the work to “finish itself”. Or as Mark et al. (2008)
find, workers may work harder following an interruption to “catch up”, though I find no evidence of
this. One possibility to investigate the degree of self-awareness is to use costly commitment with a
self-selected cut-o↵, akin to Kaur et al. (2010).
Another open question is whether these momentum e↵ects would persist over longer time periods.
One replication experiment with multiple periods following the treatment suggests that e↵ort con-
tinues to decay exponentially, suggesting that the e↵ects of momentum would disappear within 20
minutes or so. That being said, even if short-lived, measuring momentum may have direct applica-
tions to the economics of task juggling and interruptions. As outlined in Section 5.3, approximately
45% of e↵ort momentum persists after 5 minutes. Using this estimate as a starting point, 45% of
productivity is lost in the first 5 minutes after an interruption, an additional 20% in the second 5
minutes, 9% in the third 5 minutes, 4% in the next 5 minutes and so on. In total, if an interruption
causes me to lose 5 minutes of productivity, I lose an additional 4 minutes of productivity due to
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e↵ort momentum loss spread out over the next 30 minutes. Put in other terms, total productivity
loss from e↵ort momentum is 80% of the original interruption loss. Given estimates of the number
of interruptions knowledge workers face, that suggests up to an hour of productivity per work day
could be lost due to e↵ort momentum alone.
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1.8. Figures
Figure 1: Example of Counting Problem Task
Notes. Figure demonstrates a typical counting task screen faced by subject. Whether
subject was asked to count hearts or drops was randomized in experiment 2.
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Figure 2: Solved Problems by Period – Experiment 2
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Notes. Bars represent standard errors. Vertical axis represents the number of problems
solved by workers. Treatments were only in e↵ect for period 2 (see experimental design in
section 3). The Pre-Treatment period is a training period to familiarize workers with the
task. Pre-Treatment lasted 3 times the duration of the other periods and thus the problems
solved in Pre-Treatment is divided by 3 to provide accurate comparison.
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Figure 3: Solved Problems by Period – Experiment 1
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Notes. Bars represent standard errors. Three treatment pairs were applied at varying
periods (see experimental design in section 3). The Pre-Treatment period is a training
period to familiarize workers with the task.
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Figure 4: Solved Problems within Pre-Treatment Period – Experiment 2
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Notes. Bars represent standard errors. This figure demonstrates the number of problems
solved by minute of the pre-treatment period. As these counting problems take about 45
seconds, the final minute was lower due a mechanical e↵ect (of being unable to finish a
problem in time) and additional uncertainty of whether one is able to finish the problem in
time (perhaps due to the timer reading “0 minutes left”).
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Figure 5: YouTube Searches by Period – Experiment 2
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Notes. Bars represent standard errors. Vertical axis represents the number of YouTube
searches performed by workers (baseline leisure option). Treatments were only in e↵ect for
period 2 (see experimental design in section 3). The Pre-Treatment period is a training
period to familiarize workers with the task. Pre-Treatment lasted 3 times the duration of
the other periods and thus the problems solved in Pre-Treatment is divided by 3 to provide
accurate comparison.
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1.9. Tables
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Mean Standard dev Min Max Mean Standard dev Min Max
Individual Level Variables
Female 0.72 0.45 0 1 0.71 0.45 0 1
Problems Solved in PreTreatment 6.59 2.75 0 14 20.2 7.60 0 67
Age 21.3 5.27 18 61 20.4 1.85 18 38
SAT Math Score 731 78 165 800 731 63 400 800
Total Payment 3.87 1.75 0 10.75 2.16 0.94 0 5.4
Computer Skill Test 2.01 0.08 2 3 2.01 0.10 2 3
Number of Previous Lab Studies 33.4 26.7 0 129 23.7 25.0 0 292
Period Level Variables
Problems Solved 7.85 3.7 0 21 7.23 3.49 0 17
Problems Incorrect 0.06 0.29 0 4 0.08 0.30 0 3
Youtube Searches 0.16 0.59 0 6 0.24 0.67 0 5
Period Payment 0.60 0.65  0.65 5.4 0.40 0.30  0.1 2.1
High Piece Rate Indicator 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.08 0.28 0 1
Phone Access Indicator 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.09 0.29 0 1
Low Piece Rate Indicator n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.08 0.27 0 1
Number of Individuals 155 422
Number of Treatment Periods 930 1266
Notes. Computer Skill Test was a demographic variable collected by the Wharton Behavioral Lab prior to the experiment, however one with almost
no variation. SAT Math score is missing for individuals who either took the ACT or otherwise did not wish to share that information with researchers.
Indicators for treatments are presented under the period level variables – as experiment 1 had no “low piece rate” treatment, it has no such indicator.
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Table 4: Randomization Check – Experiment 1
Dependent Variable Period # for
Piece Rate Treatment Phone Treatment
Female  0.09 0.19 0.06 0.03
(0.29) (0.32) (0.30) (0.32)
SAT Math Score  0.002  0.001
(’00s of points) (0.002) (0.26)
PreTreatment Problems Solved  0.047 0.011
(0.058) (0.048)
F-test 0.10 1.24 0.05 0.15
p value 0.75 0.30 0.83 0.93
Dependent Variable Mean 3.34 3.41 3.48 3.54
Number of Observations 930 738 930 738
Number of Individuals 155 123 155 123
Adj-R2 0.001 0.018 0.001 0.005
Notes. Standard Errors (clustered at individual level) presented in parentheses above. As every subject in experiment 1 receives all treatments at some
point, the dependent variable is the period in which they received the treatment in question. If randomization was done properly, the pre-treatment
variables should not predict the period they received the treatment. Indeed, the F-stats are all large enough that I fail to reject the hypothesis that
all coe cients are zero under ↵ = 0.05. Thus, I conclude the randomization was adequately done. SAT Math score is missing for 32 individuals who
either took the ACT or otherwise did not wish to share that information with researchers.
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Table 5: Randomization Check – Experiment 2
Variable Baseline Piece Rate Decrease Piece Rate Increase Phone Access
Female 0.68 0.71 0.74 0.71 p < 0.76
(0.47) (0.46) (0.44) (0.45) (F-test = 0.39)
Age 20.26 20.13 20.73 20.39 p < 0.11
(1.75) (1.61) (2.44) (1.48) (F-test = 2.05)
# Previous Studies at Lab 25.18 24.1 26.23 23.64 p < 0.22
(23.9) (20.5) (34.5) (18.7) (F-test = 0.88)
Computer Skill Test 2.01 2.01 2.02 2.00 p < 0.56
(0.01) (0.09) (0.14) (no variation) (F-test = 0.56)
Problems Solved in PreTreatment 20.57 20.23 19.54 20.23 p < 0.80
(7.76) (8.2) (7.02) (7.22) (F-test = 0.33)
Number of Subjects Treated 103 114 104 101
Notes. As every subject in experiment 2 receives (at most) one primary treatment, the subjects are split according to primary treatment. Means and
standard deviations (in parentheses) are presented by primary treatment. If randomization was done properly, the pre-treatment variables should not
di↵er significantly according to which treatment was received. Indeed, for all rows the F-stat corresponds to a p greater than 0.05 (fail to reject the
hypothesis that all coe cients are less than zero under ↵ = 0.05).
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Table 6: Contemporaneous Piece Rate and Phone Access: Impact on E↵ort – Experiment 1
Dependent Variable: Specification
Problems Solved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Piece Rate 4.34*** 4.62*** 4.62*** 2.07* 2.07*
(in cents per problem) (1.17) (1.15) (1.14) (1.09) (1.09)
Phone Access  0.38⇤⇤  0.37⇤⇤  0.39⇤⇤  0.46⇤⇤  0.46⇤⇤
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
PreTreatment Quintiles X X X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 7.85 7.85 7.85 7.85 7.85
Number of Observations 930 930 930 930 930
Number of Individuals 155 155 155 155 155
Adj-R2 0.01 0.23 0.23 0.31 0.32
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of problems solved correctly in a single period. All specifications report results from OLS regressions
and also include a constant term. PreTreatment Quintiles represent five binary variables to non-parametrically control for the number of problems
subject solved in the pre-treatment training period. Individual Controls include sex, age, ethnicity bins, number of sessions done, and WBL computer
diagnostic scores. Standard errors are given in parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Contemporaneous Piece Rate and Phone Access: Impact on E↵ort – Experiment 2
Dependent Variable: Specification
Problems Solved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Piece Rate 12.5*** 14.9*** 16.6*** 16.7*** 16.7***
(in cents per problem) (3.39) (2.67) (3.02) (2.98) (2.98)
Phone Access  0.05  0.10 0.12 0.15 0.17
(0.33) (0.25) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32)
PreTreatment Quintiles X X X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23
Number of Observations 1266 1266 1266 1266 1260
Number of Individuals 422 422 422 422 420
Adj-R2 0.01 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.45
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of problems solved correctly in a period. All specifications report results from OLS regressions and also
include a constant term. PreTreatment Quintiles represent five binary variables to non-parametrically control for the number of problems subject solved
in the pre-treatment training period. Individual Controls include sex, age, ethnicity bins, number of sessions done, and WBL computer diagnostic
scores, but could not be matched for 2 subjects. Standard errors given in parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1,
⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Previous Period Piece Rate and Phone Access: Impact on E↵ort – Experiment 1
Dependent Variable: Specification
Problems Solved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Piece Rate 5.00*** 5.34*** 2.19* 8.06*** 7.74*** 5.43***
(cents per problem) (1.29) (1.24) (1.14) (2.48) (1.94) (1.87)
Previous Period’s Piece Rate 3.42* 3.86** 0.45 7.99** 8.04*** 5.91**
(cents per problem) (1.74) (1.56) (1.36) (3.59) (2.93) (2.78)
Phone Access  0.26  0.25  0.43**  0.29  0.30  0.38
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.36) (0.32) (0.30)
Previous Period Phone Access 0.24 0.28 0.07 0.22 0.18 0.21
(0.26) (0.24) (0.23) (0.41) (0.35) (0.34)
PreTreatment Quintiles X X X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X X
Periods 1 to 3 Only X X X
Dependent Variable Mean 7.85 7.85 7.85 7.79 7.79 7.79
Number of Observations 930 930 930 465 465 465
Number of Individuals 155 155 155 155 155 155
Adj-R2 0.01 0.24 0.32 0.04 0.34 0.39
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of problems solved correctly in a single period. All specifications report results from OLS regressions
and also include a constant term. PreTreatment Quintiles represent five binary variables to non-parametrically control for the number of problems
subject solved in the pre-treatment training period. “Periods 1 to 3” uses data of the first treatment period and following period to minimize treatment
interactions. Individual Controls include sex, age, ethnicity bins, number of sessions done, and WBL computer diagnostic scores. Standard errors are
given in parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Previous Period Piece Rate and Phone Access: Impact on E↵ort – Experiment 2
Dependent Variable: Specification
Problems Solved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Piece Rate 12.66*** 15.09*** 16.57*** 16.97*** 17.09***
(cents per problem) (3.51) (2.74) (3.03) (3.05) (3.11)
Previous Period’s Piece Rate 4.09 6.51** 7.24** 7.64** 7.87**
(cents per problem) (4.03) (3.11) (3.32) (3.35) (3.40)
Phone Access  0.03  0.08 0.12 0.16 0.18
(0.36) (0.28) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33)
Previous Period Phone Access  0.03  0.08 0.02 0.06 0.07
(0.41) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)
PreTreatment Quintiles X X X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23
Number of Observations 1266 1266 1266 1266 1260
Number of Individuals 422 422 422 422 420
Adj-R2 0.01 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.45
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of problems solved correctly in a period. All specifications report results from OLS regressions and also
include a constant term. PreTreatment Quintiles represent five binary variables to non-parametrically control for the number of problems subject solved
in the pre-treatment training period. Individual Controls include age, sex, ethnicity, computer skill test, and total # of experimental sessions done at
the lab, but could not be matched for 2 subjects. Standard errors given in parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1,
⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Table 10: Phone Access by Gender: Impact on E↵ort – Experiment 2
Dependent Variable: Specification
Problems Solved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Phone Access * Female  0.26  0.28  0.29 0.08  0.18  0.02
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.41) (0.35) (0.32)
Previous Period Phone * Female 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.12  0.39  0.08
(0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.45) (0.40) (0.38)
Phone Access * Male  1.10⇤⇤⇤  1.10⇤⇤⇤  1.11⇤⇤⇤  2.33⇤⇤⇤  1.78⇤⇤  2.02⇤⇤⇤
(0.39) (0.41) (0.41) (0.77) (0.73) (0.72)
Previous Period Phone * Male  0.69  0.59  0.65  0.42 0.42 0.18
(0.57) (0.55) (0.55) (1.05) (0.69) (0.71)
Male  1.02⇤  0.68  0.10  0.36  0.28 0.24
(0.58) (0.58) (0.56) (0.61) (0.50) (0.54)
Pre-Treatment Quintiles X X X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X X
Periods 1 to 3 Only X X X
Dependent Variable Mean 7.85 7.85 7.85 7.79 7.79 7.79
Number of Observations 930 930 930 465 465 465
Number of Individuals 155 155 155 155 155 155
Adj-R2 0.03 0.24 0.33 0.03 0.32 0.39
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of problems solved correctly in a single period. All specifications report results from OLS regressions
and also include a constant term. PreTreatment Quintiles represent five binary variables to non-parametrically control for the number of problems
subject solved in the pre-treatment training period. “Periods 1 to 3” uses data of the first treatment period and following period to minimize treatment
interactions. Individual Controls include sex, age, ethnicity bins, number of sessions done, and WBL computer diagnostic scores. Standard errors are
given in parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Table 11: Phone Access by Gender: Impact on E↵ort – Experiment 2
Dependent Variable: Specification
Problems Solved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Phone Access * Female 0.51 0.36 0.39 0.44 0.45
(0.36) (0.29) (0.32) (0.34) (0.35)
Previous Period Phone * Female 0.48 0.34 0.42 0.47 0.48
(0.44) (0.36) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40)
Phone Access * Male  1.68**  1.59***  1.57***  1.61***  1.64***
(0.82) (0.51) (0.54) (0.51) (0.53)
Previous Period Phone * Male  1.61*  1.52**  1.43**  1.48**  1.51**
(0.88) (0.61) (0.63) (0.61) (0.61)
Male  0.45  0.48  0.48  0.51*  0.53*
(0.36) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28)
Pre-Treatment Quintiles X X X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23
Number of Observations 1263 1263 1263 1263 1260
Number of Individuals 421 421 421 421 420
Adj-R2 0.02 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.44
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of problems solved correctly in a period. All specifications report results from OLS regressions and
also include a constant term. PreTreatment Quintiles represent five binary variables to non-parametrically control for the number of problems subject
solved in the pre-treatment training period. Individual Controls include age, ethnicity, computer skill test, and total # of experimental sessions done
at the lab. Gender could not be matched for one subject, and the controls for an additional subject. Standard errors given in parentheses and clustered
at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Table 12: Next Period Piece Rate and Phone Access: Impact on E↵ort – Experiment 1
Dependent Variable: Specification
Problems Solved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Piece Rate 5.33*** 5.75*** 2.78** 8.74*** 8.62*** 6.46***
(in cents) (1.26) (1.23) (1.20) (2.58) (1.98) (1.95)
Next Period Piece Rate 1.80 2.65 0.57 3.63* 5.01** 4.20*
(if known) (1.73) (2.23) (2.35) (2.01) (2.14) (2.47)
Previous Period Piece Rate 3.64** 3.90*** 0.84 8.75** 8.49*** 6.53**
(1.62) (1.45) (1.33) (3.73) (2.97) (1.62)
Pre-Treatment Quintiles X X X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X X X X
Shown Next Period Bin X X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X X
Periods 1 to 3 Only X X X
Dependent Variable Mean 7.85 7.85 7.85 7.79 7.79 7.79
Number of Observations 930 930 930 465 465 465
Number of Individuals 155 155 155 155 155 155
Adj-R2 0.01 0.23 0.32 0.04 0.34 0.39
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of problems solved correctly in a single period. All specifications report results from OLS regressions and
also include a constant term. PreTreatment Quintiles represent five binary variables to non-parametrically control for the number of problems subject
solved in the pre-treatment training period. “Only Periods 1 to 3” uses data of the first treatment period and following period to minimize treatment
interactions. Individual Controls include age, sex, ethnicity, computer skill test, and total # of experimental sessions done at the lab. Standard errors
are given in parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Table 13: Next Period Piece Rate and Phone Access: Impact on E↵ort – Experiment 2
Dependent Variable: Specification
Problems Solved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Piece Rate 12.8*** 15.5*** 16.3*** 16.65*** 16.76***
(in cents) (3.58) (2.79) (2.92) (2.96) (3.04)
Next Period Piece Rate 1.09 3.23 0.73 1.59 2.63
(if known) (2.64) (2.19) (2.62) (3.92) (3.88)
Previous Piece Rate 4.21 6.88** 7.20** 7.52** 7.75**
(4.12) (3.17) (3.27) (3.31) (3.38)
Pre-Treatment Quintiles X X X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X X X
Shown Next Period Bin X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23
Number of Observations 1266 1266 1266 1266 1260
Number of Individuals 422 422 422 422 420
Adj-R2 0.01 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.44
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of problems solved correctly in a period. All specifications report results from OLS regressions and also
include a constant term. PreTreatment Quintiles represent five binary variables to non-parametrically control for the number of problems subject solved
in the pre-treatment training period. Individual Controls include age, sex, ethnicity, computer skill test, and total # of experimental sessions done at
the lab, but could not be matched for 2 subjects. Standard errors given in parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1,
⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Table 14: Previous E↵ort Instrumental Variable: Impact on E↵ort – Experiment 2
Dependent Variable: Specification
Problems Solved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Problems Previous Period 0.39 0.50*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.43***
(0.26) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Piece Rate 12.7*** 13.9*** 15.3*** 15.2*** 14.9***
(2.63) (2.51) (2.73) (2.81) (2.88)
Phone Access 0.04 0.07 0.24 0.25 0.23
(0.24) (0.23) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
First Stage F Stat (IV) 6.1 14.5 15.5 16.5 16.2
PreTreatment Quintiles X X X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 7.22 7.22 7.22 7.22 7.22
Number of Observations 844 844 844 844 840
Number of Individuals 422 422 422 422 420
Adj-R2 0.39 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of problems solved correctly in a single period. All specifications report results from linear Instrumental
Variable regressions estimated by (iterative) GMM and also include a constant term. PreTreatment Quintiles represent five binary variables to non-
parametrically control for the number of problems subject solved in the pre-treatment training period. Individual Controls include age, sex, ethnicity,
computer skill test, and total # of experimental sessions done at the lab, but could not be matched for 2 subjects. Standard errors are given in
parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Table 15: Period or Total Earnings Salience: Impact on Earnings – Experiment 2
Dependent Variable: Specification
Problems Solved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Piece Rate 9.32* 13.12*** 17.05*** 15.84*** 15.68***
(5.27) (3.83) (4.17) (3.87) (3.88)
Piece Rate * Period Salience 2.41  3.82 -2.86  1.01  1.00
(6.93) (5.21) (5.33) (5.11) (5.13)
Phone Access 0.92* 0.62* 0.94** 0.92** 0.88**
(0.50) (0.35) (0.41) (0.46) (0.46)
Phone Access * Period Salience  2.03***  1.20**  1.21**  1.23**  1.15**
(0.73) (0.53) (0.54) (0.56) (0.54)
Period Salience -0.32 0.34 0.40 0.22 0.25
(0.58) (0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39)
Pre-Treatment Quintiles X X X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 7.28 7.28 7.28 7.28 7.28
Number of Observations 894 894 894 894 891
Number of Individuals 298 298 298 298 297
Adj-R2 0.02 0.45 0.48 0.51 0.52
Notes. The dependent variable is the total earnings from a single period. All specifications report results from OLS regressions and also include
a constant term. The subject is shown either the previous period’s earnings (as indicated by “Period Salience”) or shown total earnings up to that
period. Experiment 2 was the only one that featured this variation. Unfortunately, while every subject in Experiment 2 did face a randomized period
or total counter, a small programming typo prevented the capture of this variable for the first day. As it is unclear which counter subjects faced on
the first day, they are dropped from analysis above. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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CHAPTER 2 : Risk Over Goods
2.1. Introduction
Many important decisions involve risk, including insurance, portfolio choice, and labor
relations. As a result, researchers have made great strides in understanding how decision
makers perceive and value these risks. Yet the standard decision making models generally
rely on a (concave) utility function over a single wealth variable. This often allows us
to encapsulate risk preferences in a single parameter, which allows for comparisons across
contexts and individuals.
While parsimonious, these models of risk aversion simplify a great deal of decision making.
Recent evidence suggests that estimates of risk aversion may not be applicable across all
domains. In Einav et al. (2012), demand for di↵erent types of insurance appears to be corre-
lated, but does not correlate well with riskiness of the 401(k) investments.68 In Barseghyan
et al. (2011), demand for insurance (as measured by deductibles) were substantially di↵erent
over two di↵erent goods, houses and cars.
One potential explanation for these di↵erences in risk preferences is that individuals might
treat pure monetary uncertainty (e.g. 401k or stocks) fundamentally di↵erent than good
uncertainty (e.g. insurance for cars or houses). This paper sets out to test precisely this
implication through an experiment with a real world market place, Amazon.com.69 Subjects
choose either Amazon.com credit amounts ($5, $10, etc.) or Amazon.com goods (books,
clothing, etc.) that total up to either $20 or $100. They allocate these credits or goods
across uncertain states that have equal probabilities of occurring. To remove temporal
concerns, all credit awarded is spent immediately after the uncertainty is resolved.70
68It may be worth noting that Einav et al. (2012) focuses on how individuals rank relative to their peers.
As a result, they are less focused on testing “absolute” di↵erences between risk preferences over di↵erent
goods and instead at the reliability of how individual will rank relative to others.
69A wide variety of goods is available on Amazon.com, making this an ideal environment to study evidence
of real risk preferences over goods.
70Subjects were quizzed on this and several other topics to ensure understanding. See design section for
more details.
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If individuals treat self-selected goods and time-allocated money identically without uncer-
tainty, then with relatively weak assumptions, there should be no di↵erence between the
allocated distributions (with uncertainty). As a simple example, if given $20 of credit and
an individual allocates $10 to each of the two states, they will receive $10 of credit for
sure. This $10 could be used to purchase anything on Amazon.com under or up to $10.
Therefore, it might be suprising that when asked to choose good(s) whose prices are at
most $20, individuals often no longer choose two goods under $10, but may instead choose
a $15 good and a $5 good. If this was indeed the optimal allocation of goods, it may seem
strange that the subject did not choose a $15 credit and $5 credit allocation instead. The
theory explains why
Contrary to this prediction, subjects exhibited considerably more risk aversion when se-
lecting credit. Subjects were four times as likely to place “equal” quantities with credit
than they were with goods. Furthermore, the mean standard deviation of credit alloca-
tions was about two-thirds that of the mean standard deviation of good prices. To analyze
whether these di↵erences could be driven by price uncertainty, subjects are randomly forced
to spend more time on Amazon.com, but this does not seem to influence the allocations
(with a rather precise zero e↵ect).
Although this is the first research to explicitly test this uncertainty equivalence, an earlier
theoretical literature uncovered several implicit assumptions about uncertainty over goods
and money. Grant et al. (1992) tackles this by assuming preferences over monetary lotteries
are induced by underlying preferences over goods lotteries.71 The paper then goes on to
establish implications for what risk aversion over monetary lotteries implies about risk
aversion over good lotteries. However, rather than assuming preferences over monetary
lotteries are induced by underlying preferences for good lotteries, I outline precisely what
assumptions will generate indi↵erence between a monetary lottery and equivalent value
(self-selected) good lotteries.
This study is not unique in its interest in how consumers may treat money and goods
71To the credit of Grant et al. (1992), they acknowledge alternate approaches in footnote 7, even though
it was not the main focus of that study.
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di↵erently. An extensive literature on the endowment e↵ect indicates that subjects, after
receiving a good, value that good more than subjects who do not (c.f. Knetsch (1989);
Kahneman et al. (1991); Bordalo et al. (2012)). There is also a growing literature on salience
and its impact on utiltiy over goods. While research has recently explored the potential
for salience in monetary lotteries as in Bordalo et al. (2010) or for goods under certainty
(Bordalo et al. (2012); Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013); Gabaix (2014)). This study therefore
might contribute important empirical evidence on how individuals aggregate preferences
over salient goods to create a limited-rationality utility framework over risk.
Consumers also face decisions daily about whether to purchase products running promo-
tional contests (Dhar and Simonson (1992)). These contests pose somewhat of a mystery,
given that they often feature prizes rather than equivalent cash values. In practice, these
prizes may be sold at reduced costs to the promoter, but this study also indicates another
possibility – individuals may wish to engage in risk over goods but prefer to avoid risk with
equivalent cash prizes.This may have important implications for government run lotteries,
which often serve to fund public programs. By adding physical items to these lotteries, it
may be possible to encourage risk seeking behavior from participants and generate addi-
tional revenues for publicly funded programs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 demonstrates theoretical
predictions. Section 3 outlines the experiment design. Section 4 presents the results and
Section 5 concludes.
2.2. Theory
In this section, I demonstrate that under perfect information of goods available and prices,
risk preferences across money and goods should be the same in a static model.
Each state s = 1, 2, ..., S occurs with a probability  s. There are goods n = 1, 2, ....N which
can be consumed in each state, gn,s an element of the good-specific set Gn ⇢ R+, as well as a
monetary good for each state,ms 2 R+. Thus, any particular lottery L is defined by the vec-
tor ( 1,m1, g1,1, g2,1, ..., gN,1;  2,m2, g1,2, g2,2, ..., gN,2; ...;  S ,mS , g1,S , g2,S , ..., gN,S), an ele-
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ment of [0, 1] ⇥ R+ ⇥ G1 ⇥ G2 ⇥ ... ⇥ GN ⇥ [0, 1] ⇥ ... ⇥ GN . For simplicity, I will call
this vector space LS where S refers to the set of states.
This can also be written as the combination of degenerate lotteries Ls, where
Ls ⌘ (1,ms, g1,s, g2,s, ..., gN,s) 2 L1. Thus, for any lottery L, for shorthand we may write
it as L = ( 1L1,  2L2, ...,  SLS) where  sLs refers to ( s,ms, g1,s, g2,s, ..., gN,s). To make
assumptions of state independence more plausible,72 I also assume that
P
 s = 1.
In addition, for any given state s define the market state as a vector of prices Ps =
(p1,s, p2,s, ..., pn,s). The market consists of a vector that consists of the individual market
states P = (P1, P2, ...PS).73 The agent has preferences relation %P over lotteries LS for a
given market P .74 For notational simplicity, if there are lotteries A,B 2 LR with R < S , I
write A %P B as a shorthand for (A,~0) %P (B,~0) where ~0 2 LS R. In words, even though
preferences are over the entire S states, I pad out the remaining states with zeroes to use
the same preference relation.
In addition to the basic relation assumptions, I assume the preferences have two additional
properties: (a) Monetary Equivalence Under Certainty and (b) Independence.
Monetary Equivalence Under Certainty.
(i) For degenerate lottery Ls = (1,ms, g1,s, g2,s, ..., gN,s), the agent weakly prefers the bundle
L
0
s = (1, ms +
P
n pn,sgn,s, 0, 0, ...., 0), that is L
0
s %P Ls.
(ii) For any degenerate lottery Ls = (1,ms, g1,s, g2,s, ..., gN,s), there exists a degenerate
lottery L
00
s = (1, 0, g
00
1,s, g
00
2,s, ..., g
00
N,s) such that
P
n pn,sg
00
n,s  ms+
P
n pn,sgn,s and L
00
s %P Ls.
72If states were not mutually exclusive (with exactly one state occuring), it would be hard to believe that
properties of other states would not cause preference reversals. For example, one might prefer a 100% chance
of a chocolate to an 100% chance of a piece of marshmallow. But if we had a 100% chance of marshmallow
with an additional 50% chance of chocolate, this may now be preferred to a 100% chance of a chocolate with
an additional 50% chance of additional chocolate.
73This assumption of linear pricing is for ease of notational simplicity and could be instead considered as
a vector function.
74In this case, because the monetary good is allowed to enter directly into the bundle, market prices may
influence preferences over bundles.
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In words, Monetary Equivalence (i) states that in a case with no uncertainty, the agent is
at least as happy o↵ with converting any particular bundle into the money it would cost
to purchase that bundle. Since this is true for all degenerate lotteries, including optimal
bundles, it also implies that there are no transaction costs to converting money into goods.
Monetary Equivalence (ii) states that in a case with no uncertainty, the agent has no
particular preference for holding onto money. In other words, money is only as useful as the
things it can buy.75 It is also worth noting that this does not mean that every dollar must
get spent in an optimal bundle. For example, if goods are discrete rather than continuous,
it may not be optimal to spend every last dollar. However, what this assumption indicates
is that any money left over after purchasing the optimal goods bundle would have no value
(as they would be indi↵erent between that and the same goods bundle with no money).76
Independence Property. For any lotteries L and L
0
in LR, preferences are independent
if L %P L
0
implies 8↵ 2 (0, 1) and for all degenerate lotteries L00 , (↵L, (1   ↵)L00) %P
(↵L
0
, (1  ↵)L00).
With monetary equivalence under uncertainty and the independence property, we can
establish the following: Let GL = (g1,1, g2,1, ..., gN,1, g1,2, ..., gN,2, ...., g1,S , g2,S , ...gN,S) 2
G1⇥G2⇥ ...⇥GN ⇥G1⇥ ...⇥GN denote the vector of goods for a given lottery L in which
all monetary values are 0. Let G(P, I) = {GL s.t.
P
s
P
n psgn,s  I}, with supG(P, I)
defined using the partial ordering %P in which all monetary values are set to 0. By a
75Although this model is being presented as a static one, the same item at di↵erent periods could be
thought of as di↵erent goods – as long as the uncertainty is resolved in one period with discrete and finite
time periods, the same results hold true intertemporally.
76For example, let’s say I am buying discrete apples and bananas. If apples are $2 and bananas are $3
and I have $7 to spend, I may indeed prefer 2 bananas even though I have $1 left over. But according to
Monetary Equivalence (ii), I am indi↵erent between $0 and 2 bananas and $1 and 2 bananas.
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similar notation, let ML = (m1,m2, ...,mS) 2 RS denote the vector of monetary values for
a lottery L in which all non-monetary goods are 0. And M(P, I) = {ML s.t.
P
sms  I},
with supM(P, I) defined using the partial ordering %P in which all non-monetary goods
are set to 0.
Theorem (Monetary Equivalence Over Uncertainty): Under the assumptions of
Monetary Equivalence Under Certainty and Independence, if a lottery of goods is optimal,
then the monetary lottery (with equivalent value in each state) will also be optimal. Math-
ematically, if G⇤ = (g1,1, g2,1, ..., gN,1, g1,2, ..., gN,2, ...., g1,S , g2,S , ...gN,S) 2 supG(P, I), then
M⇤ = (p11g11 + p21g21 + ...+ pN1gN1, p12g12 + p22g22 + ...+ pN2gN2, ...., p1Sg1S + p2Sg2S +
...+ pNSgNS) 2 supM(P, I).
Proof: For proof by contradiction, assume that the condition is true, that G⇤ 2 supG(P )
but that, as defined above, M⇤ /2 supM(P, I). Note that G⇤ can be rewritten as the
combination of degenerate lotteries G⇤ =  1L⇤1 +  2L⇤2 + ... + (1 
P
 s)L⇤S where L
⇤
s =
(1, 0, g⇤1,s, g⇤2,s, ..., g⇤N,s). Individually, each of these degenerate lotteries is weakly dominated
by the degenerate lottery L
0
s = (1, p1,sg
⇤
1,s + p2,sg
⇤
2,s + ... + pN,sg
⇤
N,s, 0, ..., 0) via Monetary
Equivalence under Certainty. By multiple applications of the independence assumption, this
means that ( 1L⇤1,  2L⇤2, ...,  SL⇤S) -P ( 1L
0
1,  2L
0
2, ...,  SL
0
S) but note that this compound
lottery corresponds precisely to M⇤.
However as M⇤ /2 supM(P, I) but M⇤ 2 M(P, I), that implies there is some M⇤⇤ 2
M(P, I) with M⇤⇤  P M⇤. We can rewrite this lottery as a combination of degener-
ate lotteries ( 1,m⇤⇤1 , 0, ..., 0;  2,m⇤⇤2 , 0, .., 0; ...;  S ,m⇤⇤S , 0, ..., 0) = ( 1L
⇤⇤
1 ,  2L
⇤⇤
2 , ...,  SL
⇤⇤
S )
. However, for each of these degenerate lotteries, L⇤⇤s the Monetary Equivalence Under Cer-
tainty property (ii) states that there exists a degenerate lottery L
00
s = (1, 0, g
⇤⇤
1,s, g
⇤⇤
2,s, ..., g
⇤⇤
N,s)
such that L
00
s %P L⇤⇤s . Repeated application of the Independence property gives us G
00 ⌘
( 1L
00
1 ,  2L
00
2 , ...,  SL
00
S) %P ( 1L
00
1 ,  2L
00
2 , ...,  SL
00
S). Thus G
00 %P M⇤⇤  P M⇤ %P G⇤ .
This is a contradiction, however, as G⇤ was the supremum of G(P, I) and now there is a
new lottery G
00
in G(P, I) which strictly dominates it.
61
2.2.1. Discussion
The assumptions that drive the theory in this case warrant additional discussion. First,
if the preference relation is a weak order, that implies that the agent has both transitive
and complete preferences. Transitivity of preferences over risk has been discussed as early
as Tversky (1969) but more recent empirical evidence suggests that preferences can largely
be summarized as transitive (c.f. Birnbaum and Gutierrez (2007); Birnbaum and Schmidt
(2010); Regenwetter et al. (2011)).77 Completeness of preferences is harder to test, as
indecision between two lotteries might be interpreted as indi↵erence. This is especially
di cult given the great number of goods available on Amazon.com.
Regarding Monetary Equivalence under Certainty, part (i) states that the agent would be at
least as well o↵ with an equivalent amount of money as a goods bundle would cost. However,
if agents are somewhat unaware of the goods available or the prices of the goods, this may
not be the case. The agent might not remember that a good is available to purchase, or
the agent might have incorrect beliefs about what the prices, influencing money is capable
of purchasing. Indeed, this may be a big component for why individuals seem to treat
money and goods di↵erently. To minimize these concerns, Amazon.com was employed for
the study, which as a real market should mimic the trade o↵ between money and goods.78
Lastly, an additional information treatment was employed to test this theory as is described
in Section 3.
Monetary Equivalence under Certainty part (ii) states that money holds no inherent value
above and beyond what can be purchased with it. In other words, with a given amount
of money, the agent can always find a bundle that makes them at least as happy. Yet this
assumption makes no mention of the psychic costs that may be associated with finding the
bundle in question. In addition, this assumption may be true in our static model and the
(static) experiment, but intertemporally agents may want to hold on to some of their money
77However, this is an ongoing field of research. It is also possible that the research may not apply to the
lotteries employed, being arguably more intricate than previous lotteries studied. Yet intransitive preferences
would also make choosing a bundle more di cult in this setting. In previous studies, the outcomes in
particular states were largely fixed, whereas in this case the outcomes are subject-determined.
78In addition, subjects were allowed to sign in to Amazon if they preferred, to view existing wishlists.
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as future prices are not perfectly known.79
The Independence property is similar to the Independence property assumed for von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions. In that set up, lotteries are probability distributions over
fixed outcomes. If all goods are discrete, then as the possible lotteries are bounded by the
endowment income, then the lottery structure in section 2 could be rewritten under that
framework,80 and the Independence property would be identical.
However the Independence property has been criticized as potentially too strong an as-
sumption. In particular, the famous Allais ’paradox’ in which the chance of another lottery
may cause preference reversals. Yet the relative importance and frequency of these non-
independent lotteries for decision making is an ongoing debate (c.f.Rubinstein (1988); Allais
and Hagen (2013)).
2.3. Experiment Design Overview
In order to test this theory, I conducted an incentivized experiment with 124 undergraduate
students at the Wharton Behavioral Lab in March 2016. During this experiment, the
subjects selected goods on Amazon.com over uncertain states. Subjects sit at the computer
and are informed about the upcoming uncertainty. Depending on their treatment, they
select either Amazon.com credit (monetary allocations) or Amazon.com goods over several
possible states. A wide variety of goods are available on Amazon.com,81 making this an
ideal environment for measuring risk preferences over goods and money.
The static decision is a 2x2x2 design, with agents allocating either {credit or goods} worth
a total of {$20 or $100} and is {required or not required} to spend an extra 5 minutes
79If future prices were perfectly known, then a good in di↵erent time periods could enter the model as
di↵erent goods. However in addition to price uncertainty, there may be quantity uncertainty, e.g. car stolen,
that might make Monetary Equivalence under Certainty (ii) unlikely to be true over time.
80If all goods are discrete and bounded by the endowment, then with a finite number of goods and states,
there would only be a finite number of possible bundles. As a result, one could rewrite every possible
goods bundle in every di↵erent state as a di↵erent (fixed) outcome. Doing so would make the intuition
behind Monetary Equivalence under Certainty hard to understand, and the assumption of discrete goods is
unnecessary to the proof I outline.
81As of 2015, it is estimated that there are between 300 and 400 million unique items sold on Amazon.com.
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browsing Amazon.com. Subjects perform this procedure twice (two rounds).82 When given
a total of $20, only 2 (equal probability) states can occur, but to keep the average payout
the same, 10 (equal probability) states can occur when given a total of $100.
For example, they might be given $20 of Amazon.com credit to allocate over two states,
A or B, each of which occurs with 50% probability. In this case, a typical “risk averse”
decision would be allocate $10 of credit for State A and $10 of credit for State B, thus
ensuring that regardless of which state occurs, $10 of Amazon.com credit will be selected.
They are then required to spend any credit rewarded.
Alternatively, the subject might be given $20 of Amazon.com credit, but rather than asked
to allocate the credit, the subject selects Amazon.com goods whose prices add up to at most
$20. In other words, the subject determines what to “spend” the credit on goods before
the uncertainty is resolved.
Important to this interpretation is the intertemporal fungibility of the Amazon.com credit.
Amazon.com goods are purchased at one point in time. Thus, it is important to limit
Amazon.com credit to a similar (static) time period. To test the theory outlined above,
subjects were informed and quizzed that no matter what credit amount is selected, a single
item would be selected at the end of the session whose price is less than or equal to the
amount of credit. 83
To remove concerns about “shrouded attributes” (c.f. Gabaix et al. (2006); Chetty et al.
(2009); Brown et al. (2010)), only the list price of the good is considered. Subjects are
informed and quizzed in both cases that only the list price will count toward the total, not
shipping. In addition, for any URL entered, the browser instantaneously used the Amazon
A liate API to calculate the price of the item. At the same time, a “total counter” at
the bottom of the page informed subjects about the remaining credit available. Combined,
these measures aim to limit any “price uncertainty” to prices of unsearched items, rather
82Every agent receives both $20 or $100 treatments, but it is randomized which occurs first.
832 subjects selected physical Amazon.com gift cards using either used their Amazon.com credit or Ama-
zon.com items. This was not explicitly discouraged, as an individual willing to do this has made both
the Amazon.com goods and Amazon.com credit fungible. However, dropping these individuals makes no
di↵erence to the qualitative results or significance.
64
than the prices of items already selected or searched. For example, I may not know the
precise prices of oven mitts, but once I find a particular oven mitt on Amazon.com, all price
uncertainty of that specific oven mitt should be gone. Without taxing or shipping concerns,
there are no further mental calculations required.84
A sample of subjects were randomly selected to spend an extra 5 minutes on Amazon.com
to help understand the potential for price or product uncertainty driving potential results.
This will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.
Prior to being allowed to start each period, the subjects had to correctly answer questions
about the upcoming period, as seen in Appendix Figures 1 and 2. These procedures were
implemented to ensure subjects fully understood the incentives they faced. To remove any
subject overlap, the computer cookies and browsing history were also cleared in between
sessions.
2.4. Experiment Results
The first question is whether the primary treatment of selecting Amazon.com goods (rather
than credit) impacted the distribution of good value. Recall that under the assumptions of
section 2, there should be no di↵erence between the good distributions and the monetary
distributions. For example, if the agent preferred a 10% chance of a $100 item to a sure
thing of a $10 item, then when selecting monetary distributions, they should have also
preferred a 10% chance of $100 credit to a sure thing of $10 credit. As the credit needed to
be spent immediately after awarded, there are no intertemporal savings, so any di↵erence
in distribution over the uncertain states would indicate one of the assumptions was not
satisfied.
Result 2.4.1 Contrary to the equivalence theory presented, subjects exhibited greater risk
aversion when selecting credit amounts than they did when selecting goods. When selecting
goods, subjects were also significantly less likely to select goods of the same value.
84To further simplify things, agents are informed that only the “default” seller price matters. This is
primarily Amazon.com itself.
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There are several ways to analyze these di↵erences in distribution. I provide results using
multiple methods, including regressions of the standard deviation, tests of allocating risk
equally across all states, and nonparametric methods to test di↵erences in distribution. All
of these methods support the conclusion that subjects selecting credit allocations were more
likely to spread out the total amount over multiple states, while subjects selecting goods
chose more risky allocations (measured with the price of the items).
Specifically, when investigating the standard deviation of values selected across the possible
states, distributing credit meant that agents reduced the standard deviation of the distri-
bution by a third. As seen in Table 3A, OLS estimates suggest the standard deviation of
prices were significantly reduced by  2.66 to  2.43 down from a mean of 7.61. However,
further analysis of the allocations suggests that not only the standard deviation, but also
the mean di↵ers between credit and goods treatments. This may be because goods on
Amazon.com are discrete – it is likely di cult or suboptimal to spend precisely $20 (or
$100).85 As a result of this discreteness, one might also want to investigate the standard
deviation after normalizing values by the total amount allocated. However, the results in
Table 3B are nearly identical, with one-third of the standard deviation decreasing when
selecting credit.86
In the experiment, 16% of subjects removed all risk by allocating a uniform distribution
(equal values across all of the uncertain states). As seen in Table 4, this risk-less distribution
were over 4 times as likely to occur when the subjects were selecting credit than when they
were selecting goods (p < 0.01). Note that subjects were instructed and quizzed that they
could place the same the same good in multiple slots, thus increasing the chance of having
it selected (see Appendix Figure 2). Despite this quizzing, there were only 8 cases where
a subject selected a uniform distribution of good prices, indicating a greater tolerance for
risk.
85Indeed, the average allocation is $9.32 instead of the full $10. Selecting credit instead of the goods
increases this average by about $0.50 (more details in Appendix Table 1).
86It is worth noting that the $100 treatment e↵ect changes sign. This is likely because with more money
to spend the potential standard deviation of allocations can increase; but once normalized to fractions, this
e↵ect goes away.
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In addition to these regression results, one can also non-parametrically analyze the distri-
bution of values. However, these tests assume independence among observations, so it is
not possible to simply use every individual allocation datapoint. Instead, each allocation is
transformed into a single variable that can then be non-parametrically tested across the two
primary treatments (goods and credit). The $20 treatment is a good starting point for this,
as most of the information of an allocation can be summarized in a single number, specifi-
cally “What is the price of the lower-priced good?” These distributions across individuals
are plotted in Figure 2A, and the associated Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects equality of
the distributions (p < 0.01). Figure 2B plots distributions of a similar nature, that is the
normalized price of the lower-priced good (in other words, what fraction of the total spent
is on the lower-priced good). Kolmogorov-Smirnov suggests borderline significant rejection
for equality of the distributions of this transformation (p < 0.07).
However, though widely used, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test uses the largest di↵erence be-
tween the distributions. As a result, it tends to underweight di↵erences in the tails of the
cumulative distributions – Mason and Schuenemeyer (1983); Kim and Whitt (2015). Given
the large share of subjects who place $10 and $10 when using credit, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test may not be the most e cient. Alternatively, we can also use more informa-
tion from the distributions, such as a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the within-allocation
standard deviation. In these cases, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov rejects equality of distribution
both when using the distributions of standard deviations (p < 0.01) or the distributions of
normalized standard deviations (p < 0.01).
Result 2.4.2 When forced to spend more time searching Amazon.com, subjects did not
significiantly alter the distribution allocations of goods and credit.
To test the possibility that the di↵erence in risk for the good domain is being driven by
product or price uncertainty, some subjects were randomly submitted to an information
treatment. In this treatment, subjects were forced to wait an extra 5 minutes before they
could submit their allocations. During this time, subjects were only allowed to visit Ama-
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zon.com or sit quietly at the desk.87 The intent was to lower the marginal cost of searching.
It appears this treatment was indeed successful in inducing subjects to spend more time in
a section – the average treatment e↵ect was to spend an extra 8 minutes (3 minutes beyond
the 5 minutes imposed). This extra time spent searching could be the result of product
search being unexpectedly fun or that the the 5 minute timer was not visible while browsing
Amazon, causing subjects to run over.
As we can see in the OLS regressions in Table 5A, the treatment information had no signifi-
cant direct impact on allocation distributions (as measured by the standard distribution). If
the information treatment’s e↵ect on allocation would be through the time spent searching,
we can also use the information treatment as an instrumental variable for time spent in a
section. This allows a causal impact of time spent searching on the distribution allocations.
Table 5B presents results of this instrumental variable regression, but once again, spending
more time searching has no significant impact on the standard deviation of the allocation.
2.5. Conclusion
Contrary to the equivalence theory money and goods under uncertainty, subjects exhibited
reduced risk taking with selecting credit amounts than they did when selecting goods.
When selecting goods, subjects were also significantly less likely to select goods of the same
value across the uncertain states. These findings alone might indicate a general uncertainty
of Amazon.com goods or prices, but forcing subjects to spend more time investigating
Amazon.com does not change these di↵erences.
As a result, one of the remaining assumptions of the equivalence theory must be false to
result in this behavior. One possibility is the an endowment e↵ect, which allows for owner-
ship of the item to increase the owner’s willingness-to-accept (Knetsch (1989); Kahneman
et al. (1991)). In this experiment, if committing to a good allocation triggers a similar
endowment e↵ect, then a post-committed good allocation might be worth more than an
equivalent price bundle. In order for this to cause greater risk taking with goods, there
87This website restriction, as well as a no cellphone rule, was enforced by lab assistants monitoring the
study.
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must be convexities in the endowment e↵ect; otherwise good bundles would not necessarily
be more risky.
Another possibility is a model of thinking aversion presented in Ortoleva (2013). Although
the information treatment resulted in subjects spending more time searching, it may be
that they still dislike the large choice set. As a result, they may not decide on a particular
allocation of goods until they have no other choice. This could result in less risk taking in
credit relative to goods.
Lastly, it may be that credit, being easier to compare, may result in more “regret aversion”
as described in Loomes and Sugden (1982). If the prices of goods or inherent value of goods
makes comparisons more di cult, it may be the case that the agent will experience less
regret if the “best” outcome does not happen. As a result, they may be more willing to
engage in riskier behavior over goods than the more easily comparable money outcomes.
It may also be the case that by reducing the choice set, the di↵erence between money and
goods risk taking could decrease. For example, if subjects were only able to choose between
two goods for each uncertain state, one might expect a convergence of money and good risk
taking. But in the real world, individuals face many possible uses for their money.
While these are interesting possibilities and warrant further study, this does not change
the primary finding of this paper. In other words, whether convex endowment e↵ects or
thinking aversion is driving the di↵erence in risk taking, it remains that individuals react
di↵erentially to risk over goods and risk over money.
This finding has important implications for public policy. In 2014 U.S. government spon-
sored lotteries raised $70 billion in revenues, helping fund state governments and programs.
This paper suggests that individuals may be more willing to engage in lotteries that have
goods, not just money. Indeed, anecdotally U.S. companies often run sweepstakes with
prizes (cars, cruises, etc.) rather than a pure lottery.88 For example, a prize of $1 million
with a car worth $50,000 may cause more engagement in risk than a lottery with $1,050,000
88Some of this is likely driven by reduced costs of prizes, which may be seen as a marketing cost. However,
this reduced cost may also be achieved for a potential state run sweepstakes.
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million. Although the total ramifications of state-run lotteries are debatable, this greater
willingness in risk could be used to reduce advertisement and overhead budgets without
changing revenues.
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2.6. Figures
Figure 6: Example of Good Selection
Notes. Figure demonstrates a typical good selection screen faced by subject. Whether
subject was asked to select Amazon.com goods (via URLs) or Amazon.com credit amounts
was randomized. Whether subject was asked to find up to 10 items that totaled at most
$100 or up to 2 items that totaled at most $20 was also randomized. See Experiment Design
for more details.
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Figure 7: Distribution of the Smaller Value When Total is $20
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Notes. Plot shows two cumulative distributions of the value of the smaller good when total
is $20. When given $20 to allocate, the agent chooses to allocate across 2 uncertain states,
this represents the smaller of these two allocations. Vertical axis represents the frequency of
that value occurring across the two di↵erent treatments (selecting goods or selecting credit
allocations).
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Figure 8: Distribution of the Smaller Value (Normalized) When Total is $20
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Notes. Plot shows two cumulative distributions of the (normalized) value of the smaller
good when total is $20. Value is normalized by dividing by the total value allocated.
When given $20 to allocate, the agent chooses to allocate across 2 uncertain states, this
represents the smaller of these two allocations. Vertical axis represents the frequency of
that (normalized) value occurring across the two di↵erent treatments (selecting goods or
selecting credit allocations).
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2.7. Tables
Table 16: Summary Statistics
Mean Standard dev Min Max
Individual Level Variables
Female 0.71 0.45 0 1
Age 20.2 1.3 18 24
SAT Math Score 733 62 540 800 (22 missing)
Computer Skill Test 2 0 2 2 (1 missing)
Number of Previous Lab Studies 26.6 24.8 1 133
Period Level Variables
Average Value of Entry $9.33 1.07 4 10
Standard Dev of Entry (within) $7.06 6.92 0 31.6
$100 Treatment Indicator 0.50 0.50 0 1
Credit Treatment Indicator 0.46 0.50 0 1
Time Spent Searching (seconds) 487 373 45 1699
Number of Individuals 124
Number of Treatment Periods 248
Notes. Computer Skill Test was a demographic variable collected by the Wharton Behavioral Lab prior to the experiment, however among subjects
above it had no variation. SAT Math score is missing for individuals who either took the ACT or otherwise did not wish to share that information
with researchers.
74
Table 17: Randomization Check
Dependent Variable Period # for
Credit Treatment $100 Treatment
Female  0.11  0.01  0.02  0.01
(0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
SAT Math Score 0.01 0.01
(’00s of points) (0.08) (0.09)
Previous WBL Studies  0.001  0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
F-test 2.59 0.24 0.05 0.24
p value 0.11 0.87 0.83 0.87
Dependent Variable Mean 0.46 0.48 1.54 1.54
Number of Observations 248 204 248 204
Number of Individuals 124 102 124 102
Notes. Standard Errors (clustered at individual level) presented in parentheses above. As every subject in experiment 1 receives both the $20 and
$100 treatments, the dependent variable for $100 treatment is the period in which they received the treatment in question. If randomization was done
properly, the pre-treatment variables should not predict the period they received this treatment. Indeed, the F-stats are all large enough that I fail
to reject the hypothesis that all coe cients are zero under ↵ = 0.05. Thus, I conclude the randomization was adequately done. SAT Math score is
missing for 22 individuals who either took the ACT or otherwise did not wish to share that information with researchers.
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Table 18: Credit and $100: Impact on Standard Deviation of Selection Value
Dependent Variable: Specification
Value Standard Deviation (1) (2) (3) (4)
Subject Selects Credit  2.66***  2.61***  2.56***  2.43***
(Binary Treatment Var.) (0.77) (0.77) (0.81) (0.82)
$100 Total Allocation 4.96*** 5.00*** 5.00*** 4.99***
(Binary Treatment Var.) (0.64) (0.63) (0.64) (0.64)
First Period 0.59 0.59 0.61
(0.64) (0.66) (0.67)
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 7.61 7.61 7.61 7.61
Number of Observations 248 248 248 248
Number of Individuals 124 124 124 124
Adj-R2 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.22
Notes. The dependent variable is the standard deviation of value of the entries in a single period. All specifications report results from OLS regressions
and also include a constant term. Individual Controls include sex, age, ethnicity bins, and number of sessions done. Standard errors are given in
parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Table 19: Credit and $100: Impact on Standard Deviation of Selection Value (Normalized)
Dependent Variable: Specification
Normalized Value Std Dev (1) (2) (3) (4)
Subject Selects Credit  0.08***  0.07***  0.07***  0.07***
(Binary Treatment Var.) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
$100 Total Allocation  0.17***  0.17***  0.17***  0.17***
(Binary Treatment Var.) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
First Period 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Number of Observations 248 248 248 248
Number of Individuals 124 124 124 124
Adj-R2 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.27
Notes. The dependent variable is the standard deviation of normalized value of the entries in a single period. Values were normalized by dividing
by the total value allocated. All specifications report results from OLS regressions and also include a constant term. Individual Controls include sex,
age, ethnicity bins, and number of sessions done. Standard errors are given in parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1,
⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Table 20: Credit and $100: Impact on Equality of Selection Values
Dependent Variable: Specification
All Entries Same Value (1) (2) (3) (4)
Subject Selects Credit 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.21***
(Binary Treatment Var.) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
$100 Total Allocation  0.07  0.07*  0.08*  0.07*
(Binary Treatment Var.) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
First Period  0.13⇤⇤⇤  0.13⇤⇤⇤  0.13⇤⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Number of Observations 248 248 248 248
Number of Individuals 124 124 124 124
Adj-R2 0.10 0.13 0.21 0.22
Notes. The dependent variable is the whether all entries have equal value in a single period. Values were normalized by dividing by the total value
allocated. All specifications report results from OLS regressions and also include a constant term. Individual Controls include sex, age, ethnicity bins,
and number of sessions done. Standard errors are given in parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05,
⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Table 21: OLS Impact of Search on Standard Deviation of Selection Value
Dependent Variable: Specification
Normalized Value Std Dev (1) (2) (3) (4)
Subject Selects Credit  0.08***  0.08***  0.07***  0.07***
(Binary Treatment Var.) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
$100 Total Allocation  0.17***  0.17***  0.17***  0.17***
(Binary Treatment Var.) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Information Treatment 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Round Fixed E↵ects X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Number of Observations 248 248 248 248
Number of Individuals 124 124 124 124
Adj-R2 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.27
Notes. The dependent variable is the standard deviation of normalized value of the entries in a single period. Values were normalized by dividing
by the total value allocated. All specifications report results from OLS regressions and also include a constant term. Individual Controls include sex,
age, ethnicity bins, and number of sessions done. Standard errors are given in parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1,
⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Table 22: IV Impact of Search on Standard Deviation of Selection Value
Dependent Variable: Specification
Normalized Value Std Dev (1) (2) (3) (4)
Subject Selects Credit  0.07***  0.07***  0.06***  0.07***
(Binary Treatment Var.) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
$100 Total Allocation  0.17***  0.17***  0.17***  0.17***
(Binary Treatment Var.) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Time Searching (Minutes) 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
First Stage F Stat (IV) 176.9 168.8 159.2 144.2
Round Fixed E↵ects X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Number of Observations 248 248 248 248
Number of Individuals 124 124 124 124
Adj-R2 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.27
Notes. The dependent variable is the standard deviation of normalized value of the entries in a single period. Values were normalized by dividing by
the total value allocated. All specifications report results from GMM Instrumental variable regressions and also include a constant term. Time spent
searching was instrumented by the information treatment, with F values from the first stage reported. Individual Controls include sex, age, ethnicity
bins, and number of sessions done. Standard errors are given in parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05,
⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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CHAPTER 3 : Time Lotteries
3.1. Introduction
Suppose you are o↵ered a choice between (i) receiving $x in period t for sure, or (ii) receiving
$x in a random period t˜ with mean t. For example, you can receive $100 in 10 weeks for
sure, or $100 in either 5 or 15 weeks with equal probability. Both lotteries pay the same
amount and have the same expected delivery date. However, the delivery date is known in
the first lottery and is uncertain in the second one. Suppose also that if you choose option
(ii), the exact payment date will be revealed immediately, eliminating any planning issues.
Which would you choose?
In this paper we study preferences over time lotteries: lotteries that pay the same prize at
uncertain future dates, with the uncertainty fully resolved immediately after the choice is
made.89 Uncertainty about timing has a bearing on many real life choices. For example,
when one decides whether to invest in a project that is certain to start paying dividends
in 5 years rather than in one which starts payments within an average of 5 years. Another
example is whether to pay more to guarantee that the delivery date of an online purchase
(like a book from Amazon) is t days from now, rather than t days on average.
The starting point of our analysis is the observation that the ubiquitous model of time
preferences – Discounted Expected Utility with convex discounting – imposes a specific
direction of these preferences: independently of the values of x and t, when o↵ered a choice
between options (i) and (ii) above, subjects should always pick the option with an uncertain
payment date (ii); that is, they must be risk seeking over time lotteries (RSTL). To see
this, recall that the standard way to evaluate a consumption path that pays c in each period
and c+ x in some period t is given by
P
⌧ 6=tD (⌧)u (c) +D (t)u (c+ x) , where u is a time-
independent utility function over outcomes and D is a decreasing discount function. If the
89The notion of time lotteries is introduced in Chesson and Viscusi (2003) (termed “lottery-timing risk
aversion”), and also analyzed in Onay and O¨ncu¨ler (2007); we discuss the relation with these papers below.
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Figure 9: The exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic discount functions
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Notes. The exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic discount functions are, respectively, D (t) =  t,
D (t) = 11+ t , and D (t) =   
t for t   1 (with D(0) = 1), where  ,   2 (0, 1) and   > 0. They are all convex.
consumption path is random, overall utility is obtained by taking expectations, leading to
the Discounted Expected Utility (DEU) model. As long as the discount functionD is convex,
Jensen’s inequality implies that option (ii) is preferred. Note that this is independent
of the curvature of the utility function u, as the payment is the same in both options.
Since virtually all discount functions used in economics are convex (including exponential,
hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic; see Figure 9) and since non-convex discounting is possible
at only finitely many points (as we discuss in Section 3.2), this is a fundamental feature of
the standard model.
We contend that this prediction of DEU is too strong: in an incentivized experiment, we
find that most subjects are not RSTL. Instead, subjects normally pick lotteries with known
payment dates, exhibiting risk aversion over time lotteries (RATL). Our theoretical contri-
bution is to show that two well-known generalizations of the standard model — the sepa-
ration of risk aversion and time preference in Epstein and Zin (1989) (henceforth EZ) and
a discounted non-Expected Utility model with probability weighting — can both account
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for this behavior. We then use our experimental findings to demonstrate that EZ better
fits the data. Our results provide a new justification for the separation of attitudes toward
risk and intertemporal substitution in EZ and also suggest new theoretical restrictions on
its parameters.
According to EZ, time lotteries are evaluated by first computing the discounted utility of
each consumption path in its support. Then, unlike in DEU, these discounted utilities are
aggregated non-linearly ; the certainty equivalent of the lottery over them is computed in
a way that depends on the curvature of a function v, which captures the individual’s risk
aversion and is di↵erent from the function u used in evaluating deterministic consumption
paths. If the individual is risk averse enough (v is su ciently concave), then she will prefer a
payment in a known date to a payment with an uncertain but mean preserving date. Thus,
EZ predicts a correlation between risk aversion over time lotteries and standard atemporal
risk aversion, since both are a↵ected by the same parameter.
Another way to accommodate some risk aversion over time lotteries, also suggested in Onay
and O¨ncu¨ler (2007), is to relax Expected Utility by aggregating the discounted utilities using
expectation with respect to distorted probability weights. This Discounted Probability
Weighting Utility model (DPWU) predicts a preference for known payment dates only
among subjects who violate Expected Utility by su ciently underweighting the probabilities
of good outcomes.
We conducted an experiment to test if subjects are risk seeking over time lotteries, and,
if not, to separate between the two explanations above. We first asked subjects to choose
between pairs of time lotteries, where the distribution of dates in one option was a mean
preserving spread of that in the other. We then measured standard time preferences. Lastly,
we asked questions on regular risk preferences to measure subject’s atemporal risk aversion,
as well as violations of Expected Utility and probability weighting. The following are our
key findings:
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1. Only a small number of subjects (less than 7%) are RSTL and the majority can be
classified as RATL. When both options have random payment dates, most subjects
still prefer the less risky ones (in the sense of mean preserving spreads), which suggests
that they are not simply attracted to certainty.
2. A large majority of subjects (82%) exhibit convex discounting. The above result (1)
remains unchanged if we restrict the analysis to these subjects.
3. Consistently with EZ, preferences for known payment dates are strongly related to
atemporal risk aversion.
4. In contrast to DPWU, preferences for known payment dates are unrelated to viola-
tions of Expected Utility. Subjects who do not underweight probabilities still prefer
known payment dates. The same is true if we focus only on those who abide by Ex-
pected Utility theory in atemporal risky choices (i.e., we eliminate those who both
underweight and overweight probabilities). In addition, a regression analysis shows
that the preference for known payment dates is unrelated to the degree of probability
weighting.
Overall, our experimental results show the prevalence of RATL (contradicting DEU), and
support the generalization based on EZ, but not the one based on probability weighting.
This is of particular relevance because EZ is a widely-used model, especially in macroeco-
nomics and finance. The common justification for adopting EZ is that it allows for two
di↵erent parameters to govern attitudes toward risk and intertemporal substitution – an
additional degree of freedom that has proved particularly e↵ective in matching empirical
data.90 Behaviorally, it is sometimes justified as it allows for a preference for early rather
than late resolution of uncertainty. Based on our results presented above, we suggest an
additional reason to adopt this model: it permits a wider range of preferences over time
lotteries, allowing decision makers to prefer payments with a known date.
90See, for example, Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Chen et al. (2013).
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The impossibility of DEU to accommodate di↵erent attitudes towards time lotteries can be
understood with an analogy to the classic work of Yaari (1987). Within the (atemporal)
Expected Utility framework, diminishing marginal utility of income and risk aversion are
bonded together. But, as Yaari argues, these two properties are “horses of di↵erent colors”
and hence, as a fundamental principle, a theory that keeps them separate is desirable.
We show an analogous property in a temporal setting. Convex discounting, which is a
property of pure time preferences, necessarily implies RSTL. There is no fundamental reason
why the two notions should be related and, in fact, we find their equivalence even more
troubling than the equivalence pointed out by Yaari. This is because while diminishing
marginal utility of income and risk aversion relate to two di↵erent phenomena, they are
both reasonable properties of preferences. In our case, while decreasing willingness to wait
(convex discounting) is a plausible behavioral property, supported by our experimental data,
it seems that most people are not RSTL.
This paper is related to the literature on the interaction between time and risk.91 Chesson
and Viscusi (2003) introduce the idea of time lotteries, analyze the case of standard DEU
with exponential discounting, and argue that uncertainty aversion over outcome timing
should be correlated with uncertainty aversion over probabilities of outcomes. They con-
ducted a hypothetical survey on business owners, and found that 30 percent of the subjects
dislike uncertainty in the timing of an outcome. Onay and O¨ncu¨ler (2007) generalize their
theoretical result, pointing out that (what we call) RSTL holds in DEU for any convex
discounting (their analysis also focuses on the roles of gains and losses). They conducted
an un-incentivized survey, with large hypothetical payments, and also found that subjects
dislike uncertainty in timing. They link this to violations of Expected Utility due to proba-
bility distortions. Unlike these two papers, we show that EZ can also theoretically account
for a preference for sure dates. Moreover, we conducted an actual (incentivized) experiment
in which we confirmed the prevalence of preferences for known payment dates. When we
91See Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) and references therein.
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compared possible explanations, we found support for the one based on EZ. Eliaz and Or-
toleva (forthcoming) studied the case in which the payment date is ambiguous, as opposed
to risky. They found that the majority of subjects remain averse to this ambiguity, but the
proportion is much smaller than that of aversion to ambiguous payments.
Other papers in the literature on the relation between time and risk mostly focus on di↵er-
ent issues and do not analyze attitude towards time lotteries. For example, Halevy (2008)
suggests a link between present bias (Strotz, 1955) and the certainty e↵ect (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979) based on the idea that the present is known while any future plan is
inherently risky. He shows that the two ideas can be bridged, if the individual evaluates
stochastic streams of payments using specific non-Expected Utility functionals. Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012) challenge a property of DEU, according to which intertemporal alloca-
tions should depend only on relative intertemporal risk. They conducted an experiment that
focused on common-ratio type questions, applied to intertemporal risk. Their result indi-
cates that subjects display a preference for certainty when it is available, but behave closely
in line with the predictions DEU when only uncertain (future) prospects are considered.
Andersen et al. (2008), Epper et al. (2011), and Dean and Ortoleva (2015) experimentally
studied the relation between time and risk preferences. They found that time preferences
are correlated with the curvature of the utility function, as predicted by the standard model;
their results on the relation with violations of Expected Utility are mixed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 formally shows that DEU
implies risk seeking towards time lotteries. Section 3.3 introduces the two possible gener-
alizations that can allow for a wider range of behavior — EZ and discounted probability
weighting — and discuss their empirical predictions. Section 3.4 presents the experimental
design and its results. The appendix includes proofs of the formal results and the experi-
mental details.
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3.2. DEU and Attitudes towards Time Lotteries
We assume time to be discrete and identify the set of possible times with the set of natural
numbers. A consumption path is a sequence c = (c1, c2, ..., ct, ..) that specifies consumption
in each period ct 2 R+.
Our analysis focuses on a particular type of lotteries over consumption paths, which we
call time lotteries. Fix a base level of per-period consumption c. For each monetary prize
x 2 R+ and time t 2 N, let (x, t) denote the consumption path that pays c + x in period
t and c in any other period. A time lottery px = hpx (t) , (x, t)it2N is a finite probability
measure over {x} ⇥ N, that is, a lottery that yields an additional payment of x in period
t with probability px (t).92 The degenerate lottery that yields (x, t) for sure is denoted by
 (x,t). Let Px denote the set of all time lotteries with payment x. Preferences are defined
over P := [
x2X
Px and are represented by some function V : P !R.
We say that preferences are risk averse towards time lotteries (RATL) if, for every x 2 R+
and every px 2 Px with
P
⌧ px (⌧) ⌧ = t,
V
 
 (x,t)
    V (px) . (3.1)
They are risk seeking towards time lotteries (RSTL) if the sign in (3.1) is reversed.
According to the Discounted Expected Utility model (DEU), the value of each time lottery
px is given by
VDEU (px) =
X
t
px (t)
hX
⌧ 6=tD (⌧)u (c) +D (t)u (c+ x)
i
,
92To avoid confusion, let us emphasize that time lotteries are fundamentally di↵erent from lotteries that
pay an uncertain amounts in di↵erent periods. For example, the time lottery that pays $1 in either periods
1 and 3 with equal probabilities is very di↵erent from the lotteries that pay $0 or $1 with 50 percent chance
in periods 1 and 3. With the former, the decision maker always gets exactly $1, although she does not know
when. With the latter, she may get a total of $0, $1, or $2.
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where u : X ! R+ is a continuous and strictly increasing utility function, andD : N! (0, 1]
is a strictly decreasing discount function.
We say that a discount function is discretely convex if D is a convex function when defined,
that is, if for all t1, t2 2 N and ↵ 2 (0, 1),
↵D (t1) + (1  ↵)D (t2)   D (↵t1 + (1  ↵) t2)
whenever ↵t1 + (1  ↵) t2 2 N.
The following proposition establishes the relationship between attitudes towards time lot-
teries and the convexity of the discount function. (The first part of our result, confined to
two prizes coded as “gains,” is stated as Hypothesis 1 in Onay and O¨ncu¨ler 2007.)
Proposition 3.2.1 Under DEU, preferences are RSTL if and only if D is discretely convex.
Moreover, they cannot be RATL.
Proof First, we show that preferences are RSTL (RATL) if and only if D is discretely
convex (concave). (A discount function is discretely concave if  D is discretely convex.)
The value of  (x,t) is
VDEU
⇣
 (x,t)
⌘
=
X
⌧ 6=tD (⌧)u (c) +D
 
t
 
u (c+ x) ,
whereas the value of the time lottery p = hpx (t) , tit2N with
P
t px (t) t = t is
VDEU (p) =
X
t
px (t)
hX
⌧ 6=tD (⌧)u (c) +D (t)u (c+ x)
i
With algebraic manipulations give:
VDEU (p)   VDEU
⇣
 (x,t)
⌘
,
hX
px (t)D (t) D
 
t
 i
[u (c+ x)  u (c)]   0,
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which, because u is strictly increasing, holds if and only if D is convex.
Next, we show that D cannot be discretely concave. Suppose D is discretely concave, so
that
D(t)  D(1) + (t  1) [D (2) D (1)] .
Taking t   2D(1) D(2)D(1) D(2) and using the fact that D is strictly decreasing, we obtain D(t) < 0,
which contradicts the fact that the discount function is positive.
The first part of Proposition 3.2.1 states that if the discount function is convex, a DEU
decision maker must be RSTL. Importantly, this result does not rely on the curvature of the
utility function u since all options involve the same payments, although in di↵erent periods.
But is it plausible to assume that the discount function is convex? As we pointed out in
the introduction, virtually all discount functions used in economics are convex (see Figure
9). Indeed, convexity of the discount function has a natural behavioral interpretation: it
means that time delays are less costly the further away in time they occur. Therefore, with
standard discount functions, DEU leaves no degrees of freedom on the risk attitude towards
time lotteries.
The second part of Proposition 3.2.1 states that discount functions cannot be (globally)
concave, implying that we cannot have RATL with DEU. Figure 10 illustrates the intuition
behind this result. The discount function must be decreasing. Concavity requires it to
decrease at an increasing rate, meaning that the discount function at all periods greater
than t+1 must lie below the secant passing through D(t  1) and D(t+1). If the discount
function were concave, it would eventually cross the horizontal axis, contradicting the fact
that discount functions are positive.
In light of Proposition 3.2.1, we ask whether DEU can satisfy weaker, local versions of RATL.
Since time lotteries have two dimensions (time and prizes), we consider two di↵erent notions
of local RATL. We say that preferences are locally risk averse towards time lotteries at prize
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Figure 10: Discount functions are locally convex in all but a finite number of periods
t
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 ...
D(
t)
0
0.1
0.2
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0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Notes. Dotted lines are the secants going through the points adjacent to the dates where D is locally
concave. To be globally concave, D would have to be below these secants, crossing the horizontal axis.
x if
V
 
 (x,t)
    V (p)
for every p 2 Px with
P
⌧ px (⌧) ⌧ = t. They are locally risk averse towards time lotteries at
time t if the sure payment at t is preferred to a random payment occurring at either t  1
or at t+ 1 with equal probabilities, that is,
V
 
 (x,t)
    V (h0.5, (x, t  1); 0.5, (x, t+ 1)i)
for every x 2 R+. As before, we say that preferences are locally risk seeking at either x or
t if the reverse inequalities hold.93
Proposition 3.2.2 below shows that even these weaker versions of RATL are inconsistent
with DEU. Thus, even if we were willing to abandon convexity, it would be of limited
93While neither notion of local RATL is contained in the other, being locally RSTL in any of them prevents
the decision maker from being locally RATL in the other.
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help. Since the previous discussion did not rely on varying the prize x, it follows that DEU
also cannot accommodate local RATL at any x. Moreover, as Figure 10 illustrates, local
concavity can hold only at a small number of periods. Therefore, preferences are generically
locally RSTL in time, in the sense that they are locally RATL in only finite number of dates.
Proposition 3.2.2 Under DEU, there is no x at which preferences are locally RATL. More-
over, the set of periods in which preferences are locally RATL at t is finite.
Proof See Appendix.
In the following section, we will see two theories, each of them allowing for one of these
notions of local RATL to hold.94
3.3. Beyond DEU: Epstein Zin Preferences and Probability Weighting
We now present two generalizations of DEU that allow more flexible attitudes towards time
lotteries. The first one disentangles attitudes towards risk from intertemporal substitution,
leading to the model of Epstein and Zin (1989). The second replaces objective probabilities
by decision weights. We show that both models can capture preferences for known payment
dates and discuss their implications. In the next section, we will evaluate each of them
using data from our experiment.
3.3.1. Separating Time and Risk Preferences: the model of Epstein Zin
Epstein and Zin (1989) (EZ) introduced a general class of preferences over stochastic con-
sumption paths, defined recursively over this period’s known consumption and the certainty
equivalent of next period’s utility. In the most popular version of EZ, lotteries over con-
sumption paths are evaluated using the recursive formula:
94The analysis thus far does not permit individuals to smooth consumption by redistributing their prize
over time. In the Appendix, we allow the decision maker to costlessly borrow and save. We show that  (x,t)
is preferred over h0.5, (x, t  1); 0.5, (x, t+ 1)i if and only if the decision maker is su ciently risk averse.
However, quantitatively, choosing the safe lottery requires absurdly high risk aversion or extremely large
prizes. For example, suppose the (market) rate of discount is 0.9. Then, an individual with a million dollars
in discounted lifetime earnings and a constant coe cient of relative risk aversion of 10 would prefer the safe
lottery only if the prize exceeds $123, 500.
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Vt =
⇢
(1   ) c1 ⇢t +  
⇥
Et
 
V 1 ↵t+1
 ⇤ 1 ⇢
1 ↵
  1
1 ⇢
, (3.2)
where ct denotes consumption at time t, ↵ > 0 is the coe cient of relative risk aversion,
and ⇢ > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. EZ boils down to
DEU whenever ↵ = ⇢. A well-known advantage of this model is that it separates the roles
of risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution – which must be the inverse
of one another with DEU. This additional degree of freedom has proved to be particularly
useful in applied work, and this model is widely used in macroeconomics, asset pricing,
and portfolio choice. From a behavioral prospective, this generalization of DEU also allows
subjects to express preferences for early or late resolution of uncertainty. One message
from our analysis below is that separating risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution also allows accommodating some risk aversion over time lotteries. This feature,
in turns, suggests new theoretical restrictions on the values of the parameters ↵ and ⇢.
Given the simple structure of time lotteries, in which all uncertainty about future con-
sumption is resolved immediately, the value of a time lottery p 2 Px using equation (3.2)
is
VEZ (p) =
⇢
(1   ) c1 ⇢ +   ⇥Ep  V 1 ↵ ⇤ 1 ⇢1 ↵  11 ⇢ , (3.3)
where Ep (·) denotes the expectation with respect to the measure p.95 If we let   := c+xc > 1
denote the proportional increase in consumption from the prize, the continuation utility V
is determined by
V
 
 (x,t)
 
= [(1   ) c] 11 ⇢
h
 t 1 ⇢ +
X
⌧ 6=t  
⌧
i
. (3.4)
Consider a choice between the safe lottery  (x,t) and the risky lottery h0.5, (x, t  1); 0.5, (x, t+ 1)i.
The next proposition establishes that EZ can accommodate a preference for the safe lottery
over the risky one and determines the main comparative statics of these preferences given
95Note that in order to use equation (3.2), we think of any time lottery p as determining payo↵s from next
period on, preceded by a (known) consumption of c today.
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the parameters of the model:
Proposition 3.3.1 Under EZ, for any  , ⇢, and x, there exists ↵¯⇢, ,x > max {⇢, 1} such
that VEZ
 
 (x,t)
 
> VEZ (h0.5, (x, t  1); 0.5, (x, t+ 1)i) if and only if ↵ > ↵¯⇢, ,x. Moreover,
limx&0 ↵¯⇢, ,x = +1.
Proof See Appendix.
Proposition 3.3.1 shows that, controlling for discounting  , elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution 1/⇢, and the size of the prize x, more risk averse individuals are more likely to
prefer the safe lottery.96 That is, under EZ there is a connection between risk aversion
over time lotteries and risk aversion over regular, atemporal lotteries. Moreover, the risky
lottery is always preferred if the utility function is less concave than a logarithmic function
(↵ < 1), if ↵  ⇢, or if the prize is small enough.
To illustrate the nature of this trade-o↵, and why EZ allows for a preference for the safe
lottery while DEU does not, consider the case of an infinite elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (⇢ = 0) and suppose the mean payment period is t = 3. Applying equation
(3.3), the value of the safe lottery is simply the (per-period) discounted present value of
consumption:
(1   ) c

1 +   +   2 +
 3
1   
 
, (3.5)
The value when choosing the risky lottery (the 50 : 50 mixture between t = 2 and t = 4)
equals
(1   ) c
2641 +  
⇣
 +  1  
⌘1 ↵
+
⇣
1 +   +   2 +  
3
1  
⌘1 ↵
2
375
1
1 ↵
, (3.6)
which is the (per-period) certainty equivalent of the atemporal lottery that pays the dis-
counted present value of future payments, that is, it pays either c
⇣
 +  1  
⌘
, or c
⇣
1 +   +   2 +  
3
1  
⌘
with equal probabilities.
96That is, ↵0 > ↵ implies that if the decision maker with coe cient of risk aversion ↵ prefers the safe
lottery over the risky one, so does the decision maker with ↵0 (holding other parameters fixed).
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From (3.6), it follows that the value of the risky lottery is decreasing in the risk aversion ↵,
while that of the safe lottery is una↵ected. With risk neutrality (↵ = 0), the risky lottery
is preferred since it o↵ers a higher expected discounted payment. As risk aversion ↵ goes
to infinity, however, the value of choosing the risky lottery decreases to that of receiving
the worst possible outcome for sure – namely, the present discounted value from getting the
prize at t = 4. Since receiving the prize at t = 3 is better than receiving it at t = 4, the
safe lottery is preferred with extreme risk aversion. By monotonicity and continuity, there
exists a unique cuto↵ ↵¯0, ,x separating the regions where safe lottery and the risky lottery
are preferred. Since EZ coincides with DEU when ↵ = ⇢, and DEU displays RSTL, the
cuto↵ level of risk aversion ↵¯⇢, ,x must be greater than ⇢.97 Further notice that the cuto↵
↵¯⇢, ,x only depends on the ratio x/c and does not depend on the time distance t. This
follows from the homogeneity of this version of EZ and the dynamic consistency property
of these preferences.
A broader intuition of why EZ preferences need not be RSTL is the following. Under
DEU, the decision maker evaluates the risky lottery by first computing the discounted
utility of each possible consumption path, and then aggregating these values linearly, by
taking expectation; no curvature, or distortion, is applied to this aggregation – in DEU all
the curvature is applied when computing the value of each path. Instead, under EZ the
decision maker also computes the discounted utility of each path, but then aggregate them
non-linearly : she calculates the certainty equivalent of the lottery over them in a way that
depends on the individual’s risk aversion (as captured by the parameter ↵). If risk aversion
is su ciently high, then she will prefer the safe lottery.
At the same time, Proposition 3.3.1 also shows that limx&0 ↵¯⇢, ,x = +1, which means
that for any ↵, ⇢ and  , EZ preferences are locally RSTL at x whenever x is small enough.
97Starting with Kreps and Porteus (1978), a large literature has studied preferences over the timing of
resolution of uncertainty. With EZ, early resolution of uncertainty is preferred if and only if ↵ > ⇢ (Epstein
et al., 2014). Proposition 3.3.1 then implies that this condition is also needed for the safe time lottery to be
preferred.
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Therefore, with this formulation of EZ, preferences also cannot be locally RATL at any
t (see footnote 93). Intuitively, this follows from the fact that the certainty equivalent
of future paths is calculated according to Expected Utility (with constant relative risk
aversion). Recall that Expected Utility implies that preferences are approximately risk
neutral when stakes are very small (Segal and Spivak, 1990; Rabin, 2000). Then, since risk
neutral preferences are RSTL, the risky lottery is preferred if the prize x is small enough.
We conclude with a brief discussion on the parameter restrictions on EZ implied by Propo-
sition 3.3.1. Figure 11 presents the loci of points separating the regions where the safe and
risky lotteries are preferred for a discount parameter of   = 0.9. Points above each curve
correspond to parameters that favor the safe lottery; below each curve, the risky lottery
is preferred. Notice that the region where the safe lottery is preferred increases with the
prize x and with the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (i.e., it decreases with ⇢). For
example, with x = c, ⇢ = 0.6, and   = 0.9, the safe lottery is chosen as long as ↵ is at least
15.
3.3.2. Discounted Probability Weighting Utility
An alternative way to generalize DEU is to allow for probability distortions. Consider a
decision maker who evaluates a time lottery that pays prize x > 0 at t0 with probability ↵
and at t1 > t0 with probability 1  ↵ according to
VDPWU (h↵, (x, t0) ; (1  ↵) , (x, t1)i) = ⇡ (↵)VDEU
 
 (x,t0)
 
+ (1  ⇡ (↵))VDEU
 
 (x,t1)
 
,
where ⇡ : [0, 1] ! [0, 1] is increasing and continuous. This formula generalizes many non-
Expected Utility models such as rank dependent utility (Quiggin, 1982; Yaari, 1987), cu-
mulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), and disappointment aversion
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Figure 11: The function ↵¯⇢, ,x determines whether the risky lottery is preferred to the safe
lottery
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Notes. Each panel depicts parameters under which a decision maker with discount parameter   = 0.9 will
be indi↵erent between the safe lottery  (x,3) and the risky lottery h0.5, (x, 2); 0.5, (x, 4)i, where points above
each curve correspond to parameters for which the safe lottery is preferred. Panel (a) has ⇢ on the horizontal
axis and each curve corresponds to the prize x as a proportion of per-period consumption c. Panel (b) has
the prize as a proportion of per-period consumption in the horizontal axis. Notice that the safe lottery is
preferred when ↵, ⇢, and x/c are large. As x/c decreases to zero, the decision maker eventually prefers the
risky lottery.
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(Gul, 1991).98 For concreteness, we refer to any preferences satisfying this condition as
Discounted Probability Weighting Utility (DPWU).
Consider again a choice between the safe lottery  (x,t) and the risky lottery that pays either
(x, t  1) or (x, t+1) with equal probabilities. We now show that within DPWU, the more
convex the discount function is, the more likely that the risky lottery is preferred; and the
more probabilities are underweighted (that is, the lower ⇡ (↵) is for any ↵), the more likely
that the safe lottery is preferred. To make this statement precise, we need a measure of the
convexity of the discount function. Let
dt ⌘ D(t  1) D(t)
D(t) D(t+ 1)
denote the degree of convexity at t. In particular with exponential discounting we have
dt =
1
  , so a lower discount parameter implies a more convex discount function.
Straightforward calculations show that the safe time lottery is preferred if and only if
D(t)   ⇡ (0.5)D(t  1) + (1  ⇡ (0.5))D(t+ 1),
which can be rearranged as
dt  1
⇡ (0.5)
  1. (3.7)
Thus, the safe time lottery is chosen by individuals with less convex discount functions
and those who underweight probability more, showing that DPWU can accommodate local
RATL at any t. Moreover, unlike with EZ, the condition for the safe lottery to be chosen
(3.7) does not depend on the prize x.
For example, with exponential discounting (D(t) =  t), the decision maker prefers the safe
lottery if and only if   2  q ⇡(0.5)1 ⇡(0.5) , 1 . Thus, if the decision maker distorts probabilities
98In the context of static choice under risk and uncertainty, Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) studied the
general class of preferences with this property, which they termed biseparable.
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pessimistically – leading to ⇡(0.5) < 0.5 and thus ⇡(0.5)1 ⇡(0.5) < 1 – and if   is high enough –
the discount function is not too convex – then she will choose the safe lottery.
The following proposition summarizes the result from above and establishes that DPWU
cannot accommodate preferences that are locally risk averse at any x (and, therefore, cannot
be globally RATL).
Proposition 3.3.2 Under DPWU, preferences are locally RATL at time t if and only if
(3.7) holds. Moreover, they cannot be locally RATL at any prize x.
Proof See Appendix.
3.4. Experiment
3.4.1. Design
We conducted the experiment at the Wharton Behavioral Lab at the Wharton School of
the University of Pennsylvania in October and November 2013. We ran 16 sessions with
197 subjects, recruited from a database of volunteer students. Each session lasted about
45 minutes and no subject participated in more than one session. The experiment was
conducted on paper-and-pencil questionnaire. No time limit was given to answer each
question. Average earnings were $25.20, including a $10 show-up fee. Appendix D includes
the complete questionnaire and instructions.
Some of the questions in the experiment involved payments to be made on the same day. If
selected for payment, those would be paid at the end of each session, along with the show-
up fee. Other questions involved payments to be made in the future. For these, subjects
were told that their payment would be available to pick up from the lab starting from
the date indicated. All payment dates were expressed in weeks, with the goal of reducing
heterogeneity in transaction costs between the dates, under the assumption that students
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have a regular schedule each week during the semester.99
We ran two treatments: ‘long delay’ and ‘short delay’ (labeled Long and Short). A total of
91 and 105 subjects participated in each, respectively. Both treatments had identical ques-
tionnaires except for the length of delays in some of the questions: in the Long treatment,
some payments were delayed by up to 12 weeks; in the Short treatment, the maximum delay
was 5 weeks. Testing both treatments allows us to study long times spans, where di↵erences
between time lotteries become more pronounced; as well as shorter ones, where students’
schedules are more stable, reducing heterogeneous sources of variation.100
The experiment has three parts.101 Subjects received general instructions about the exper-
iment and specific instructions about the first part of the experiment when they entered
the room. Separate instructions were distributed in the beginning of each of the following
parts.
Part I asks subjects to choose between di↵erent time lotteries and is the key part of our
experiment. For example, the first question asked them to choose between $15 in 2 weeks or
$15 in 1 week with probability .75 and in 5 weeks with probability .25. Subjects answered five
questions of this kind. Table 23 lists the questions asked in each treatment. All questions
o↵ered two options that paid the same prize at di↵erent dates, and one distribution of
99An email was then sent to remind them of the approaching date (and they were told they would receive
it). Subjects were also given the contact details of one of the authors, Daniel Gottlieb (at the time a full-
time faculty at Wharton), in case they had questions about payments. Returning to the lab to collect the
payment involve transaction costs, a typical concern for experiments involving delayed payments. However,
transaction costs are less concerning for our experiment where all payments related to time lotteries take
place in future dates. A second concern is that our questions involve payments of di↵erent amounts of
money over time, and it is well-known that using money to study time-preferences may be problematic
(Augenblick et al., forthcoming). However, for the purpose of our study most of these concerns do not apply
(for example, the curvature of the utility function is inconsequential on ranking of time lotteries, as we
have seen). Moreover, an important part of our analysis is the relationship between risk aversion over time
lotteries and atemporal risk aversion. Since atemporal risk aversion is only defined for monetary lotteries, we
focus our experiment on lotteries over money and leave for future research an investigation of time lotteries
involving di↵erent objects.
100In the Short version all payments were scheduled before the end of the semester in which the experiment
was run, and no payment was scheduled during exam week.
101The order of parts and of questions in each part were partly randomized: we first describe each part,
and then discuss the randomization procedure.
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payment dates was a mean preserving spread of the other. Hence, these questions allow
us to elicit subjects’ attitudes towards time lotteries. In three of them, one of the options
had a known date; in the other two, both options had random payment dates. All subjects
received the same first question (Question 1 in Table 23) in a separate sheet of paper. The
answer to this question is a key indication of the subjects’ preferences, as it captures their
immediate reaction to this choice, uncontaminated by other questions.102
Table 23: Questions in Part I
Long Delay Short Delay
Q. $$ Option 1 vs. Option 2 $$ Option 1 vs. Option 2
1 $20 2 wk 75% 1 wk, 25% 5 wk $20 2 wk 75% 1 wk, 25% 5 wk
2 $15 3 wk 90% 2 wk, 10% 12 wk $15 3 wk 50% 1 wk, 50% 5 wk
3 $10 2 wk 50% 1 wk, 50% 3 wk $10 2 wk 50% 1 wk, 50% 3 wk
4 $20 50% 2 wk, 50% 3 wk 50% 1 wk, 50% 4 wk $20 50% 2 wk, 50% 3 wk 75% 2 wk, 25% 4 wk
5 $15 50% 2 wk, 50% 5 wk 75% 1 wk, 25% 11 wk $10 50% 2 wk, 50% 5 wk 75% 3 wk, 25% 5 wk
Notes. Each lottery pays the same prize with di↵erent delays (in weeks). Subjects in the long delay
treatment chose between ‘Option 1’ and ‘Option 2, Long Delay.’ Those in the short delay treatment chose
between ‘Option 1’ and ‘Option 2, Short Delay.’
Parts II and III use the multiple price list (MPL) method of Holt and Laury (2002) to
measure time and risk preferences. With MPL, each question has a table with two columns
and twenty-one rows. One column always displays the same option – e.g., receiving $10
today – while each row in the right column o↵ers a slightly better option in constant
increments. For example, in the first question, the options on the right go from $10 in 2
weeks to $15 in 2 weeks with .25c increments per row. For each row, subjects have to choose
between the left and the right options. These questions are typically interpreted as follows:
if a subject chooses the option on the left for all rows above a point, and the option on
the right below that point, then the indi↵erence point should be where the switching takes
place. Subjects who understand the procedure should not switch more than once.
Part II measures time preferences and attitudes towards time lotteries (see Table 24). Ques-
102One potential concern with o↵ering a list of similar questions is that subjects may ‘try’ di↵erent answers
even if they have a mild preference in one direction with some hedging concern in mind (Agranov and
Ortoleva, 2015).
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tions 6-9 measure discounting between various dates, allowing us also to quantify its con-
vexity. Questions 10 and 11 allow us to quantify risk preferences towards time lotteries.
Part III measures atemporal risk preferences, with payments taking place immediately at
the end of the session (see Table 25). From these questions, we can quantify each subject’s
(standard) risk aversion. Moreover, by asking Allais’ common-ratio-type questions (see for
example Questions 12 and 13), we can determine which subjects behave according to Ex-
pected Utility theory and quantify violations of it. Finally, at the end of the experiment
subjects answered a non-incentivized questionnaire.
Table 24: Questions in Part II
Long Delay Short Delay
Q. Option 1 vs. Option 2 Option 1 vs. Option 2
6 $10 today x in 2 wk $10 today x in 2 wk
7 $10 in 1 wk x in 2 wk $10 in 1 wk x in 2 wk
8 $10 in 1 wk x in 5 wk $10 in 1 wk x in 3 wk
9 $10 in 1 wk x in 12 wk $10 in 1 wk x in 4 wk
10 $20 in 4 wk $20, x% in 2wk, (1-x)% in 12wk $25 in 3 wk $25, x% in 2wk, (1-x)% in 5wk
11 $25 in 2 wk $25, x% in 1wk, (1-x)% in 5wk $25 in 2 wk $25, x% in 1wk, (1-x)% in 5wk
Notes. Questions 6-9 ask the amount $x that would make subjects indi↵erent between each option. Ques-
tions 10-11 ask the probability x% that would make subjects indi↵erent between each option. These amounts
were determined using MPL.
Table 25: Questions in Part III
Q. Option 1 vs. Option 2
12 $15 x% of $20, (1-x)% of $8
13 50% of $15, 50% of $8 x% of $20, (1-x)% of $8
14 20% of $15, 80% of $8 x% of $20, (1-x)% of $8
15 $20 x% of $30, (1-x)% of $5
16 50% of $20, 50% of $5 x% of $30, (1-x)% of $3
17 10% of $20, 90% of $5 x% of $30, (1-x)% of $3
Notes. Questions ask the probability x% that would make subjects indi↵erent between each option, deter-
mined using MPL. All payments were scheduled for the day of the experiment.
After all subjects completed the questionnaire, one question was randomly selected from
Parts I, II, and III for payment. The randomization of the question selected for payment,
as well as the outcome of any lottery (if the selected question had random payments), was
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made with the use of dice.103 Crucially, all uncertainty was resolved at the end of the
experiment, including the one regarding payment dates. The instructions explicitly stated
that subjects would know all payment dates before leaving the room.
The order of parts and of questions within parts was partly randomized. All randomizations
took place at a session level. Therefore, all subjects in the same session saw the same
questionnaire, but di↵erent questionnaires were used in di↵erent sessions. Because Part
I is the key part of the experiment, all subjects saw it first to avoid contamination. For
the same reason, within Part I, Question 1 was always the same. The other elements were
randomized.104 We find no significant e↵ects of ordering.105
We conclude with a short discussion of our incentive scheme. The random payment mech-
anism, as well as the multiple price list method, are incentive compatible for Expected
Utility maximizers, but not necessarily for more general preferences over risk.106 Since this
is the procedure used by most studies, a significant methodological work has been done to
examine whether this creates relevant di↵erences, with some reassuring results.107
103Specifically, at the end of the experiment one participant was selected as ‘the assistant,’ using the roll
of a die by the experimenter. This subject was then in charge of rolling the die and checking the outcome to
determine payments. This was done to reduce the fear that the experimenter could manipulate the outcome.
All was clearly explained in the initial instructions.
104Specifically: for questions in Part I other than the first, half of the subjects answered questions in one
specific order (the one used above), while the other half used a randomized order. In each of them, which
option would appear on the left and which on the right was also determined randomly. The order of Parts
II and III was randomized. For both parts, it was determined randomly whether in the MPL the constant
option would appear on the left or on the right. This was done (independently) for each part, but not for
each question within a part: in Part II or III the constant option of the MPL was either on the left or on the
right for all questions of that part. This is typical for experiments that use the MPL method, as it makes
the procedure easier to explain.
105The only exception is that out of the five questions in the first part, subjects have a significant (moderate)
preference for the option on the right in the second question. While this is most likely a spurious significance
(due to the large number of tests run), the order was randomized for all sessions and thus this tendency
should have no impact on our analysis.
106Holt (1986) points out that a subject who obeys the reduction of compound lotteries but violates the
independence axiom may make di↵erent choices under a randomly incentivized elicitation procedure than he
would make in each choice in isolation. Conversely, if the decision maker treats compound lotteries by first
assessing the certainty equivalents of all first stage lotteries and then plugging these numbers into a second
stage lottery (as in Segal, 1990), then this procedure is incentive compatible. Karni and Safra (1987) prove
the non-existence of an incentive compatible mechanism for general non-Expected Utility preferences.
107Beattie and Loomes (1997), Cubitt et al. (1998) and Hey and Lee (2005) all compare the behavior of
subjects in randomly incentivized treatments to those that answer just one choice, and find little di↵erence.
Also encouragingly, Kurata et al. (2009) compare the behavior of subjects that do and do not violate
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3.4.2. Results
We start with two preliminary results. First, most subjects (82%) exhibit convex discount-
ing. Second, the large majority of subjects gave monotone answers to MPL questions: 13%
gave a non-monotone answer in at least one of the 12 MPL questions, and only 4.6% gave
non-monotone answers in more than one. These are substantially lower numbers (i.e., fewer
violations) than what previous studies have found (Holt and Laury, 2002).108
Risk Aversion over Time Lotteries
Our main variable of interest is each subject’s risk attitude towards time lotteries, which
can be measured in three di↵erent ways. First, we can measure it using Question 1 of
Part I, the first question that subjects see. Second, we can look at the answers to all five
questions in Part I and ask whether subjects exhibited RATL in the majority of them (for
the purpose of this section, we say that subjects are RATL in a given question if, in that
question, they chose the option with the smallest variance of the payment date). A third
way is to look at the answers given in Questions 10 and 11 of Part II, using MPL.
Table 26 presents the percentage of RATL answers for each of these measures. The results
are consistent: in most questions, especially in the Long treatment, the majority of subjects
are RATL. In Question 1, the proportions are about 66% for the Long treatment and 56%
for the Short one. Notice that subjects are still RATL when both options are risky but
one of the options is a mean preserving spread of the other (Questions 4 and 5). Thus,
the data suggest an aversion to mean preserving spreads, not simply an attraction towards
certainty.109 In addition, the majority of subjects are RATL in at least one of the two MPL
Expected Utility in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure (which is strategically equivalent to MPL) and
find no di↵erence. On the other hand, Freeman et al. (2015) find that subjects tend to choose the riskier
lottery more often in choices from lists than in pairwise choices.
108The non-monotone behavior did not concentrate in any specific question. Following the typical approach
in the literature, these answers are disregarded. Alternatively, we could have dropped any subject that
exhibits a non-monotone behavior at least once. Doing so does leave our results essentially unchanged (as
to be expected given the number of them).
109We also note that we find no gender di↵erences in RATL, or relationship with results in the SATMath
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questions (Questions 10 and 11).
Table 26: Percentage of RATL
in each question
Question Long Short
1 65.71 56.04
2 50.48 54.95
3 48.57 37.36
4 64.76 38.46
5 73.33 52.75
Majority in 1-5 64.76 49.45
10 44.23 54.44
11 57.28 41.11
Either in 10 or 11 64.07 66.66
Table 27: Frequency of RATL answers in Part I
Frequency of
RATL
Long Delay Short Delay
Percent Cum. Percent Cum.
0 2.86 2.86 9.89 9.89
1 9.52 12.38 16.48 26.37
2 22.86 35.24 24.28 50.55
3 23.81 59.05 26.37 76.92
4 28.57 87.62 19.78 96.70
5 12.38 100.00 3.30 100
In most questions, RATL is stronger in the Long rather than in the Short treatment.110 This
is intuitive: when the time horizon is relatively short, the di↵erence between the options
decreases and subjects should become closer to being indi↵erent – and their choices closer
to an even split. In the Long treatment the di↵erence in time horizon increases, and so does
the di↵erences between the options. While the standard model suggests that this should
push more strongly towards RSTL, the opposite holds in our data.
While most answers are consistent with RATL, it could be that a non-trivial fraction of our
subjects still consistently chooses the risky option, as predicted by DEU. However, Table 27
shows that the fraction of subjects who does so is minuscule in the Long treatment (2.86%)
and very small in the Short one (9.89 %). By contrast, in the Long treatment almost 41%
give risk averse answers at least 4 out of 5 times, and 59% at least three times. (These
numbers are about 23% and 48.45% in the short treatment.)
Result 3.4.1 The majority of subjects is RATL. This is more pronounced in the Long
or the total SAT.
110In Question 10, subjects appear to be more RSTL in the Long than in the Short treatment. This could
reflect a genuine preference, or it could be because of the specifics of the MPL for this question: to be RATL
in the Long treatment, a subject would have to ‘switch’ very close to the end of the list (row 18 out of 21).
It is well-known that with MPL subjects tend to switch close to the middle of the table, generating a bias
towards RSTL in this case. (In all other cases, the switching point exhibited by an RATL subject was after
the middle but closer to it.)
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rather than Short treatment. Only a very small fraction is consistently RSTL.
RATL and convexity, probability weighting, and atemporal risk aversion
In this subsection we analyze the relationship between RATL and convex discounting, viola-
tions of Expected Utility, and atemporal risk aversion. With DEU, all subjects with convex
discounting should be RSTL; in turn, this means that such tendency should be negatively re-
lated to convexity of the discount function. With EZ, RATL should be positively correlated
with atemporal risk aversion. With DPWU, only subjects who underweight probabilities
should exhibit RATL.
We test these predictions using our data. We quantify convexity of the discount function,
violations of Expected Utility, and atemporal risk aversion using the MPL measures col-
lected in Parts II and III. We first analyze RATL in the restricted samples of subjects with
convex discounting, those who behave according to Expected Utility, and those who do not
underweight probabilities. We then move to the regression analysis.
As previously described, we determine which subjects have convex discounting based on
their answers to Questions 7, 8, and 9 in Part II.
There are two related measures of violations of Expected Utility, constructed using questions
from Part III. The first measure uses answers from Questions 12 and 13, or 12 and 14 (see
Table 25) to determine if subjects display what is typically called certainty bias (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979).111 This is the relevant measure for our analysis since subjects who
111Suppose that in Question 12 the subject switches at x12, while in Question 13 she switches at x13. If
the subject follows Expected Utility, we should have 2x13 = x12. A certainty-biased subject would instead
have x12 > 2x13; because she is attracted by the certainty of Option 1 in Question 12, she demands a high
probability of receiving the high prize in Option 2 to be indi↵erent. Thus, the answers to Question 12
and 13 allow us to identify subjects who are certainty biased and to quantify the bias (by x12   2x13). A
similar measure can be obtained from the answers to Questions 12 and 14. In what follows, when we want
to focus on subjects who are certainty biased, we focus on the measure obtained from Questions 12 and 13
(the results using the measure obtained from Questions 12 and 14 are essentially identical and are reported
in Appendix). When we need to quantify certainty bias (in the regression analysis), we use instead the
principal component of the two measures, which should reduce the observation error (essentially identical
results hold using either of the two measures or their average.)
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underweight probabilities must also display certainty bias. We find that a small number of
subjects do (15.71%).112
The second measure uses the answers to Questions 12, 13, and 14 to determine whether they
are jointly consistent with Expected Utility. Since this is a very demanding requirement (it
is well-known that these measures can be noisy), we consider as “approximately Expected
Utility” those subjects who abide by Expected Utility in all three questions, allowing for a
“one-line mistake” – more precisely, they would be consistent with Expected Utility if we
changed their answer to these questions by one line. These are 39.89% of the pool (43.3%
and 36.67% in the Long and Short treatments, respectively).
Table 28: Proportion of RATL subjects
Sample Convex Discounting Approximately Expected Utility No Certainty Bias
Treatment Long Short Long Short Long Short
Question 1 67.78 50.70⇤ 66.67 60.61 67.50 55.00
Majority in Q1-5 65.56 43.66⇤⇤ 64.29 60.61⇤ 68.75⇤ 50.00
Question 10 46.07 52.86 54.76⇤ 68.75⇤⇤ 47.50 51.90
Question 11 57.95 44.29⇤⇤ 64.29 56.25 54.43 48.10
Observations 90 71 42 33 80 80
Notes. The first row measures RATL using Question 1. The second row identifies as RATL subjects who
chose the safe option in the majority of Questions 1-5. The third and fourth rows use answers to MPL
Questions 10 and 11. Columns present the proportion of RATL subjects in the subsamples of subjects with
convex discounting, approximately Expected Utility, and those with no Certainty Bias as measured using
Questions 12 and 13. ⇤ and ⇤⇤ denote significance at the 10% and 5% level in a Chi-squared test of whether
each subset is di↵erent from its complement.
Table 28 shows that, based on the four di↵erent measures, subjects are still RATL in each
of the subsamples described above. The table also shows the results of Chi-squared tests
on whether subjects in each of subsample are statistically di↵erent from those outside of
it. Using Question 1, subjects in any of these subsamples are not statistically di↵erent
from those in their complements at the 5% level. Moreover, in all treatments and for
all RATL measures, certainty-biased subjects are statistically indistinguishable from those
112These small numbers are not surprising: it is a stylized fact that certainty bias is less frequent when
stakes are small, as in our experiment (Conlisk, 1989; Camerer, 1989; Burke et al., 1996; Fan, 2002; Huck
and Mu¨ller, 2012). See the discussion in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015).
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with no certainty bias at the 5% level. Similarly, approximately Expected Utility subjects
were statistically di↵erent from the rest of the population only for the Short treatment and
only for Question 10 – where approximately Expected Utility subjects tend to be more
RATL (the opposite of the prediction of DPWU). Subjects with convex discounting were
only statistically di↵erent for the Short treatments in the Majority of Questions 1-5 and
in Question 11.113 These results are in direct contrast with the predictions of DEU and
probability weighting models: according to the former, there should be no RATL with
convex discounting; according to the latter, there should be no RATL without certainty
bias, or within approximately Expected Utility subjects.
A regression analysis confirms these results. Table 29 presents the coe cients of Probit
regressions of RATL with our measures of certainty bias and of convexity as independent
variables. (Essentially identical results hold when considering each in isolation; see Ap-
pendix.) Two patterns emerge. First, certainty bias is generally not related to RATL. With
the exception of the Short treatment in Question 10 (regression 6), certainty bias is either
statistically insignificant, even at the 10% level, or its sign is the opposite of what theory
predicts. Second, there is only a significant relationship between convexity and RATL for
the Short treatment, and only for the RATL measures using the majority of Questions 1-5
or Question 11 (regressions 4 and 8). In all other regressions, convexity is either insignificant
at the 10% level, or it has the opposite sign relative to what theory predicts. Both patters
contradict the predictions of DEU and DPWU.
Lastly, we examine the relationship between RATL and atemporal risk aversion. Table
30 presents the coe cients from a Probit regression, with our four RATL measures as
dependent variables and the degree of risk aversion (as measured in Question 12) as the
independent variable. Consistently with EZ, the coe cients are positive and, with the
exception of the Short treatment in Question 1, they were all statistically significant at the
113Even this should be taken with caution: since we are simultaneously running 24 tests, this can easily be
spurious.
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Table 29: Probit Regressions: RATL and Convexity and Certainty Bias
Dep. Variable RATL Q1 RATL Majority Q1-5 RATL Q10 RATL Q11
Treatment Long Short Long Short Long Short Long Short
(Probit) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Certainty Bias -.25⇤ .18 -.20 .18 -.03 .44⇤⇤⇤ .16 .23
(-1.94) (1.17) (-1.60) (1.20) (-.25) (2.77) (1.42) (1.52)
Convexity 4.27⇤ -4.45 .06 -11.10⇤⇤⇤ 3.47 -1.77 .99 -7.73⇤⇤
(1.82) (-1.29) (.03) (-2.86) (1.64) (-1.29) (.46) (-2.16)
Constant .19 .28⇤ .39⇤⇤ .19 -.26 .16 .19 .12
(1.07) (1.82) (2.15) (1.20) (-1.52) (1.03) (1.08) (.79)
Pseudo-R2 .06 .02 .02 .01 .02 .07 .02 .06
Obs. 92 86 92 86 92 85 92 85
Notes. Dependent variables are indicated in the first row. Coe cients in brackets are z-statistics. ⇤, ⇤⇤,
and ⇤⇤⇤ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Table 30: Probit Regressions: RATL and Atemporal Risk Aversion
Dep. Variable RATL Q.1 RATL Majority Q.1-5 RATL Q.10 RATL Q.11
Treatment Long Short Long Short Long Short Long Short
(Probit) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Risk Aversion, .336⇤⇤ .175 .308⇤⇤ .341⇤⇤ .459⇤⇤⇤ .435⇤⇤⇤ .571⇤⇤⇤ .239⇤⇤⇤
Atemporal (2.41) (1.30) (2.27) (2.40) (3.27) (2.91) (3.81) (1.75)
Constant .07 -.01 .07 -.34⇤ -.60⇤⇤⇤ -.27 -.37⇤⇤⇤ -.19
(0.38) (-0.07) (0.38) (-1.79) (-3.01) (-1.47) (-1.87) (-1.08)
Pseudo-R2 0.047 0.014 0.040 0.049 0.083 0.076 0.121 0.025
Observations 101 90 101 90 101 89 100 89
Notes. Dependent variables are indicated in the first row. Atemporal risk aversion measure is obtained from
Question 12. RATL measures were obtained from Question 1 (Regressions 1 and 2), having chosen the safe
option in the majority of Questions 1-5 (Regressions 3 and 4), and MPL Questions 10 and 11 (Regressions
5-8). Coe cients in brackets are z-statistics. ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤⇤⇤ denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
5% level. In fact, all treatments in Questions 10 and 11 were statistically significant at the
1% level. Similar results hold constructing risk aversion from Question 15 or using a linear
probability model.
Result 3.4.2 Subjects who exhibit convex discounting, no certainty bias, or are approxi-
mately Expected Utility also have a tendency to be RATL. In fact, the proportions in these
groups are almost identical to the one in the overall population. Regression analysis shows
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that RATL is unrelated to probability distortion and generally unrelated to convexity. It is,
however, related to (atemporal) risk aversion.
These findings are not compatible with Discounted Expected Uitlity or with Discounted Prob-
ability Weighting Utility. Instead, they are compatible with Epstein Zin.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Appendix
A.1.1. Chapter 1 Appendix Tables
Appendix Table
1. Previous E↵ort Instrumental Variable: Impact on E↵ort – Replication with Sliders
Dependent Variable: Specification
Sliders Moved Correctly (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sliders Previous Period 0.35 0.57*** 0.46** 0.42** 0.42**
( aka ⇢ parameter ) (0.39) (0.19) (0.18) (0.21) (0.21)
Piece Rate 41.73*** 48.27*** 60.26*** 58.21*** 57.51***
(in cents per 100 sliders) (11.80) (12.17) (13.39) (13.51) (13.72)
First Stage F Stat (IV) 5.3 18.9 20.2 16.6 15.1
PreTreatment Quintiles X X X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 52.1 52.1 52.1 52.1 52.1
Number of Observations 552 552 552 552 549
Number of Individuals 184 184 184 184 183
Adj-R2 0.45 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.65
Notes. The above table represents an additional experiment that replicated the main findings using a di↵erent (slider) task. The
dependent variable is the number of sliders correctly moved to 50% in a single period. See more details in Appendix section 10.3. All
specifications report results from linear Instrumental Variable regressions estimated by (iterative) GMM and also include a constant
term. PreTreatment Quintiles represent five binary variables to non-parametrically control for the number of problems subject solved
in the pre-treatment training period. Individual Controls include age, sex, ethnicity, computer skill test, and total # of experimental
sessions done at the lab, but could not be matched for 1 subject. The First Stage F Statistic is from the instrument alone (F(1, 183)).
Standard errors are given in parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Appendix Table 2. Previous E↵ort Instrumental Variable: Impact on E↵ort –
Experiment 1
Dependent Variable: Specification
Problems Solved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Problems Previous Period 0.49** 0.48*  0.02 0.41 0.71* 0.47
(0.25) (0.26) (0.17) (0.34) (0.37) (0.40)
Piece Rate 4.50*** 4.51*** 2.03 7.41*** 7.02*** 6.13***
(1.31) (1.29) (2.88) (2.41) (2.54) (2.30)
Phone Access  0.42⇤⇤  0.40⇤⇤ 0.23 0.14 0.09 0.17
(0.19) (0.18) (0.27) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33)
First Stage F Stat (IV) 9.8 9.5 4.6 2.8 3.6 2.8
PreTreatment Quintiles X X X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X X
Period 1 and 2 Only X X X
Dependent Variable Mean 7.85 7.85 7.85 7.79 7.79 7.79
Number of Observations 930 930 930 465 465 465
Number of Individuals 155 155 155 155 155 155
Adj-R2 0.01 0.31 0.37 0.02 0.66 0.66
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of problems solved correctly in a single period. All specifications report results from linear
Instrumental Variable regressions estimated by (iterative) GMM and also include a constant term. PreTreatment Quintiles represent
five binary variables to non-parametrically control for the number of problems subject solved in the pre-treatment training period.
Individual Controls include age, sex, ethnicity, computer skill test, and total # of experimental sessions done at the lab, but could
not be matched for 2 subjects. Standard errors are given in parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1,
⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Appendix Table 3. Previous Period Piece Rate and Phone Access: Random E↵ects
– Experiment 2
Dependent Variable: Specification
Problems Solved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Piece Rate 11.05*** 12.58*** 14.95*** 15.07*** 15.00***
(2.40) (2.29) (2.67) (2.71) (2.78)
Previous Period’s Piece Rate 2.47 4.00 5.62** 5.73** 5.78**
(2.68) (2.55) (2.80) (2.83) (2.89)
Phone Access  0.05  0.08 0.25 0.27 0.28
(0.22) (0.22) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Previous Period Phone Access  0.05  0.08 0.15 0.17 0.17
(0.27) (0.27) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Random E↵ects X X X X X
PreTreatment Quintiles X X X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Number of Observations 1266 1266 1266 1266 1260
Number of Individuals 422 422 422 422 420
Adj-R2 0.01 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.45
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of problems solved correctly in a single period. All specifications report results from OLS
regressions and also include a constant term. PreTreatment Quintiles represent five binary variables to non-parametrically control for
the number of problems subject solved in the pre-treatment training period. Individual Controls include age, sex, ethnicity, computer
skill test, and total # of experimental sessions done at the lab. Standard errors given in parentheses and clustered at the subject
(individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Appendix Table 4. Previous Period Piece Rate and Phone Access: Fixed E↵ects –
Experiment 2
Dependent Variable: Specification
Problems Solved (1) (2) (3)
Piece Rate 12.66*** 10.46*** 13.49***
(3.51) (2.54) (3.00)
Previous Period’s Piece Rate 4.09 1.89 4.16
(4.03) (2.63) (2.94)
Phone Access  0.03  0.05 0.36
(0.36) (0.22) (0.28)
Previous Period Phone Access  0.03  0.05 0.26
(0.41) (0.26) (0.31)
Subject Fixed E↵ects X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X
Dependent Variable Mean 7.23 7.23 7.23
Number of Observations 1266 1266 1266
Number of Individuals 422 422 422
Adj-R2 0.01 0.72 0.72
Notes. In the presence of momentum, these estimates are severely biased downward. They are presented here only in the spirit of
openness but are not intended to be taken as accurate estimates. The dependent variable is the number of problems solved correctly
in a period. All specifications report results from OLS regressions and also include a constant term. PreTreatment Quintiles represent
five binary variables to non-parametrically control for the number of problems subject solved in the pre-treatment training period.
Note that session fixed e↵ects and individual controls cannot be estimated with subject fixed e↵ects as these variables do not vary
within individual. Standard errors given in parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05,
⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
113
Appendix Table 5. Previous Period Piece Rate and Phone Access: Impact on
YouTube Searches – Experiment 2
Dependent Variable: Specification
Youtube Searches (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Piece Rate  2.39***  2.52***  2.80***  2.68***  2.59***
(in cents) (0.42) (0.44) (0.56) (0.63) (0.65)
Previous Period’s Piece Rate  1.01*  1.15**  0.94  0.83  0.72
(0.56) (0.55) (0.58) (0.66) (0.68)
Phone Access  0.02  0.02  0.06  0.03  0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Previous Period Phone Access 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.14
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
PreTreatment Quintiles X X X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
Number of Observations 1266 1266 1266 1266 1260
Number of Individuals 422 422 422 422 420
Adj-R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of YouTube videos searched in a period. All specifications report results from OLS
regressions and also include a constant term. PreTreatment Quintiles represent five binary variables to non-parametrically control for
the number of problems subject solved in the pre-treatment training period. Individual Controls include age, sex, ethnicity, computer
skill test, and total # of experimental sessions done at the lab, but could not be matched for 2 subjects. Standard errors given in
parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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Appendix Table 6. Phone Usage: Relationship with E↵ort – Experiment 2
Dependent Variable: Specification
Problems Solved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Phone Usage  3.81⇤⇤⇤  2.19⇤⇤⇤  2.06⇤⇤⇤  2.11⇤⇤⇤  1.93⇤⇤⇤
(0.88) (0.71) (0.72) (0.73) (0.73)
Previous Period Phone Usage  4.73⇤⇤⇤  3.14⇤⇤⇤  3.11⇤⇤⇤  3.16⇤⇤⇤  2.99⇤⇤⇤
(0.92) (0.65) (0.67) (0.69) (0.70)
Piece Rate 12.41*** 14.95*** 15.99*** 15.96*** 16.13***
(3.51) (2.76) (2.96) (2.95) (3.01)
Previous Period Piece Rate 3.95 6.50** 6.70** 6.67** 6.96**
(3.93) (3.05) (3.23) (3.24) (3.29)
Pre-Treatment Quintiles X X X X
Period Fixed E↵ects X X X
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23
Number of Observations 1266 1266 1266 1266 1260
Number of Individuals 422 422 422 422 420
Adj-R2 0.04 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.44
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of problems solved correctly in a period. Phone Usage is a self reported variable indicating
use of the phone during period 3. As this is endogenously chosen, these regressions should not be taken as causal, as a subject who
uses the phone may have unobservable di↵erences. All specifications report results from OLS regressions and also include a constant
term. PreTreatment Quintiles represent five binary variables to non-parametrically control for the number of problems subject solved in
the pre-treatment training period. Individual Controls include age, ethnicity, computer skill test, and total # of experimental sessions
done at the lab. Gender could not be matched for one subject, and the controls for an additional subject. Standard errors given in
parentheses and clustered at the subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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A.1.2. Chapter 1 Appendix Figures
Appendix Figure 1. Word Cloud for Survey – “Opinion of Task”
Notes. Top 100 words from responses to a post experiment survey question asking “What is your opinion of the task?” Size scaled
linearly with count.
Source: Jasondavies.com word cloud generator.
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Appendix Figure 2. Quiz for Introduction Instructions
Notes. Every participant in experiment 2 had to answer the above questions after reading experiment
instructions. Subjects had to answer all three questions correctly to proceed. If the subject entered the
wrong answers, the browser would alert them to this and ask for them to review the instructions again.
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Appendix Figure 3. Quiz for Instructions Prior to Each Period
Notes. Every participant had to answer the following questions prior to every period (including Pre-
Treatment). If the subject had information about future periods, they were also quizzed on the piece rate
and phone access for future periods. If the subject entered the wrong answers, the browser would alert them
to this and ask for them to review the instructions again.
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Appendix Figure 4. Cubicle Environment
Notes. Every participant had access to an identical computer with headphones as pictured above. Screen
brightness was uniformly set at 95% to ensure consistency across cubicles. It was not possible to see other
subjects from within the cubicle. Google Chrome was employed as the browser during the task, with the
window maximized (full screen mode). All instructions were written, but RAs were on site to answer any
additional questions.
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Appendix Figure 5. Slider Task Example
Notes. Slider Task employed as a replication of momentum e↵ects. As can seen above, it would be di cult
to view YouTube and move sliders at the same time on the monitor and resolution employed. Furthermore,
the website code blocked any attempt to “zoom” in or out.
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A.1.3. Chapter 1 – Slider Task (Experimental Replication)
In addition to replicating findings of the first experiment with Experiment 2 (details in main text), I also ran
an additional experiment with a di↵erent task to serve as an additional replication. In this setting, subjects
face 30 “sliders” on a screen, as in Gill and Prowse (2011). This can be seen in Appendix Figure 5 above.
The subjects are asked to move the slider to exactly 50% of the way, with a numerical setting next to the
slider indicating the current %. The exact position and length of sliders was randomized to make the task
more di cult.
In this setting, as the sliders take far less time than the counting problems, the piece rate was also reduced.
Subjects received a baseline of $0.01 per 10 sliders. The “high piece rate” treatment was $0.03 per 10 sliders
(three times baseline), while the “low piece rate” treatment was $0.0033 per 10 sliders (one third of baseline).
Subjects were rounded to the nearest cent in the case they were unable to finish before time ran out. In
addition, due to the small subject size available and the relatively “noisy” e↵ect of cellphones in previous
experiments, there was no phone access treatment. This a↵ords us greater power in detecting e↵ects through
the financial incentives, but does make it harder to distinguish some theories ruled out in experiment 2.
In order to better understand the underlying model of momentum, the pre-treatment period was reduced 5
minutes and an additional 5 minute period following treatment was added. This allows one to investigate
the rate of decay of e↵ort inducement.
As predicted by a model of momentum, these gains from working harder continue to decay exponentially
as time goes on. As the design and results are otherwise similar to the main findings of the paper, I have
omitted most tables for brevity. See Appendix Table 1 or contact the author for additional details.
A.1.4. Chapter 1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
This proof will be using methods of supermodularity discussed in Milgrom and Shannon (1995).114 For
simplicity, I retain the assumption about the utility function being twice di↵erentiable over ct, et, et 1,
however this assumption could be weakened as long as the utility function maintains increasing di↵erences.
MS Theorem 6a: I begin by applying Theorem 6 of Milgrom and Shannon (1995), which first states that
114An earlier draft of the proof uses the (Dini) Multivariate Implicit Function Theorem, but supermodu-
larity allows for fewer restrictions and also removes the need for matrix manipulation in calculating deter-
minants.
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a twice di↵erentiable function f : Rn ⇥Rm ! R has increasing di↵erences in (x, z) if and only if @f2@xi@zj   0
for all i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ....,m.
MS Theorem 6a Conditions: In this case, x1 ⌘ c1, x2 ⌘ c2 ,...,xT ⌘ cT , and xT+1 ⌘ e1, xT+2 ⌘
e2, ..., x2T ⌘ eT . y are the non-choice state variables, z1 ⌘ w1, z2 ⌘ w2, ..., zT ⌘ wT , and zT+1 ⌘
  1, zT+1 ⌘   2, ....z2T ⌘   T , and f is the full Lagrangian (treating yt, r, and pt as fixed):
f(x, z) =
TX
t=1
 t 1u(ct, et, et 1,  t) +  
 
TX
t=1
(wtet + yt)(1 + r)
 t  
TX
t=1
ptct(1 + r)
 t
!
With variables redefined this way, we can check the conditions. For consumption and wage, it is clear
that @f
2
@ci@wj
= 0 as wj does not enter the utility function and the budget constraint is linear with no
term containing both ci and wj . For consumption and leisure technology,
@f2
@ci@ j
= 0 if i 6= j. However,
without an assumption on @f
2
@ct@ t
, it is possible that increased leisure technology increases the utility of
consumption so much that e↵ort rises in every period (including time period t) to satisfy the greater demand
for consumption goods. However, while leisure and consumption might have complementarities (and hence
e↵ort and consumption exhibit substitutibility), leisure technology itself is constructed to not influence the
utility from consumption.115
For e↵ort and wage, @f
2
@ei@wj
= 0 if i 6= j as wage and e↵ort only appear together in the same time period.
In this case @f
2
@et@wt
= @f
2
@et@wt
=  (1 + r) t, which is   0 as consumption ct is enjoyable and r >  1.
For e↵ort and leisure technology, @f
2
@ei@ j
= 0 if i > j or i + 1 < j as et only appears in two u(·) functions,
at time t and time t + 1. Thus, the only cases we need to check are on @f
2
@ei@(  i) and
@f2
@ei@(  i+1) , which
are equivalent to   i 1 @u2@ei@ i and   
i @u2
@ei@ i+1
, respectively. From the assumptions above, @u
2
@ei@ i
 0, as
leisure technology makes marginal contemporaneous e↵ort more costly in utility terms, and @u
2
@ei@ i+1
= 0, as
leisure technology does not carry over across periods. Thus, both @f
2
@ei@(  i) and
@f2
@ei@(  i+1) are   0. And
in conclusion, f has increasing di↵erences in (x, z).
MS Theorem 6b: I apply the second half of Theorem 6 of Milgrom and Shannon (1995), which states
that a twice di↵erentiable function f : Rn ⇥ Rm ! R is supermodular in x if and only if @f2@xi@xj   0 for all
i 6= j in 1, ..., n.
115E.g. Popcorn is enjoyable while watching the new Star Wars movie; the new Star Wars movie does not
make popcorn itself taste better on December 18th if you did not get to watch it.
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MS Theorem 6b Conditions: As before, x1 ⌘ c1, x2 ⌘ c2 ,...,xT ⌘ cT , and xT+1 ⌘ e1, xT+2 ⌘
e2, ..., x2T ⌘ eT , and f is the full Lagrangian:
f(x, z) =
TX
t=1
 t 1u(ct, et, et 1,  t) +  
 
TX
t=1
(wtet + yt)(1 + r)
 t  
TX
t=1
ptct(1 + r)
 t
!
Note that @f
2
@ci@cj
= 0 for i 6= j as there is no overlap in the additively separable terms. Likewise @f2@ei@ej = 0 if
i > j or i+1 < j as only last period’s e↵ort influences this period’s e↵ort.116 Thus, for time period t we are
concerned with two terms: first, @f
2
@et@et 1 =  
t 1 @u2
@et@et 1   0, as we have positive momentum (last period
e↵ort makes this period’s e↵ort marginally less costly in terms of utility). Second, @f
2
@et+1@et
=  t @u
2
@et+1@et
  0
for the same reasons.
The only remaining terms of interest are the cross-partials between consumption and e↵ort. Similar to
above, @f
2
@ei@cj
= 0 if i > j or i + 1 < j as the overlap only occurs for a ct and et or ct and et 1, as per the
utility function. First, @f
2
@ct@et
=  t 1 @u
2
@ct@et
  0, as assumed in the set up. This implies that consumption
and e↵ort are not complements. By a similar assumption @f
2
@ct@et 1 =  
t 1 @u2
@ct@et 1   0 as last period’s e↵ort
should have no negative e↵ect on this period’s consumption. These assumptions, while not trivial, ensure
the utility function is reasonably well behaved – otherwise if last period’s e↵ort greatly reduced the demand
for consumption, it could theoretically reduce this period’s e↵ort as well as the demand for consumption has
decreased so dramatically.117 Thus, in conclusion, the conditions are satisfied, and f is supermodular in x.
MS Theorem 4: Using these results from Theorem 6, apply Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Shannon (1995)
to achieve the main result. The theorem states that if f : X ⇥ Z ! R, where X is a lattice, T is a partially
ordered set, and S ⇢ X, then argmaxx2Sf(x, z) is a monotone nondecreasing function in (z, S) if and only
if f is quasisupermodular in x and satisfies the single crossing property in (x; z).
MS Theorem 4 Conditions: First note that Rn with component-wise order forms a lattice as for 8x, y 2
Rn, x ^ y and x _ y are both in Rn. By the same token, Rm with component-wise ordering is a partially
ordered set. Thus, using the lagrangian function above as f, with x and z defined as above, we have already
established supermodularity in x, which implies quasisupermodularity in x. In addition, as f has increasing
116Though this assumption of only last period’s e↵ort influencing this period is not necessary for this
proof. For example, if all previous periods’ e↵orts entered the utitlity function as a discounted sum with
non-negative weights, as long as e↵ort is positive with respect to that sum (positive e↵ort momentum), the
result would be the same.
117For example, if after working a long day, the agent no longer cared for consumption. Under this example,
the agent might call in sick, even though e↵ort would have been easier due to e↵ort momentum. In this odd
model of behavior, an increase in piece rate last period could decrease e↵ort in the next period.
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di↵erences, it satisfies the single crossing property. Thus it follows that ~c⇤, ~e⇤ 2 argmaxc,e2R2T+ f(c, e, z)
are monotone decreasing functions over (z, Rn+) – but recall that zT+1 was defined as negative  1 , zT+2
as negative  2, and so on. Thus, consumption and e↵ort are monotonically non-decreasing over piece rate
vector ~w and monotonically non-increasing over leisure technology vector ~ .118
Alternate Proofs
It’s possible to relax the assumptions of the model. The di↵erentiability of u is unnecessary as long as
the conditions of increasing di↵erences / single crossing condition and quasi-supermodularity are satisfied.
However, I felt the assumptions above are more familiar with readers compared to assumptions of increasing
di↵erences. In addition, the assumption that only last period enters the utility function is unnecessary.
It may also be worth mentioning that there are other ways to achieve a similar result. An earlier draft
included a proof using the Multivariate Implicit Function Theorem and also assumed second order conditions
and positive determinant Jacobian matrices to get the stronger result of e↵ort strictly increasing in piece
rates (or strictly decreasing in leisure technology). However, the matrix notation was cumbersome relative
to the above proof.
Proposition 2: Naive Momentum g(.) function
Under the FOC for et, ct:
 ue(c⇤t , e⇤t , et 1,  t) =  wt
uc(c
⇤
t , e
⇤
t , et 1,  t) =  pt
As u is strictly concave over the first argument, this allows for inverse of uc:
c⇤t = u
 1
c ( pt, e
⇤
t , et 1,  t)
Which can be inserted into the first FOC to give:
 ue(u 1c ( pt, e⇤t , et 1,  t) , e⇤t , et 1,  t) =  wt
118To be clear, as I am using component-wise ordering, increasing just one element of the piece rate vector
or one element of the leisure technology vector causes the vector to be ordered as higher than the unaltered
vector.
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The e⇤t which solves this first order condition is equivalent to the e
⇤⇤
t which would maximize (by construction):
e⇤⇤t = argmaxet  wtet +
Z et
0
ue(u
 1
c ( pt, x, et 1,  t) , x, et 1,  t)dx
This objective function can be rewritten as U
0
t =  wtet   g (et, et 1,  t). It remains to be shown that this
g(et, et 1,  t) is convex in et, which in this case is equivalent to having a negative second derivative:
dg
det
=   @u(u
 1
c ( pt, e
⇤
t , et 1,  t) , e
⇤
t , et 1,  t)
@et
d2g
de2t
=  @
2u
@e2t
  @
2u
@et@ct
dct
det
Note
det 1
det
= d tdet = 0 as et 1 and  t are not choice variables at time t. The total di↵erential of the first
order condition for ct yields:
uccdct + ucedet = 0
) dct
det
=  uce
ucc
Thus for the second derivative:
d2g
de2t
=  uee + uec uce
ucc
=   1
ucc
(ueeucc   uecuce)
> 0
As ucc < 0 and ueeucc   uecuce > 0. Given this derivation, one can derive how past, present, and future
piece rate and leisure technology influence e↵ort as outlined in Section 2.
Proposition 3: Reciprocity Proof 1
If ↵2 > 0 and e1, e2 is an interior solution, then
@et+1
@ t
> 0
U = ( w1 + ↵1w1 + ↵1w2 + ↵2 1 + ↵2 2)(e1 + e2)  g( 1e1)  g( 2e2)
First order condition:
( w1 + ↵1w1 + ↵1w2 + ↵2 1 + ↵2 2) =  1g
0( 1e1)
( w2 + ↵1w1 + ↵1w2 + ↵2 1 + ↵2 2) =  2g
0( 2e2)
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Multivariate implicit function theorem (Dini) gives us:
@e2
@ 1
=  
det
24 @F1@e1 @F1@ 1
@F2
@e1
@F2
@ 1
35
det
24 @F1@e1 @F1@e2
@F2
@e1
@F2
@e2
35
=  
det
24   21g00( 1e1) ↵2   g0( 1e1)   1e1g00( 1e1)
0 ↵2
35
det
24   21g00( 1e1) 0
0   22g00( 2e2)
35
=    ↵2 
2
1g
00
( 1e1)
 21 
2
2g
00( 1e1)g
00( 2e2)
=
↵2
 22g
00( 2e2)
> 0
Proposition 3: Reciprocity Proof 2
If ↵1 > 0 and e1, e2 is an interior solution, then
@et+1
@wt
> 0:
By Multivariate Implicit Function Theorem using the above FOC.
@e2
@w1
=  
det
24 @F1@e1 @F1@w1
@F2
@e1
@F2
@w1
35
det
24 @F1@e1 @F1@e2
@F2
@e1
@F2
@e2
35
=  
det
24   21g00( 1e1)  + ↵1
0 ↵1
35
det
24   21g00( 1e1) 0
0   22g00( 2e2)
35
=    ↵1 
2
1g
00
( 1e1)
 21 
2
2g
00( 1e1)g
00( 2e2)
=
↵1
 22g
00( 2e2)
> 0
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A.1.5. Chapter 1 Secondary Outcome Treatment E↵ects
In addition to correct problems solved as a metric for e↵ort, I also collected the number of YouTube videos
searched as a proxy for leisure time.119 As predicted, subjects in the first experiment search 0.2 fewer
YouTube videos when the piece rate is increased (see Appendix Table 5). In some specifications, this
reduction in leisure persists into the next period as well. This is consistent with the model in which YouTube
videos are a leisurely activity, and when faced with a higher piece rate, the agent exerts more time and e↵ort
working (and less on leisure).
To further validate that the phone access was actually a leisure activity, subjects in the first experiment
searched about 0.12 to 0.15 fewer searches (p < 0.05) when given access to cell phones. This is consistent with
a model in which phone access and YouTube videos are both leisure activities that compete for attention.
Anecdotally, both YouTube and the cellphone often rely on visual cues on di↵erent screens, making them
di cult to serve as leisure complements.
A.1.6. Chapter 1 Median Unbiased Estimator (MUE)
In this appendix section, I employ a Median Unbiased Estimator as an alternate specification (as opposed
to instrumental variables).
Andrews (1993) outlines a method for adjusting the well known bias of using OLS to estimate an AR(1)
for three cases: (i) without an intercept, (ii) with an intercept, and (iii) with an intercept and time trend.
Unfortunately, the original Andrews (1993) paper does not allow for individual fixed e↵ects or individual
exogenous variables xit. Estimating the model without fixed e↵ects or individual-level covariates would likely
bias the ⇢ parameter upwards through omitted variable bias, as individuals have time-constant heterogeneity
in their e↵ort allocation.120 Thus the Andrews (1993) MUE estimator would still be biased in this setting
as it would be too low, unable to account for the additional omitted variable bias.
However, there has been considerable work extending the original MUE estimator to panel data. One
direction can be found in work on Panel Exactly Median-Unbiased Estimators (PEMU) by Cermeno (1999)
and Phillips and Sul (2003). However, an important assumption of this early work is that the error terms are
119Ideally I would prefer total length of YouTube videos played, but this information could be gathered
from the web browser. In addition, playing a video does not necessarily imply that the agent is actually
watching a video, and length of the video may be imperfect measures if the agents skip portions. Thus, both
would be noisy estimates of the total leisure time.
120For example, if there were two types of workers, lazy and hard working, then even if the true ⇢ was 0 in
the model above, because the individual heterogeneity is not being addressed, you would detect a very large
⇢ˆ.
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homoskedastic and i.i.d. normal.121 In addition, these works do not allow for other exogenous regressors xit
aside from individual and time fixed e↵ects. Under these assumptions, the mapping between ⇢ˆLSDV from
Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) and the median unbiased ⇢ˆMU does not depend on the individual
fixed e↵ects and can be obtained by Monte Carlo simulations.
Carree (2002) extends Andrews (1993) by allowing exogenous variables xit to be included as well as individual
fixed e↵ects. This addition may be important as I have exogenous treatment variables (piece rates and leisure
options) that could influence e↵ort. As Carree (2002) proves, the Least Squares Dummy Variable estimator
of ⇢ will still be biased downward, as in the original Nickell (1981) paper. One additional benefit of the Carree
(2002) paper is that it provides closed form solutions for T = 2 and T = 3, which one of my experiments
satisfies.122 This enabled me to provide you some results below, but does not provide closed forms for the
standard errors (which would be estimated by Monte Carlo simulations).
To reiterate, I will be applying the Carree (2002) results using the piece rate as the exogenous variable and
number of problems solved (per 5 minutes) as the outcome variable, and di↵erencing out the running sum
to remove individual fixed e↵ects:
eit = ⇢ · eit 1 + µi +  xit + ✏it
) eit   e¯it = ⇢ · (eit 1   e¯i,t 1) +   · (xit   x¯it) + (✏it   ✏¯it)
e˜it = ⇢ · e˜it 1 +   · x˜it 1 + ✏˜it
As in Nickell (1981) and proven in Carree (2002), the ⇢ estimated from the OLS of this specification is still
biased downward. However, Carree provides a median unbiased estimator when T = 3 (as in my case).
Specifically:
121These assumptions are relaxed in Phillips and Sul (2003) in an estimator called Panel Feasible Gener-
alized Least Squares Median-Unbiased Estimators (PFGLSMUE). A less important di↵erence is that they
assume the AR(1) component is actually embedded in a latent variable:
eit = µi + e
⇤
it + ✏it
e⇤it = ⇢e
⇤
it 1 + ⌫it
However, this can still be mapped to my original model above by scaling µ⇤i = µi/(1  ⇢)
122Although the paper only gets “nearly” unbiased asymptotic estimators for T > 3, for T = 2 and T = 3
the estimator is asymptotically exactly unbiased. However, the usual issues with sample size remains.
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⇢ˆMUE =
9⇢ˆOLS + 2gˆ
9  gˆ (from equation 12b)
gˆ ⌘  ˆ
2
✏˜
(1  corrx˜,y˜t 1) ·  ˆ2y˜t 1
(from equation 10)
When I constructed the above OLS regression di↵erincing out running means, I received a ⇢ˆOLS = 0.1052.
Once I use this method for correcting the bias, I receive a ⇢ˆMUE = 0.4610 which is very close to the
Instrumental Variable estimates I find in the paper of 0.43 to 0.45. I provide more details below on how this
estimate was constructed:
Term Estimate Origin
 ˆ2✏˜ 2.686 Estimated from residuals of OLS of di↵erenced equation above
 ˆ2y˜t 1 2.066 Estimated from the data of y˜i,t 1
corrx˜,y˜t 1 5.23⇥ 10 7 Estimated from the data of x˜i,t, y˜i,t 1 . Note this should be 0 (see details below).
gˆ 1.301 Transformation of above statistics using closed form solution
⇢ˆOLS 0.1052 Estimated coe cient from OLS of di↵erenced equation above (biased downward)
⇢ˆMUE 0.4610 = (9⇢ˆOLS + 2gˆ)/(9  gˆ) from Carree (2002), T = 3 case, equation 12b
pˆIV 0.43 to 0.45 From IV strategy, see Table 5
Note that corrx˜,y˜t 1 is essentially 0. This is not a mistake or a sign of a weak regressor, but rather a sign
that treatment was properly randomized. Because it represents the correlation between x˜ at time t and y˜
at time t-1, this is saying that last period’s e↵ort di↵erence does not predict the piece rate treatment in the
next period. This is to be expected as treatment was randomized, so last period’s e↵ort should not predict
next period’s piece rate treatment.
As Carree (2002) mentions, “An exogenous variable which is very highly correlated with the lagged endoge-
nous variable and which provides little additional explanatory power will lead to worse bias.” An exogenous
variable x which is highly correlated with the lagged endogenous variable would result in a large corrx˜,y˜t 1 .
As can be seen from the above equations, a large correlation would increase gˆ, increasing the bias. However
a predictive x also helps lower  2✏˜ , which reduces the bias. Thus, there is a potential trade o↵ for including
exogenous covariates. In my case, piece rate helps predict e↵ort – the  ˆ from the above regression was 11.99
with a t-value of 5.49, very much in line with the Instrumental Variable results from the main specification
– and does not correlate with past e↵ort, so it helps reduce bias in both directions.
However, there are two potential issues to address with this estimation. First, as with PEMU models, this
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model’s bias correction relies on homoskedastic and i.i.d. normal errors. Second, as with other MUE bias
correction, the estimator is only median unbiased asymptotically, as N ! 1. While Monte Carlo results
have explored the small sample properties of these estimators in some cases, this is still a potential concern.
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A.1.7. Chapter 2 Appendix Tables
Appendix Table 1. Credit and $100: Impact on Mean of Selection Value
AverageV aluei,t = ↵ · Crediti,t +   · 100Treatmenti,t +  Xi + ✏i,t
Dependent Variable Specification
Average Value (1) (2) (3) (4)
Subject Selects Credit 0.56*** 0.57*** 0.52*** 0.52***
(Binary Treatment Var.) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
$100 Total Allocation 0.29⇤⇤⇤ 0.30⇤⇤⇤ 0.30⇤⇤⇤ 0.30⇤⇤⇤
(Binary Treatment Var.) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
First Period 0.12 0.12 0.12
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Session Fixed E↵ects X X
Individual Controls X
Dependent Variable Mean 9.32 9.32 9.32 9.32
Number of Observations 248 248 248 248
Number of Individuals 124 124 124 124
Adj-R2 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.17
Notes. The dependent variable is the average value of the entries in a single period. All specifications
report results from OLS regressions and also include a constant term. Individual Controls include sex, age,
ethnicity bins, and number of sessions done. Standard errors are given in parentheses and clustered at the
subject (individual) level. ⇤ = p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ = p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ = p < 0.01.
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A.1.8. Chapter 2 Appendix Figures
Appendix Figure 1. Quiz for Introduction Instructions
Notes. Every participant had to answer questions after reading experiment instructions. Subjects had to
answer all questions correctly to proceed. If the subject entered the wrong answers, the browser would alert
them to this and ask for them to review the instructions again.
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Appendix Figure 2. Quiz for Instructions Prior to Each Period
Notes. Every participant had to answer questions prior to every period. If the subject entered the wrong
answers, the browser would alert them to this and ask for them to review the instructions again.
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Appendix Figure 3. Cubicle Environment
Notes. Every participant had access to an identical computer with headphones as pictured above. Cookies
and browser history were cleared after every session to limit any subject overlap. It was not possible to see
other subjects from within the cubicle. Google Chrome was employed as the browser. All instructions were
written, but lab assistants were on site to answer any additional questions.
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A.1.9. Chapter 3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.2.2. The sequence {D (t)} is monotone and bounded. Thus, by the Monotone
Convergence Theorem, it converges to some number, say d   0. We need to show that the sequence
{D (t+ 1) +D (t  1)  2D (t)} has no negative limit points:
lim inf
t!1
(D (t+ 1) +D (t  1)  2D (t))   0.
Suppose this is not true. Then there exists ✏ > 0 and a subsequence {D (tk)} such that
D (tk + 1) +D (tk   1)  2D (tk)   ✏
for all tk. However, because D (tk) converges to d, it follows that D (tk + 1)+D (tk   1) 2D (tk) converges
to zero. Thus, there exists tk such that for all t > tk,
  ✏
2
 D (tk + 1) +D (tk   1)  2D (tk)  ✏
2
,
which contradicts the previous inequality.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof will use a couple of Lemmas.
First notice that, because preferences are dynamically consistent, there is no loss in taking t = 3. To simplify
the expressions, it is convenient to write   ⌘ (c + x)/c > 1 to denote the consumption with the prize as a
proportion of consumption without it. Using the formula in the text, the utility of the safe lottery equals
V0 = [(1   ) c] 11 ⇢ ·

1 +   +  1 ⇢ 2 +
 3
1   
  1
1 ⇢
,
and the utility of the risky lottery is
V0 = [(1   ) c] 11 ⇢
8>><>>:1 +  
2664
⇣
 1 ⇢ +  1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
+
⇣
1 +   +  1 ⇢ 2 +  
3
1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
2
3775
1 ⇢
1 ↵
9>>=>>;
1
1 ⇢
.
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Therefore, preferences are locally RSTL at t if and only if the following inequality holds:
8>><>>:1 +  
2664
⇣
 1 ⇢ +  1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
+
⇣
1 +   +  1 ⇢ 2 +  
3
1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
2
3775
1 ⇢
1 ↵
9>>=>>;
1
1 ⇢
>
✓
1 +   +  1 ⇢ 2 +
 3
1   
◆ 1
1 ⇢
.
(A.1)
To simplify notation, let f(x) ⌘ x 1 ↵1 ⇢ . In the proofs, we will repeatedly use the following result. The
expected discounted payo↵ from the risky lottery exceeds the one from the safe lottery if and only if the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution exceeds 1. Formally:
 1 ⇢ +  1   + 1 +   +  
1 ⇢ 2 +  
3
1  
2
8<: ><
9=; 1 +  1 ⇢  +  21    () ⇢
8<: <>
9=; 1. (A.2)
We first verify that (A.1) always holds when ↵  1.
Lemma A.1.1 Let ↵  1. Then, preferences are RSTL.
Proof There are three cases: (i) ↵  ⇢  1, (ii) ⇢ < ↵  1, and (iii) ↵  1 < ⇢.
Case i: ↵  ⇢  1. Since 1  ⇢ < 0, inequality (A.1) can be written as
⇣
 1 ⇢ +  1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
+
⇣
1 +   +  1 ⇢ 2 +  
3
1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
2
>
✓
1 +  1 ⇢  +
 2
1   
◆ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
.
Algebraic manipulations establish that the expected discounted payment of the risky lottery exceeds the one
from the safe lottery. Because ⇢ < 1, inequality (A.2) gives
 1 ⇢ +  1   + 1 +   +  
1 ⇢ 2 +  
3
1  
2
> 1 +  1 ⇢  +
 2
1    .
The result then follows from Jensen’s inequality since f(x) is increasing and convex when ↵, ⇢  1.
Case ii: ⇢ < ↵  1. To simplify notation, perform the following change of variables:   ⌘ 1 ↵1 ⇢ 2 (0, 1)
where   > 0 since both ↵ and ⇢ are lower than 1, and   < 1 since ↵ > ⇢. We can rewrite inequality (A.1)
substituting ↵ for   as⇣
 1 ⇢ +  1  
⌘ 
+
⇣
1 +   +  1 ⇢ 2 +  
3
1  
⌘ 
2
>
✓
1 +  1 ⇢  +
 2
1   
◆ 
.
136
Rearrange this condition as0@ 1
1
 1 ⇢+  1  
+  
1A  + 1
1 +  1 ⇢  +  
2
1  
+  
! 
> 2.
It is straightforward to verify that the expression on the left (“LHS”) is a convex function of  . Recall that
  2 (0, 1). Evaluating at   = 0, we obtain
LHS| =0 = 2.
Since LHS is a convex function of  , it su ces to show that its derivative wrt   at zero is positive. We claim
that this is true. To see this, notice that
dLHS
d 
    
 =0
= ln
0B@
1
1+ 1 ⇢ +  21  
+  
1
 1 ⇢+  1  
+  
1CA , (A.3)
which, with some algebraic manipulations, can be shown to be strictly positive for any ⇢ < 1. Thus, LHS > 2
for all   2 (0, 1] , establishing RSTL.
Case iii: ↵  1 < ⇢. Inequality (A.1) can be simplified as
2664
⇣
 1 ⇢ +  1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
2
+
⇣
1 +   +  1 ⇢ 2 +  
3
1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
2
3775
1 ⇢
1 ↵
< 1 +  1 ⇢  +
 2
1    .
Since 1 ↵1 ⇢ < 0, this holds if
⇣
 1 ⇢ +  1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
+
⇣
1 +   +  1 ⇢ 2 +  
3
1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
2
>
✓
1 +  1 ⇢  +
 2
1   
◆ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
. (A.4)
Notice that f(x) = x
1 ↵
1 ⇢ is convex since
f 00(x) =
✓
1  ↵
1  ⇢
◆✓
1  ↵
1  ⇢   1
◆
x
1 ↵
1 ⇢ 2 > 0,
where we used 1 ↵1 ⇢ < 0 and
1 ↵
1 ⇢   1 < 0. Thus, by Jensen’s inequality,
⇣
 1 ⇢ +  1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
+
⇣
1 +   +  1 ⇢ 2 +  
3
1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
2
>
0@ 1 ⇢ +  1   + 1 +   +  1 ⇢ 2 +  31  
2
1A 1 ↵1 ⇢ .
(A.5)
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From condition (A.2), we have
 1 ⇢ +  1   + 1 +   +  
1 ⇢ 2 +  
3
1  
2
< 1 +  1 ⇢  +
 2
1    .
Raising to 1 ↵1 ⇢ < 0, gives
0@ 1 ⇢ +  1   + 1 +   +  1 ⇢ 2 +  31  
2
1A 1 ↵1 ⇢ > ✓1 +  1 ⇢  +  2
1   
◆ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
.
Substituting in (A.5), we obtain
⇣
 1 ⇢ +  1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
+
⇣
1 +   +  1 ⇢ 2 +  
3
1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
2
>
✓
1 +  1 ⇢  +
 2
1   
◆ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
,
which is precisely the condition for RSTL (A.4).
Lemma A.1.2 Let ↵  ⇢. Then, preferences are RSTL.
Proof By Lemma A.1.1, the result is immediate when ↵  1. Therefore, let ↵ > 1 (which, by the statement
of the lemma, requires ⇢ > 1).
Rearranging inequality (A.1), we obtain the following condition for RSTL:
⇣
 1 ⇢ +  1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
+
⇣
1 +   +  1 ⇢ 2 +  
3
1  
⌘ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
2
<
✓
1 +  1 ⇢  +
 2
1   
◆ 1 ↵
1 ⇢
. (A.6)
Moreover, from condition (A.2), we have
 1 ⇢ +  1   + 1 +   +  
1 ⇢ 2 +  
3
1  
2
< 1 +  1 ⇢  +
 2
1    .
Notice that f(x) is increasing when ↵, ⇢   1 and it is concave when ⇢   ↵. Then, condition (A.6) follows
by Jensen’s inequality.
We are now ready to prove the main result:
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1 First, suppose ⇢ < 1. Let   ⌘   1 ↵1 ⇢ 2 (0,+1) so we can rewrite inequality
(A.1) in terms of   and ⇢ as
1⇣
 1 ⇢ +  1  
⌘  + 1⇣
1 +   +  1 ⇢ 2 +  
3
1  
⌘  < 2⇣
1 +  1 ⇢  +  
2
1  
⌘  ,
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which can be simplified as:
 
1
 1 ⇢ +  1  
+  
! 
+
0B@ 11
1+ 1 ⇢ +  21  
+  
1CA
 
< 2.
The first term in the expression on the left (“LHS”) is convex and decreasing in  , because the term inside
the first brackets is smaller than 1:
⇢  1 =) 1
 1 ⇢ +  1  
+    1
The second term is convex and increasing in   because the term inside the second brackets is greater than
1:
⇢  1 =) 11
1+ 1 ⇢ +  21  
+  
  1.
Since the sum of convex functions is convex, it follows that LHS is a convex function of  .
Evaluating   at the extremes, we obtain:
LHS| =0 =
 
1
 1 ⇢ +  1  
+  
!0
+
0B@ 11
1+ 1 ⇢ +  21  
+  
1CA
0
= 2,
and
lim
 !1
LHS = +1 > 2.
Moreover, we claim that the derivative of the LHS wrt   at zero is negative. To see this, note that
dLHS
d 
    
 =0
= ln
0B@ 1 1 ⇢+  1   +  1
1+ 1 ⇢ +  21  
+  
1CA ,
which, following some algebraic manipulations, can be shown to be strictly negative.
Thus, there exists  ¯ > 0 such that LHS > 2 (RATL) if and only if   >  ¯. But, since   ⌘   1 ↵1 ⇢ (so that
  is strictly increasing in ↵), this establishes that there exists a finite ↵¯⇢,  > max{1, ⇢} such that we have
RATL if ↵ > ↵¯⇢,  and RSTL if ↵ < ↵¯⇢,  . This concludes the proof for ⇢ < 1.
Now suppose that ↵ > ⇢   1 (the result is trivial if ↵  ⇢ from Lemma A.1.2). Let   ⌘ 1 ↵1 ⇢   1. Then, we
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have RSTL if and only if⇣
 1 ⇢ +  1  
⌘ 
+
⇣
1 +   +  1 ⇢ 2 +  
3
1  
⌘ 
2
<
✓
1 +  1 ⇢  +
 2
1   
◆ 
.
Rearrange this condition as0@ 1
1
 1 ⇢+  1  
+  
1A  + 1
1 +  1 ⇢  +  
2
1  
+  
! 
< 2. (A.7)
As before, it can be shown that the expression on the left (“LHS”) is a convex function of  . Notice that
lim !1 LHS = +1 > 2. Morevoer, LHS| =1 < 2 since, with some algebraic manipulations, one can show
that
 1 ⇢ < 1 () 11
 1 ⇢+  1  
+  
+
1
1 +  1 ⇢  +  
2
1  
+   < 2.
Thus, there exists  ¯ > 0 such that LHS > 2 (RATL) if and only if   >  ¯. The result then follows from the
fact that   is increasing in ↵.
To conclude the proof, it remains to be shown that limx&0 ↵¯⇢, ,x = +1. Both sides of (A.1) are equal to⇣
1
1  
⌘ 1
1 ⇢
when   = 1. The derivative of the expression on the right (utility of the safe lottery) with respect
to   at   = 1 is ✓
1
1   
◆ ⇢
1 ⇢
 2. (A.8)
The derivative of the expression on the left (utility of the risky lottery) with respect to   at   = 1 is
 
1 +  2
2
✓
1
1   
◆ ⇢
1 ⇢
. (A.9)
With some algebraic manipulations, it can be shown that for any   2 (0, 1), the term in (A.8) is lower than
the one in (A.9).
Proof of Proposition 3.3.2. The first claim was proved in the text. For the second claim, it is enough to
show that there is a specific time lottery that will always be preferred to the safe lottery independently of x.
For k  t and payment x, consider the time lottery h0.5, (x, t  k) ; 0.5, (x, t+ k)i 2 Px. Using the formula
of DPWU, we have
VDPWU
 
 (x,t)
    VDPWU (h0.5, (x, t  k) ; 0.5, (x, t+ k)i),
D(t)   ⇡ (0.5)D(t  k) + (1  ⇡ (0.5))D(t+ k)
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Take k = t and recall that D(0) = 1, this holds if and only if
D(k)   ⇡ (0.5) + (1  ⇡ (0.5))D(2k)
or
D(k) D(2k)   ⇡ (0.5) (1 D(2k)) (A.10)
ButD is a decreasing function which is by 0. By the the monotone convergence theorem, lim
k!1
D(k) D(2k) =
0, while the right hand side of equation (A.10) is bounded below by
⇡ (0.5)
⇣
1  lim
k!1
D(2k)
⌘
> 0.
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A.1.10. RATL with Consumption Smoothing
In this appendix, we consider the choice between safe and risky time lotteries when the decision maker can
freely save and borrow. While the main benchmark is the Discounted Expected Utility model (DEU), we
will consider the more general Epstein-Zin model (EZ) we discuss in Section 3. EZ coincides with DEU
when ↵ = ⇢.
We study a standard consumption-savings model with no liquidity constraints. The decision maker allocates
income between consumption and a riskless asset that pays a constant interest rate r. Let D ⌘ 11+r > 0
denote the market discount rate. In period t, the decision maker earns an income Wt. Let W ⌘P1t=0DtWt
denote the net present value of lifetime income (in the absence of the time lottery). For existence, we assume
that   < D1 ⇢, which always holds if ⇢   1.
As in the text, the decision maker faces a choice between a time lottery that pays $x in period t with
certainty (“safe lottery”) and a lottery that pays $x at either t  1 or t+ 1 with equal probabilities (“risky
lottery”). We will determine the qualitative and quantitative ability of this model to reconcile a preference
for the safe lottery. Our qualitative result states that the safe lottery is preferred if people are su ciently
risk averse and, moreover, as the prize decreases, the amount of risk aversion needed to make someone prefer
the safe lottery goes to infinity. More precisely:
Proposition A.1.3 There exists a unique ↵¯x,D,W > 1 such that the safe time lottery is preferred if and
only if ↵ > ↵¯x,D,W . Moreover, limx&0 ↵¯x,D,W = +1.
Proof It is helpful to consider the utility of deterministic streams of payments first. With deterministic
incomes, the optimal consumption solves the following program:
max{Ct}
⇥
(1   )P1t=0  tC1 ⇢t ⇤ 11 ⇢
subject to
P
DtCt = W
.
A variational argument establishes the following necessary optimality condition:
Ct = W
⇣
1 D1  1⇢   1⇢
⌘✓  
D
◆ t
⇢
. (A.11)
Therefore, the utility from a deterministic stream of payments with net present value W is
V (W) ⌘
⇢
(1   )P1t=0  t ⇣W ⇣1 D1  1⇢   1⇢ ⌘    D   t⇢ ⌘1 ⇢  11 ⇢
= W
⇣
1 D1  1⇢   1⇢
⌘n
(1   )
hP1
t=0
 
 
D1 ⇢
  t
⇢
io 1
1 ⇢
.
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Notice that this expression is finite if and only if   < D1 ⇢, which we assumed to be the case.
Recall that the safe time lottery pays x in period t and the risky lottery that pays x at either t  1 or t+1.
By dynamic consistency, the choice between these lotteries does not depend on t. For notational simplicity,
we therefore set t = 2. The utility from the safe lottery is
V (W +Dx) = (W +D )
⇣
1 D1  1⇢   1⇢
⌘24 1   
1     
D1 ⇢
  1
⇢
35 11 ⇢ .
The utility from the risky lottery is
(
[V(W + x)]1 ↵ + ⇥V(W +D2x)⇤1 ↵
2
) 1
1 ↵
=
⇣
1 D1  1⇢   1⇢
⌘24 1   
1     
D1 ⇢
  1
⇢
35 11 ⇢ " (W + x)1 ↵ +  W +D2x 1 ↵
2
# 1
1 ↵
.
Comparing these two expressions, it follows that the risky lottery is preferred if and only if
"
(W + x)1 ↵ +  W +D2x 1 ↵
2
# 1
1 ↵
 W +Dx. (A.12)
Notice that this condition relies only on risk aversion, not on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
That is, disentangling IES from risk aversion clarifies that only risk aversion matters for the choice between
the safe and the risky time lottery.
First, we claim that the risky lottery is always preferred when ↵ < 1. To see this, rewrite condition (A.12)
as ✓ W + x
W +Dx
◆⇠
+
✓W +D2x
W +Dx
◆⇠
  2,
where ⇠ ⌘ 1  ↵ 2 [0, 1]. The expression on the left is a convex function of ⇠. The result then follows from
the fact that, at ⇠ = 0, the inequality holds and that the expression on the left is increasing. Evaluating the
expression on the left at ⇠ = 0, gives
✓ W + x
W +Dx
◆0
+
✓W +D2x
W +Dx
◆0
= 2. (A.13)
The derivative of the expression on the left at ⇠ = 0 equals
ln
"
(W + x)
 
W +D2x
 
(W +Dx)2
#
  0,
where the inequality follows from standard algebraic manipulations.
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Next, let ↵ > 1 and rewrite condition (A.12) as
✓W +Dx
W + x
◆ 
+
✓ W +Dx
W +D2x
◆ 
 2,
where  ⌘ ↵   1 > 0. We claim that there exists a unique interior cuto↵ such that the inequality holds
if and only if  lies below this cuto↵. Notice that the expression on the left is again a convex function  .
Moreover, it equals 2 at  = 0 and it converges to +1 as ⇠ !1. It su ces to show that the derivative at
zero is negative. The derivative of the expression on the left  = 0 is
ln
✓
(W +Dx)2
(W + x) (W +D2x)
◆
,
which can be shown to be negative.
To show that limx!0 ↵¯x,D,W = +1, notice that, at x = 0, both sides of (A.13) equal 2. Moreover, tedious
algebra establishes that the derivative of the the expression on the left of (A.13) with respect to x evaluated
at 0 is negative.
Next, we turn to the quantitative ability of this model to generate a preference for the safe time lottery.
Since the condition for the safe lottery to be chosen depends on the risk aversion parameter but not on the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, all results also hold for DEU.
Rationalizing a preference for the safe lottery requires either unreasonably high levels of risk aversion or
unreasonably low lifetime incomes. For example, with D = 0.9 and ↵ = 10 and a net present value of
lifetime income of one million dollars, a person would only prefer the safe lottery if the prize exceeded
$123,500!
Figure A.1.10 shows that this is a general pattern. It represents, for each lifetime income (horizontal axis),
the prize that would make the individual indi↵erent between the risky and the safe time lotteries. The risky
lottery is preferred if the prize lies below the depicted line, and the safe lottery is preferred if it lies above
it. For ↵ = 5, the risky lottery is preferred as long as the prize does not exceed 27.7% of the total lifetime
income (W). For ↵ = 10, the risky lottery is chosen as long as the prize does not exceed 12.3% of W. Even
for ↵ = 25, a high risk aversion coe cient, the risky lottery is chosen for any prize below 4.6% of W.
Thus, for moderate prizes (including any of the ones in our experiments) and reasonable risk aversion
parameters, EZ with smoothing predicts a preference for the risky lottery.
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Appendix Figure 1. Indi↵erence regions for risk
Total Lifetime Income ×10 6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Pr
ize
×10 6
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
α=5
α=10
α=15
α=20
Notes. Regions of indi↵erence between the safe and the risky time lotteries, with total lifetime incomes
W on the horizontal axis and prizes x on the vertical axis, for di↵erent coe cients of relative risk aversion
↵ (and discount parameter D = .9). The risky lottery is preferred at points below the line, and the safe
lottery is preferred at points above it.
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A.1.11. Additional Experimental Analysis
Table 31: Proportion of RATL subjects
Sample No Cert. Bias (12-13) No Cert. Bias (12-14)
Treatment Long Short Long Short
Question 1 67.50 55.00 62.50 54.17
Majority in Q1-5 68.75⇤ 50.00 63.89 47.22
MPL in Q10 47.50 51.90 45.83 50.00
MPL in Q11 54.43 48.10 56.94 48.61
Observations 80 80 72 72
Notes. Same as Table 28, including certainty bias measure from Questions 12 and 14 (see footnote 111).
Table 32: Probit Regressions: RATL and Atemporal Risk Aversion
Dep. Var. RATL Q.1 RATL Majority Q.1-5
Treatment Long Short Long Short
(Probit) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cert. Bias -.19 .18 -.21 .12
(-1.56) (1.20) (-1.71) (0.82)
Convexity 3.73⇤ -4.17 -.39 -10.60⇤⇤⇤
(1.68) (-1.25) (-0.19) (-2.83)
Constant .22 .40⇤⇤⇤ .25⇤ .19 .41⇤⇤ .37⇤⇤⇤ .15 .01
(1.35) (2.93) (1.67) (1.41) (2.50) (2.75) (1.02) (.09)
Pseudo-R2 .02 .02 .01 .01 .01 .03 .07 .01
Obs. 101 95 88 88 101 95 88 88
Notes. Same as Table 29. Each regression excludes one dependent variable.
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Table 33: Probit Regressions: RATL and Convexity and Certainty Bias
Dep. Var. RATL Q.10 RATL Q.11
Treatment Long Short Long Short
(Probit) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Convexity 3.63⇤ -1.59 1.13 -7.59⇤⇤
(1.73) (-2.83) (-0.53) (-2.20)
Cert. Bias -.06 .45⇤⇤⇤ .19⇤ .18
(-0.52) (2.84) (1.71) (1.23)
Constant -.29⇤ -.11 .13 .13 .12 .24⇤ .12 .18
(-1.79) (-.88) (.88) (.92) (0.75) (1.80) (.81) (1.23)
Pseudo-R2 .02 .01 .01 .07 .01 .02 .04 .01
Obs. 101 95 87 87 101 95 87 87
Notes. Same as Table 29. Each regression excludes one dependent variable.
A.1.12. Chapter 3 Question Example
The following is an example of the questionnaire used in the experiment, in the Short treatment, followed
by the instructions used in the experiment. For a full set of questionnaires, please contact the author.
A.1.13. Questionnaire Part 1
QUESTIONNAIRE – PART I
Please indicate your lab id:
Please answer each of the following questions by checking the box of the preferred option.
If the question is selected for payment, you will get the payment specified above the question,
with a payment date based on your choice and, in some cases, on chance.
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Question 1
Payment: $20. Payment date:
Option A Option B
2 weeks 2 2 75% chance of 1 week
25% chance of 5 weeks
Question 2
Payment: $15. Payment date:
Option A Option B
3 weeks 2 2 50% chance of 1 week
50% chance of 5 weeks
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